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Full fathom five thy father lies; 
Of his bones are coral made; 
Those are pearls that were his eyes; 
Nothing of him that doth fade, 
But doth suffer a sea-change 
Into something rich and strange. 
Sea-nymphs hourly ring his knell: 
Ding-dong. 
Hark! now I hear them — Ding-dong, bell. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 The Sea Change 
In ‘The Tempest’ – Shakespeare’s last play – the Duke of Milan, Antonio, and his son, 
Ferdinand, sail the sea. But suddenly, they land in a storm. Their ship is wrecked, and both 
men strand on the same remote island, though separate from each other. Thereafter, the 
Duke’s son is led to believe that his father has drowned, by a spirit named Ariel, who sings 
the song of ‘Full Fatham Five’.1 The spirit tries to comfort Ferdinand: though his father is 
dead, he would now become part of the sea: his body would turn into coral, and his eyes into 
pearls. Thus, the sea would change him into something better, ‘rich and strange’.  
The transformation of the Duke’s body was thus made by the sea; and therefore 
Shakespeare named it a ‘sea-change’. It meant an unanticipated turnover, a sudden start of a 
gradual process over time. In this metamorphosis, the body’s form was retained, but the 
substance was replaced. In the end, though, the body would change ‘beyond recognition’. It 
would take on a resemblance to the new surroundings; the body would become part of the 
sea.
2
 Hence, a new word was invented. 
In the centuries after, ‘the sea-change’ term stopped being a direct quotation and 
turned into an idiom; a neologism that could be used in different texts and contexts. It 
occurred again in the literature of the nineteenth century, but has nowadays become part of 
common English. It is used in news and business discourse alike.
3
 In the twentieth century, 
‘sea change’ lost its necessary connection to the sea: nowadays it refers to any profound 
transformation, caused by any agency. Yet, the word maintained its core meaning: a complete, 
unexpected, but positive transformation.
4
 
 
1.2 Democracy: Then and Now 
The stand of this thesis is that the concept of ‘democracy’ underwent exactly such a 
tempestuous transformation, in the British parliament of the late nineteenth century. In the 
House of Commons of the 1860s and 1870s, at least, ‘democracy’ was despised by the MP’s: 
the word carried a strong negative connotation. No one wanted to have a democracy, and no 
                                               
1 The full play can be read on ‘The Tempest’, The Complete Works of William Shakespeare, 
http://shakespeare.mit.edu/tempest/full.html (accessed on November 14, 2012). 
2 W. Shakespeare, The Tempest (London 1999). 
3 B. Watson, ‘Buzzword of the Week: Sea Change’, Daily Finance, 
http://www.dailyfinance.com/2010/12/09/buzzword-of-the-week-sea-change (published on September 12, 2010; 
accessed on November 14, 2012). 
4 M. Quinion, ‘Sea Change’, World Wide Words, http://www.worldwidewords.org/qa/qa-sea1.htm (published on 
March 25, 2000; accessed on November 14, 2012). 
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one wanted to be a democrat. Gradual franchise extensions (1867, 1884) transformed this 
valuation. Yet it took the British parliament decades of debates, and three parliamentary 
reform acts, before the concept of ‘democracy’ was judged positively by most members of the 
House of Commons. It was only after the Third Reform Act, during the Irish Home Rule 
debates of 1886, that a new consensus was reached: that Great-Britain was a democracy, 
essentially ruled by ‘the people’. Twenty years before, during the Second Reform Act debates 
in 1866, such an utterance was unimaginable; it was perhaps desired by a few Radicals, but 
condemned by a broad majority. Hence, from 1866 to 1886, the meaning and value of the 
concept of ‘democracy’ underwent a complete, unexpected, but positive change. Therefore, it 
was a ‘sea change’.  
How can we explain this conceptual turnover, from an essentially negative to a 
predominantly positive valuation? And how did democracy’s meaning shift? Those are the 
two main questions that this thesis tries to answer. By doing this, we can considerably 
improve our contemporary understanding, and analyse our current appreciation, of 
democracy. Anno 2012, the slogan of democracy has become the most valid legitimization of 
all politics; there is hardly an alternative. The Arab spring countries are expected to become 
‘democracies’, Western newspapers assert,5 and the EU itself suffers from its democratic 
deficit.
6
 Time and again, democracy is the solution. In the late nineteenth century, however, it 
was a key problem. What were the arguments then, in favour and against? Why have we 
become a democracy? For an important part, we share and copy the meaning and value of 
‘democracy’ that originated in the late nineteenth century. If we study the start of this process, 
we can better understand how the present dogma of ‘democracy’s’ superiority originated, and 
learn why we think what we think, and say what we say. 
 
1.3 The British Lacuna 
The interest in this topic was first actuated by Professor in Dutch History, Henk te Velde of 
Leiden University, who in 2010 gave a class on populism in the Netherlands, and supervised a 
paper on ‘the dangers of democracy’, as perceived by Dutch parliamentarians in the early 
1890s.
7
 What did ‘democracy’ mean in the Netherlands’ political debate? After assisting in an 
                                               
5 C. Coughlin, ‘The Arab Spring was no prelude to democracy’, The Telegraph, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/9302719/The-Arab-Spring-was-no-prelude-to-
democracy.html (published on May 31, 2012; accessed on November 14, 2012). 
6 Author unknown, ‘An ever-deeper democratic deficit’, The Economist, 
http://www.economist.com/node/21555927 (accessed on November 14, 2012). 
7 J.W.P. van der Weele, ‘De dreiging van de democratie. Conservatief-liberale ideeën over ‘democratie’ tijdens 
de strijd om de Kieswet-Tak in het weekblad De Liberaal in 1894’ (Unpublished; Leiden 2011). 
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MA course on this very question, in which the class intensively studied the conceptual change 
of ‘democracy’ in Dutch political debate (19th-21th century), we asked ourselves how 
distinctive the Dutch developments were. To answer this question, the perspective was shifted 
to another country, across the North Sea: to Great-Britain. 
Great-Britain proved interesting, above all, because – different from the neighbouring 
countries of Germany and France – it has no tradition of ‘conceptual history’ at all. Never was 
a diachronic, British history of the word ‘democracy’ written. This is deplorable, for the 
concept is so salient in the twenty-first century world, with English’ status as a world 
language. Only one entry by Dr Robert Saunders (Oxford University) comes close. He 
analysed the concept’s meaning during the Second Reform Bill debates, yet stopped at the 
year 1867.
8
 His perspective was thus synchronic. As Saunders admits, ‘we still lack an 
intellectual history of the very word ‘democracy’’.9 This thesis hopes to contribute to this 
peculiar knowledge lacuna in European, conceptual history. 
This thesis thus focuses solely on Great-Britain. Although a comparison with a 
different country, such as the Netherlands, has been considered for its interesting potential, it 
proved impossible for the scope of this thesis. Not only would it result in a thesis twice as 
thick, and twice as late, it would also impair the depth of the analysis and the scope for 
political context and internal explanations. By choosing for a thorough, synchronic analysis of 
individual speech acts, a shallow and nugatory comparison was prevented. Thus, this thesis 
can be perceived as a stand-alone case study, within European history. It may be read, though, 
beside Te Velde’s recent work on 'democracy’ in the Netherlands, to obtain a comparative 
overview.
10
 
  
1.4 Source material 
The thesis’ main aim remains to better understand the history of democracy in Great-Britain 
itself. To be more specific: the history of the concept in the parliamentary discourse of the 
House of Commons between 1866 and 1886. Due to a major digitisation programme, which 
finished in 2008,
11
 it has been possible to compose a corpus, consisting of all the 
                                               
8 R. Saunders, Democracy and the Vote in British Politics. 1848-1867: The Making of the Second Reform Act 
(Oxford 2011) 9-13. 
9 R. Saunders, ‘Rethinking British Democracy’ on Wikidot, http://robertsaunders.wikidot.com/democracy-
project (published on January 18, 2011; accessed on November 14, 2012). 
10 H. te Velde, ‘De domesticatie van democratie in Nederland. Democratie als strijdbegrip van de negentiende 
eeuw tot 1945’, BMGN. Low Countries Historical Review Vol 127 No 2 (2012) 3-27. 
11 C. Adams, ‘The Hansard Digitisation Project’ in New Statesman, http://www.newstatesman.com/blogs/new-
media-awards/2008/06/government-hansard-project-web (published on June 9, 2008; accessed on November 14, 
2012). 
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parliamentary speeches in which the word ‘democracy’ occurred at least once. Indeed, the 
primary source material is limited to the parliamentary debates of the Lower House, for this 
was the determinant arena in which the reform question was contested. At Westminster, the 
actual decisions were made. Although very important discussions on reform and democracy 
started, indeed, outside parliament – particularly by philosophical radicals in the 1860s – it 
was the national parliament that held the key to constitutional change. For this reason, it is 
worth assessing the changing language within this one demarcated domain: the House of 
Commons. 
We must, however, keep in mind that this House, as a stage of debate, was not 
‘radical’ at all. It was a ‘rear-guard’, rather than an ‘avant-garde’ of ideas. Positive values of 
‘democracy’, for example, were not first introduced into politics, and then into public opinion, 
but exactly the other way around. Radical pamphlets and brochures preceded the 
parliamentary records in the innovation of political legitimization. Hence, the discourse of the 
national parliament was not representative at all of the language living in society. And 
similarly, the thoughts of parliamentary debate were not innovative at all. At the most, 
parliamentary language formed a ‘middle range’ discourse; continuously lagging behind the 
innovative challenges uttered in the press.
12
 However, for both pragmatic and eclectic reasons, 
no extra-parliamentary sources, such as newspapers and brochures, were included in this 
study. Though these are often sources for conceptual histories,
13
 it would impair the 
uniformity and the impartiality of the corpus.  
Subsequently, the source material fully consists of the digitised Hansard records. 
Hundreds of speech acts have been analysed and arranged thoroughly. To be able to (re-
)arrange the many speech acts conveniently, each utterance was labelled, according to the 
speaker, date, subject, line of reasoning, related concepts, and finally the definition and 
valuation of ‘democracy’. In this way, not only what the concept meant, is portrayed, but also 
how it was used. This question is the most interesting, for it does not only ask about the 
concept’s definition, but also about the values it contained, the feelings it brought about and 
the emotional force it yielded. ‘Democracy’ was a slogan often used as a weapon, and its 
rhetorical value thus cannot be ignored. Much attention is therefore paid to actual quotes, to 
illustrate its real use. Moreover, by explaining what it meant, we will touch upon the 
                                               
12 This argument was made by Emeritus Professor of Politics Michael Freeden, in a private interview on the 
research plans of this thesis (Oxford, March 13, 2012). 
13 M. Richter, The History of Political and Social Concepts. A Critical Introduction (Oxford 1995) 39. 
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arguments and metaphors, so that we learn much as well about the how and why: the 
parliamentarian’s strategies. 
Despite the efficient organization of the sources, beforehand, no particular distinction 
was made between different parties or groups within the House. This choice was made on 
purpose, as the principal aim was to see how the concept was used ‘in parliament’, and to 
judge how individual actors responded to each other’s language. In the parliamentary 
discourse of the nineteenth century, the political landscape consisted not simply of Liberals 
versus Conservatives, or Whigs versus Radicals. Instead, the Lower House was generally 
comprised of individual men, with their own individual behaviour, values, and strategies. 
Every speech act was therefore viewed upon itself, in relation to the others in the debate, for 
after all; individual men of each party met each other in the debating chamber. Conceptual 
change did not stop at party boundaries. Their language use, thus, should not be 
oversimplified, by stressing party lines. 
Of course, some background information on every politician has been added to the 
narrative, such as professions and party affiliations, yet this data formed not the start of the 
research. This information has been added between brackets, every time a new MP is 
introduced. All the displayed names are the original first and family names, and not the noble 
names and titles, as often displayed in the Hansard Records. This was done on purpose, 
because often noble titles changed over time: Lord Robert Cecil, for example, was first 
referred to as Viscount Cranborne and later as the Marquis of Salisbury.
14
 To prevent 
confusion only their original names are mentioned. For further information on specific 
politicians, one can look up their biographies in the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography: 
the exact links are given in the footnotes. And for a quick check on a member’s party 
affiliation, an alphabetical factsheet of quoted MP’s is added to the appendix. 
Besides the parliamentary primary sources and the biographical dictionary, frequent 
use was made of secondary literature; both to portray how the issue of parliamentary reform 
figured on the political agenda, and to explain the political innovations occurring in this 
period. Two handbooks in particular should be named; the introductory works written by the 
historians Ian Machin (Professor at Dundee) and Martin Pugh (Professor at Newcastle). 
Although their respective books on ‘the rise of democracy’ and ‘the making of modern British 
politics’ are no exhaustive nor ground-breaking publications, they offer pleasant overviews of 
factual information; as they summarize the non-disputed developments, as depicted in several 
                                               
14 Paul Smith, ‘Robert Cecil’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 
http://www.oxforddnb.com.ezproxy.leidenuniv.nl:2048/view/article/32339 (accessed on December 3, 2012). 
13 
 
recent monographs. For a quick reference, these two books proved very useful. However, for 
more in-depth information on specific themes, the reader is advised to read further, for 
example in the additional literature that is suggested in the footnotes. 
 
1.5 Three meanings, three parts 
Furthermore, much secondary literature was read for the second chapter of this thesis, named 
the ‘Theoretical framework’. This chapter first outlines the historiography of ‘conceptual 
histories’, before it explains the choice to associate to one of the three ‘schools’. The rest is of 
the thesis is ordered chronologically, in three parts. The first part covers the Second Reform 
Act debates, which took place from 1866 to 1867: in these two years, a clear consensus 
existed on democracy’s meaning and negative value. The next ten years, from 1868 to 1878, 
are depicted in part two. In this period, the concept became highly polarized: a second 
meaning emerged, and for the first time democracy’s meaning was challenged by various 
members, who conferred a positive valuation. After the Third Reform Act debates, which 
went on from 1878 to 1885, the positive valuation won the strife, so that after 1886 – during 
the Irish Home Rule debates – a new consensus could emerge. The first meaning, that of a 
‘distant form of government’ was now replaced by a third one: Great-Britain had become a 
democracy. In each of the three parts, ample space is devoted to changes in the political 
agenda, political relations, and political culture, to portray the context and to explain the 
causes of conceptual change.  
Despite all these dynamics, the term ‘democracy’ was continuously used with one 
aim: to convince the audience of a certain viewpoint. After all, that is what parliamentary 
debate is ultimately about. At least from 1866 to 1886, the concept was constantly part of a 
certain ‘mode of persuasion’. Nevertheless, ‘democracy’s’ exact aim and function differed in 
each of the three parts: it was first used to incite emotion, then to state the facts, and finally to 
legitimize positions. How these ‘persuasion modes’ functioned precisely is explained in each 
of the three separate conclusions, with the names of ‘Pathos’, ‘Logos’ and ‘Ethos’. Indeed, 
these concepts are derived from Ancient Greek, and were first described in Aristotle’s work 
on rhetorical advice. The narrative is built up rhetorically – according to an old Greek 
threefold. 
 
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: CONCEPTUAL HISTORY 
The study of the history of concepts has an interesting history itself: quite separate from each 
other scholars in two different countries developed their own research tradition in this field. 
14 
 
From the 1970s, historians in Germany developed their Begriffsgeschichte, as British 
academic worked on their history of ‘political discourse’. These two schools proceeded along 
‘parallel tracks’: they came close to each other, but they never intersected.15 They differed in 
origin, methodology and outcomes. In the two first paragraphs of this chapter, the main 
characteristics of the German and British schools will be discussed, while the third paragraph 
displays an interesting development occurring in the 1990s; a group of Anglo-American 
scholars presented a convergence of the best of both schools into a new discipline named 
‘critical conceptual history’. A close reflection on the theoretical premises of the three models 
offers methodological insights for use in this study. 
 
2.1 German ‘Begriffsgeschichte’ 
The Begriffsgeschichte school was the result of an immense research mission; the life work of 
a generation of German historians. They first developed their own theoretical justification and 
a clear methodology, and then built up a practical research project. This project started in 
1972 and finished only twenty-five years (!) later, in 1997, and was named the 
‘Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe. Historisches Lexicon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in 
Deutschland’.16 The enormously ambitious plan resulted in a monumental collection: seven 
volumes with – in sum – more than 9000 pages. It was a lexicon that analysed the 
‘fundamental concepts’ in history, with a focus specifically on social-political words in the 
German language: 122 Begriffe were discussed accordingly.
17
   
The central belief that the editors and authors of the GG shared, was the insistence on 
the connection of conceptual history (Begriffsgeschichte) with social history 
(Sozialgeschichte).
18
 In post-war West-Germany, social history was a relatively new and 
upcoming discipline, professed by younger scholars who challenged the ‘traditional’ forms of 
political and intellectual history and sought to synthesise the social sciences with historical 
research. History was viewed by them more as a framework of structures, than as a set of 
events. Social processes were the key subject to research, to understand how human action 
                                               
15 T. Ball, ‘Conceptual History and the History of Political Thought’, in: History of Concepts. Comparative 
Perspectives (Amsterdam 1998) 78. 
16 M. Richter, The History of Political and Social Concepts. A Critical Introduction (Oxford 1995) 27. 
In the rest of this thesis the Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe will be abbreviated as GG. 
17 I. Hampsher Monk, K. Tilmans and F. Van Vree, ‘A Comparative Perspective on Conceptual History – An 
Introduction’, in: History of Concepts. Comparative Perspectives (Amsterdam 1998) 1. 
18 R. Koselleck, ‘Begriffsgeschichte and Social History’ in: Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time, 
transl. Keith Tribe (New York 2004) 76. 
15 
 
was conditioned; the former focus on intentions and purposes of historical actors had been too 
narrow.
19
 The new ‘social historians’ thus focused on long-term structural transformations. 
The best example of the impact of this logic is the overarching hypothesis that the 
editors of the GG envisaged: the Sattelzeit hypothesis. The central idea behind the project was 
a postulate about the German road to modernity, which was thought to be distinct from the 
rest of Europe. Four long-term social processes formed the German modernisation: 
Verzeitlichung, Demokratisierung, Ideologisierbarkeit and Politisierung.
20
 The name of the 
hypothesis was chosen for its metaphor of the Sattel, literally a saddle, meaning the pass 
across a mountain range linking two valleys.
21
 It was the period between approximately 1750 
and 1850 that was seen as such a Sattel: a watershed, constituting the historical transition to 
modernity. This was the time in which the concepts, central to the political and social 
language of German-speaking Europe, changed the most: a linguistic process which intensely 
reflected and affected social transformations to modernity.
22
  
The German conceptual historians explained their methodological assumptions with 
the use of a few concepts derived from linguistics. The first is the distinction between 
semasiology and onomasiology. Semasiology means the study of all the different meanings of 
a term or concept, it is the first basic question a conceptual historian asks: ‘What did concept 
X mean?’. But asking only this question can never be enough, the German editors postulated: 
some historical phenomena may have been designated by several different concepts, or by a 
combination of concepts. If so, semasiologically following only one concept cannot give us 
satisfactory answers.
23
 
Therefore, the GG sought a combination with the onomasiological approach. 
Onomasiology stands for the opposite approach of semasiology: it means the study of all 
names or terms in a language for the same thing or concept.
24
 This second approach entails 
looking for related concepts and synonyms: which different words were being used to refer to 
the same one thing in reality, in a language at a specific time? Which other concepts 
correlated or overlapped with the specific concept under study? Another part of this linguistic 
strategy was the search for opposite or contrary concepts: what were the antonyms of a 
particular concept? By reflecting on all these related concepts, the historian could expose the 
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‘semantic field’ of a given time.25 By creating a web of related concepts, a better 
understanding of concepts and conceptual change could be gained. 
The second pair of methodological concepts, borrowed from the study of linguistics, 
was the distinction between the diachronic and synchronic aspects of a language. This 
dichotomy was based on the acknowledgement that languages change across time 
(diachrony), and yet have a definite structure at any point in time (synchrony).
26
 Synchrony 
thus meant the portrayal of the meaning of a concept, and the sketching of the semantic field, 
at a certain point in time. Diachrony meant the focus on linguistic change in the long run: 
tracing the changing meaning of concepts over time, and moreover, the addition of new 
concepts and the disappearance of older ones. The editors of the GG wanted to write a lexicon 
stressing the changing of meanings over time: therefore they alternated the synchronic with a 
diachronic perspective. Besides explaining what a concept meant in a certain time, the 
questions ‘when’, ‘where’ and ‘how’ this changed, were central parts of each entry in the 
GG.
27
 
Influenced by the approach of the Sozialgeschichte, the authors of the GG decided that 
for writing their ‘histories of concepts’ they should analyse a great variety of materials. 
Different from the traditional ‘histories of ideas’, not only texts by ‘major thinkers’ and 
philosophers should be included, but also material written by less known authors, for example 
documents originating from everyday life. A question of great importance to the authors of 
the German project was the degree of representativeness of the sources, and therefore much 
emphasis was placed on the need of critically weighing the evidence.
28
 The GG was to be 
more about the meaning of concepts in common language than about developments in 
intellectual thought: only this way conceptual change could be connected to social 
transformations.
29
  
Therefore, the authors aimed at a range of sources ‘unusually broad in range, 
discrepant in origin and appeal, and extending to as many social formations as the sources 
permit’.30 Besides utilizing the work of famous thinkers, information was to be gathered from 
newspapers, journals, pamphlets, reports and speeches in assemblies; in documents 
originating in governmental, administrative, and legal bureaucracies, and in memoires, 
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correspondence, and diaries. Other praised sources included dictionaries, encyclopaedias, 
handbooks and thesauri.
31
  
 
2.2 British ‘Political Discourse’  
At the same time as the German scholars worked on their Begriffsgeschichte project, their 
colleagues in Great-Britain occupied themselves with a somewhat related but different type of 
research. From the 1970s on they developed further on the traditional discipline of the history 
of ideas – the study of political thought and classical political writings – to create the history 
of ‘Political Discourse’.32 Different from their continental counterparts, they did not proceed 
encyclopaedic and instead worked quite selectively, and, for the most part, individually. The 
University of Cambridge formed the centre of this new discipline, where the three historians 
John Dunn, John Pocock and Quentin Skinner came to be known as the ‘Cambridge school’.33  
These scholars stressed the need to study the ‘political discourse’ that historians 
encounter while studying historical texts: the ‘languages’ that historical actors used to express 
their political ideas. With ‘language’ they did not mean the natural languages such modern 
English, but instead a specific sub-language which comprised ‘shared conceptions of the 
world, shared manners and values, shared resources and expectations and procedures for 
speech and thought’ through which ‘communities are in fact defined and constituted’.34 It 
meant the language spoken in a particular discipline, domain, sphere or sub-community.
35
 
These ‘sub-languages’ were often referred to as ‘discourses’. 
When can something be named a discourse; when is it not simply a political style? 
Pocock argued we need to search for modes of speech ‘stable enough to be available for the 
use of more than one discussant and to present the character of games defined by a structure 
of rules for more than one player’.36 From this explanation we can conclude that the sub 
community of a parliament is a good example of a possible research subject within this 
discipline. The relatively closed environment of a parliament, as an arena with its own ‘game 
rules’ and ‘language customs’ makes a good fit. It seems Pocock thought the same thing, as 
he himself wrote elaborately on the history of ‘Whig political discourse’.37  
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In studying ‘discourses’, the historical dimension is very important: all language-use 
has taken time to form, and is a reflection of the recognized values or ways of thinking of a 
certain period. But norms and values change over time, and therefore a constant struggle 
dominates political speech: historical actors continuously explore the tension between 
established linguistic usages and the practical ‘need’ to use words in new ways. The language 
one uses is thus first constrained by the ‘context’: the norms and values present in a certain 
time, the political environment and the society at large. It is the historians’ task to connect 
changes in these areas with changes in the use of the language in political discourse, for in the 
context one can find the causes for linguistic innovation. Each conceptual study thus goes in 
two directions: first towards the ‘political context’ and then towards individual, strategic 
speech acts. 
The former is studied because, as Pocock stressed, ‘to attain any knowledge of the 
linguistic innovation the researcher needs to have knowledge of the political context.
38
 When 
the structures of society, the rules of politics or certain norms and values change, the actors 
live through ‘new experiences’, as Pocock calls them, to which they have to react, in deeds 
and in words. The historian will therefore ‘look for indications that words were being used in 
new ways as the result of new experiences’;39 and in doing this he will have to work towards 
what he sees as new elements in their experience.
40
 The ‘political context’ thus yielded new 
experiences, and so influenced the arguments and words the politicians of the past deployed in 
their debates. What political change triggered them to use innovative language?
41
 
From here Pocock moves to a second level, that of identifiable, individual historical 
actors, and the strategic ‘moves’ they made in saying what they said. This is also where 
Skinner’s repeated focus on ‘intentions’ springs up: we need to know what a political actor 
‘was doing’ when he said or wrote something, and when he expressed himself in a political 
debate. What case did he desire to argue? What action or desire did he want to legitimate or 
delegitimize?
42
 What practical situation was he in? This practical situation will include 
pressures, constraints, and encouragements the actor was under or perceived himself as being 
under; the historian thus has to consider both personal characteristics as political informal 
rules and relations.  
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Why does anyone say what they say? Pocock explains that each actor will ‘present 
information selectively as relevant to the conduct and character of politics, and […] will 
encourage the definition of political problems and values in certain ways and not in others’.43 
Politicians will generally choose their words as to fit the common language rules that are 
accepted in a certain discourse, but also try to frame their own values and arguments as 
effective as possible. Obviously, this leads to the simultaneous employment of speech acts 
favouring the utterance of contrary propositions. Actors manoeuvre strategically and use 
language for their own benefit, and this consequently leads to disagreement about the 
meaning of certain concepts. Here Pocock arrives at Walter Gallie’s renowned term of the 
‘essentially contested concepts’, and concludes that political language is by its nature 
ambivalent.
44
  
Thus, historical actors often disagree about the language that they use. As we saw, 
when conceptual change takes place, others step up and comment critically on the chosen 
words, and reflect on it. These types of discussions, labelled as ‘second-order languages’, are 
very useful for the historian, for they are the moments that explicate the diverse opinions on 
conceptual change. According to Pocock, the historian should look ‘for ways in which [a 
speech act] may have rearranged, or sought to rearrange, the possibilities open to the author 
and his co-users of language’. Stumbling upon ‘second order languages’ can help in pursuing 
this aim, because exactly these moments can shed a light on how individual speech acts 
affected other users of the language. Hence, they show how speech acts influenced the 
discourse.
45
  
To discover precisely why actors said something new is not an easy task, but Pocock 
emphasized the possibility to at least construct certain hypotheses. He described the sources 
and the procedure: ‘From the texts they wrote, from our knowledge of the language they used, 
the communities of debate to which they belonged, the programs of action that were put into 
effect, and the history of the period at large, it is often possible to formulate hypotheses 
concerning the necessities they were under and the strategies they desired to carry out […].’  
The historian who wants to explain conceptual change has to reflect on the linguistic 
strategies of individuals, and perceive these as ‘necessary’ reactions to changes in the societal 
or political context. The British scholars thus did not neglect the social context, but started 
their research from the identifiable individual actor.  
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2.3 ‘Critical Conceptual History’ 
As we saw, the German and British schools of thought, while both trying to connect the 
history of language with the history of politics, differed quite strongly from each other. 
German historians had a background in social history, and thus looked for explanations in 
long-term social structures, while the British advanced on their interest in the history of ideas, 
and sought to explain linguistic change by pointing towards identifiable historical actors. Not 
a diachronic but a synchronic narrative was their focal point. And as the Geschichtliche 
Grundbegriffe yielded a conceptual lexicon, to prove the practical outcomes of its 
methodology, the Cambridge scholars questioned the relevance of this approach. For Pocock, 
language was about the interaction of multiple concepts in a certain delineated context, and to 
him the German narratives of isolated concepts over a few centuries made it look as if these 
words had a life of their own. By criticizing its theoretical premises, the British denied the 
utility of such a ‘history of concepts’ and instead proposed a ´history of discourse´. The two 
schools never integrated or converged.
46
 
Instead, the Anglo-Saxon scholars produced a number of theoretical articles, which 
seem very useful as well for any historian trying to write a (synchronic!) history of a concept. 
Especially Pocock’s article on ‘political discourse’ presented a clear methodology, as he 
practically discussed what the historian’s task should be. The explanations he suggested for 
finding the causes of linguistic change are just as applicable to conceptual change. It can be 
argued that a history of a concept in a certain delineated time is in fact an essential part of a 
history of discourse, as any discourse simply consists of numerous words and (key) concepts. 
It appears that the distance between the German and British schools of thought might be less 
unbridgeable than the Bielefeld and Cambridge scholars thought themselves, and although 
vast differences remain, it seems that the development of an ‘Anglo-Saxon conceptual 
history’ might be possible after all. 
This conclusion was, at least, drawn, at the end of the 1980s, by numerous historians 
active in the Anglo-Saxon world. Led by the American editors James Farr and Terence Ball, a 
group of British and American scholars started an initiative to explore the possibilities of an 
Anglo-Saxon conceptual history. As they advanced on the ‘political discourse’ tradition, the 
academics now acknowledged the relevance of ‘conceptual history’. Until then, English 
conceptual histories had been a rarity; the volume Political Innovation and Conceptual 
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Change was the first in its kind. Sixteen entries were written about the use of various key 
concepts in the English language, of which two came from John Dunn and Quentin Skinner.
47
 
Pocock, however, resisted any such rapprochement to Begriffsgeschichte.
48
  
The American academic Terence Ball proved to be the main advocate of this 
discipline, which he named ‘critical conceptual history’, as he defended it in various 
publications.
49
 He repeatedly stressed the similarities between the German and the British 
schools of thought. ‘Both are interested in the linguistic limitations and political possibilities 
inherent in historically situated vocabularies. Both are, accordingly, concerned with the 
linguistic dimensions of political conflict’.50 Nevertheless, it soon becomes clear, that he leans 
more towards the Anglophone school.  
He proceeds, for example, from the starting point of the ‘political discourse’. Concepts 
are the defining features, the building blocks, of any discourse, and the task of the historian 
should be to track how words and languages changed in the past.
51
 The ways in which any 
actor can use and change language is not unlimited, it is constrained by a ‘particular tradition’, 
a discourse of – for example – ‘republicanism’ or ‘Liberalism’. The common values and rules 
in such a sub-language set the borders within which conceptual change can occur. The critical 
conceptual historian must therefore always use the framework of a certain political discourse: 
the language that is used within a particular community.  
The aim in this discipline should be to chart the contestation and innovation of the 
concepts used by politicians in the past. According to Ball there is a causal link between these 
two processes: when political agents take issue with their opponents’ and/or audience’s 
understanding of a concept, they challenge its meaning.
52
 This way a conceptual change is 
brought forward; innovation follows upon contestation. The historian should wonder how and 
why these changes came about: who did this; for what reasons, and with what rhetorical 
strategies? Any conceptual change must be traced to the problems perceived by particular 
historical agents in particular political situations.
53
 It thus becomes clear that Ball focuses on 
the language-use of identifiable actors. 
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Such ‘language traditions’ are, as Ball explains, challenged in political conflicts: 
concepts are ‘weapons of war, tools of persuasion and legitimation, badges of identity and 
solidarity’.54 Political actions, including those that alter of extend the meaning of political 
concepts, are intentional; they attempt to do something, to bring something about.
55
 The use 
of concepts is thus strategic, and to understand how they are used, the researcher should direct 
his attention to the political contests and arguments in which the concept under study appears. 
Hence, the historian should dive into political debates, to see in what ways the linguistic 
innovation occurred. How were political problems framed, with what arguments and with 
which metaphors or analogies?
56
 Key words are used in debates to perform particular kinds of 
action, and it is the historian’s task to reconstruct these strategies.  
It is necessary to remember that conceptual change, as well as political innovation, 
often occurs ‘piecemeal and by way of a rather ragged process’. It comes about through 
debate, dispute, conceptual contestation and partisan bickering.
57
 In choosing their words, 
actors always try to present themselves as positive as possible while reflecting negatively on 
their political opponents. In this process, however, the politicians of the past were also 
constrained by the tastes and standards of the audience at which they aimed. How far can you 
go? In political debates, Ball emphasized, the audience is the referee who judges whether an 
action is still intelligible and legitimate.
58
 The critical conceptual historian should thus focus 
on both the rhetorical strategies of the individual innovator as well as on the practical 
possibilities offered by the language conventions and the boundaries set by the audience. 
 
2.4 Valuable elements 
A few central ideas from both the German and British schools of thought offer practical value 
for this thesis. The German starting point of asking what a certain concept meant in the past 
overlaps with the aim of this study. Moreover, its alternation of semasiology and 
onomasiology, and its attention to creating ‘semantic webs’ to explain a concepts meaning,  
present practical possibilities, as well as its use of both diachrony and synchrony. However, 
the German focus on the representativeness of sources and its background in social history do 
not seem to fit well with the limited sources chosen for this thesis and its emphasis on the 
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development of political thought among political elites. Not social structures but political 
conflicts should be in the centre of this study. 
In this respect, the British discipline of ‘political discourse’ forms a better point of 
departure. The Cambridge scholars’ emphasis on identifiable individuals, concrete rhetorical 
strategies and personal intentions legitimizes the value of closely reading parliamentary 
debates: here one can find why and how concepts were actually used in political arguments. 
The notion of ‘essentially contested concepts’ helps to understand conceptual change, while 
the notion of ‘second order languages’ helps us to locate this process. More importantly, 
Pocock’s suggestion that historians should explain linguistic change from the political 
context, and the individual experiences of politicians in the past, will prove very useful. 
The most beneficial and promising starting point for this thesis however, must be 
Ball’s convergence, as offered in his method of ‘critical conceptual history’. The Anglo-
Saxon focus on identifiable actors yields the possibility to reason from the sources, and of 
explaining conceptual change by closely reading parliamentary debates. Not vague and large 
hypotheses of long-term social processes but tangible and demonstrable speech acts are 
designated to account for the changing uses of language. The view of language as the result of 
rhetorical strategies has convincingly been stated by the British and American scholars: words 
are used as weapons and the historian should wonder what strategies the politicians of the past 
possessed. Ball makes credible that it is in the actual contestation of concepts in debates, 
occurring within a certain discourse, that linguistic innovation takes place. His 
methodological insights offer a feasible research map, as they correspond directly to the aim 
and sources of this thesis. 
 
PART I: THE SECOND REFORM ACT DEBATES (1866-1867)  
 
3. THE CORE MEANING: DISTANT FORM OF GOVERNMENT 
 
3.1 Reform on the agenda (1832-1867) 
 
3.1.1 After the First Reform Act (1830s-1840s) 
Histories of parliamentary reform usually start in the year 1832. This was the year of the 
Great Reform Act: the first widespread reconstruction of parliamentary representation since 
24 
 
several centuries.
59
 Small, ‘rotten’ boroughs were disfranchised, new larger town received 
parliamentary seats, and the vote was extended to parts of the middle classes. The effects, 
however, were still very limited: the vote rested firmly on property and privilege. This was in 
accordance with the initiator’s desideratum. The aim was not to change the constitution, nor 
to democratize the country. The Reform Bill instead intended to reinforce the existing 
political system of deference towards the aristocracy. They reformed to maintain.
60
 
While in 1832, by most politicians, the Reform Act was judged as a ‘final settlement’, 
in the following two decades an increasing number of MP’s perceived a need for further 
reform.
61
 Throughout the 1830s and 1840s Radicals made repeated, but futile, efforts in the 
House, to extend the franchise, to introduce the secret ballot, and to stop electoral bribery. All 
such proposals were defeated, for a majority opposition existed of many Liberal MP’s and 
almost all Conservative ones. Many sitting MP’s were themselves involved in electoral 
bribery and were hostile to broader popular influence.
62
 They rather maintained the status quo. 
While inside parliament plans for further electoral reform were thwarted, outside parliament 
they gained support. The Chartist movement, a strong, middle class pressure group, 
campaigned for reform from the late 1830s until the late 1840s. Their demands, however, 
were ignored by the government and had only few supporters in parliament; their ‘Six Points 
of the People’s Charter’ was for most politicians too extreme.63  
 
3.1.2 Failed governmental proposals (1850s) 
From the 1850s, however, after the Chartist movement had faded away, parliamentary interest 
in electoral reform was slowly resuscitated. A few Liberal and Conservative politicians now 
opened their eyes for electoral change. Upcoming politicians such as John Russell and 
Benjamin Disraeli started to realise the potential benefits for their own party: appealing to a 
broader public might win them votes and could also strengthen the divided parties. Both 
parties were rather weak in the Commons: the Liberals in cohesion (landed Whigs on the one 
hand and urban Radicals on the other) and the Conservatives in seats. Perhaps a moderate 
reform carried out by them could increase their electoral support.
64
 Their interest was thus 
largely party-political.  
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But instead of strengthening each party, reform divided both. The two parties were 
dominated by aristocrats, who opposed reform, fearing it would reduce the power of the 
landed interest. Party leaders were divided as well: while Russell enthusiastically defended 
parliamentary reform, his fellow Liberal Palmerston strongly opposed it. And while Disraeli 
continuously tried to persuade Derby that the Conservatives should press for Reform, as 
means to an electoral boost, the latter was not so confident.
65
 Throughout the 1850s, several 
members of both parties introduced moderate franchise extension and redistribution plans, but 
all failed because of internal disagreement. For many MP’s reform seemed either too extreme, 
or unnecessary: why change what was good? 
The idea that reform was unnecessary was concluded from the lack of public agitation. 
Strikingly, while the House started debating reform, outside parliament interest in electoral 
changes had declined. Therefore Russell complained that ‘the apathy of the country was 
undeniable’, after his reform proposal of 1860 was defeated.66 He blamed the lack of public 
agitation: without the help of the public it was impossible to pass reform. Thus, while in the 
1830s and 1840s the public desired reform, but parliament did not; in the 1850s and 1860s the 
situation was fully reversed. Now parliamentarians sought to reform, but could not convince a 
majority, without a cry from the people.  
 
3.1.3 Towards the Second Reform Act (1860s) 
This stalemate situation ended in the middle of the 1860s. In 1864 the Reform Union was 
founded, a mainly middle-class organization, led by the Radical politician John Bright, that 
campaigned for household suffrage and the secret ballot. One year later, the working classes 
organized themselves as well, in an association named the Reform League. Their demands 
were even higher: they called for general manhood suffrage.
67
 When one Radical MP, Edward 
Baines, introduced a measure in the Commons this year, to lower the qualification for the 
vote, the Liberal Chancellor of the Exchequer, William Gladstone (Liberal leader)
68
, was 
recorded saying: ‘every man who is not presumably incapacitated by some consideration of 
personal unfitness or of moral danger, is morally entitled to come within the pale of the 
Constitution’.69 This statement caused quite a stir: following this rule would open the way to 
manhood suffrage.  
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Manhood suffrage was, however, not what Gladstone wanted to introduce at all. His 
main aim was to demonstrate his faith in the respectability of the working classes; a limited 
reform measure might therefore be enough. Working class men such as artisans, shopkeepers, 
and factory workers now asked for the vote, in order to secure recognition as independent and 
respectable citizens, and Gladstone had felt the need to respond.
70
 The Liberal party, 
traditionally tied closely to urban community life, could no longer ignore such cries. As 
British historian Parry described the Liberal dilemma: ‘their political reluctance to be seen 
resisting Reform proposals should not be mistaken for a general enthusiasm for Reform’.71 To 
please the working men, a moderate gesture was necessary. 
Therefore, in 1866, Gladstone himself introduced a reform bill; albeit a fairly 
moderate one. The measure would not bring manhood suffrage, but would limit the 
enfranchisement to about 400,000 new voters: a group of skilled, ‘respectable’ working class 
men.
72
 For a majority of MP’s this measure went too far. Most Conservatives opposed it and 
the Liberals were divided: a combination of Whig aristocrats and Liberal middle class MP’s 
opposed the reform bill. They were led by Robert Lowe, a middle class intellectual who 
genuinely feared the measure: under his leadership they formed the ‘Cave of Adullam’: a 
gathering of dissidents, named by the Radical MP John Bright after one of the biblical stories 
in the Old Testament. 
73
 Subsequently these MP’s were named Adullamites. 
Together with the Conservatives these Adullamites soon destroyed the bill in the 
Commons: in Mid-June 1866, the Liberal ministry had to resign. It was replaced by a minority 
Conservative government.
74
 The bill was lost, but the Radicals showed their determination not 
to lose the current chance of reform. They redoubled their agitation in the country. With the 
help of the working-class Reform League the public pressure was built up, to keep the 
question afloat. With mass meetings, demonstrations and riots in London, the working classes 
made their desire for further reform heard, in a way comparable to the Chartist movement of 
twenty years before. This incited the new Conservative government to contemplate the 
question of reform.
75
 
Obviously, the Conservatives were aware of their minority position in the House. If 
the Liberal Party was able to reunite, the Conservatives would lose their position in the 
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government. Therefore, they needed to try and enhance their strength, while maintaining the 
divisions amongst Liberals. Proposing their own reform bill could help them: it might win 
them new votes, while conserving the Liberal rupture. Furthermore, it might transform 
popular agitation into popular support for Conservatism. To stay in power, they had to bring 
in their own bill.
76
 Soon Derby presented his broad proposal: male household suffrage in the 
boroughs. This measure considerably exceeded the bill of 1866, and would enfranchise a 
much larger group of working class men. This seemed to be no problem: only a handful of 
Conservatives protested and resigned.
77
  
Hence, the positions in the Commons had shifted completely within one year. While in 
1866 the Bill was defended by Liberals and Radicals, and opposed by Conservatives and 
Adullamites, only a year later the Liberals and Conservatives had switched places. In 1867, 
the Adullamites grumblingly joined Gladstone (against reform), while the Radicals joined the 
Conservative cause (for reform).
78
 This latter group was able to pass some amendments, 
which broadened the franchise even further. In this new situation the Conservative party 
triumphed. Despite severe criticism, the bill was accepted by a majority in the House in Mid-
July 1867.
79
 
The effect of this measure was the doubling of the electorate, to nearly two and a half 
million men.
80
 Most of these new household voters lived in large urban constituencies, though 
not typical Conservative strongholds! How could this measure then benefit the Conservative 
party? The large enfranchisement in the boroughs was neutralized by a limited redistribution 
of seats: the larger towns only received a few additional seats while many small boroughs 
remained in place. And for the counties – traditional Conservative constituencies – not much 
changed at all.
81
 The British district system made the 1867 reform bill, the ‘Second Reform 
Act’ a safe bet: admitting majorities of working men in a few large boroughs would not 
translate into a majority of working men in the House. 
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3.2 One slogan, diverse definitions 
 
3.2.1 Frequency and facts 
In the parliamentary reform debates of these last two years, 1866-7, which led up to the 
Second Reform Act, the word ‘democracy’ was very frequently mentioned in the House of 
Commons. Reform and democracy were inextricably linked: in most cases, when 
parliamentary reform was discussed, MP’s spoke of ‘democracy’. And thus, in 1866-7, the 
word was noted more than 300 times in the Hansard records. It was the determining slogan of 
the reform debates, the slogan used to discuss parliamentary reform. The statistics support this 
assertion, for in the year 1868, after reform had been accomplished, the word ‘democracy’ 
immediately left the House, with only seven appearances in the entire year. The exact 
frequency of our period can be found in the appendix, in table 1 and graph 3. 
After analysing these debates thoroughly, it becomes clear that there was in fact one 
narrative being told, over and over again, by dozens of different parliamentarians. This story 
consisted of three parts: the explanation of democracy’s meaning, its direct electoral results, 
and its consequences in the long run. By explaining the negative prospects of democracy the 
MP’s had one aim: to denounce the proposed parliamentary reform. Its meaning was clearly 
negative: democracy was a word of warning. The concept was repeatedly designated as the – 
direct or indirect – consequence of accepting the bill, and for that reason, the MP’s frequently 
elaborated on the precise meaning of this threat. The MP’s tried to prove that the bill was 
democratic, and that democracy was a dangerous thing. This you should not try nor risk.  
 
3.2.2 Reform leads to democracy 
In the debates of both 1866 and 1867 the importance of the reform bills was repeatedly 
stressed: the meaning and consequences of reform was regularly inflated to great heights. 
Now was a decisive moment: the acceptance or rejection of reform would form a breaking 
point in British history. Everything could change. By this logic, MP Christopher Griffith
82
 
attested in 1867: ‘The House found itself on the top of an inclined plane which led directly to 
the pit of democracy’.83 If reform was passed, then a process was started that could not be 
stopped: then Great-Britain would ultimately transform into a democracy. This argument of 
the ‘slippery slope’, essentially a sophism, was repeated frequently by several members. A 
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clever metaphor was invented by Alexander Beresford Hope (author and independent MP)
84
, 
who said that even a limited measure would open the ‘floodgates to democracy’.85  
Several similar metaphors were invented to propagate the notion of such a democratic 
pitfall. One of the words used to describe it was ‘progress’. Robert Cecil (Viscount 
Cranborne, Conservative)
86
, for example, worried about the forthcoming reform and said that 
this could never be a permanent settlement of the suffrage question, as the government had 
promised. The First Reform Act of 1832 was enacted with the same idea of ‘finality’ in mind, 
Cecil said, but that turned out to be false as well. ‘No sooner was it passed than politicians 
were found who urged a further extension of the franchise and a more rapid progress towards 
democracy.’87 Cecil looked at the past and predicted the future: ‘The same process will take 
place, be it through a period of few years or many, as has taken place between 1832 and the 
present time; and, if you accept that instance as your guide, it is certain that at a complete 
democracy you must arrive at last, and that, perhaps, within no very distant period.
88
 Reform 
would only lead to more reform, and to democracy in the end. 
Although the word ‘progress’ may sound as a positive valuation, this was clearly not 
the case. Most MP’s, including Cecil, chose neutral terms, such as ‘steps towards democracy’. 
As Cecil argued, the introduction of ‘yet another reduction of the franchise’ would only ‘make 
another step towards complete democracy’.89 And John Maguire (Irish newspaper proprietor 
and Liberal MP)
90
, for example, made his negative feelings clear, by arguing that ‘to make a 
step in the direction of democracy’ appeared to be ‘the strangest and wildest proposition that 
was ever broached by man’.91 Others chose negative frames such as ‘the inroads’92, ‘the 
onward march’93 or ‘the downward career’94 towards democracy. And Charles Newdegate 
even said that democracy was an ‘evil influence’ that ‘operated in an evil direction in a 
constitutional country.’95 Whatever words the parliamentarians chose, the message was the 
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same: if reform was accepted, the road towards democracy was opened. And once this process 
was started, no one knew whether it could still be stopped. 
 
3.2.3 Universal suffrage 
But what did democracy mean, exactly? An important element one should realise, is that it 
was viewed as a system: a form of government with particular characteristics. This meaning 
comes forward already in the first utterance of democracy from this period: a statement made 
in March 1866 by Matthew Marsh (Liberal Whig, backbencher)
96
. Marsh pointed towards 
Australia as an example of the failures of democracy, and said that ‘he hoped and trusted that 
England would not adopt a system which at the other side of the world had had such 
deplorable results’.97 Other parliamentarians made similar remarks and mentioned the United 
States of America and France as other examples of ‘democracies’.98  
So what kind of system was this, exactly? Many parliamentarians connected it to the 
suffrage system, as did Marsh, who mentioned that in Australia there had been a ‘large 
extension of the suffrage, combined with local self-government.’99 Democracy thus meant 
that a large part of the population had a direct say in politics, by either self-government or by 
the right to vote. The notion of self-government was however an exception; conventionally it 
was portrayed as a form of government based on the idea of representation of the people by 
delegates in a parliament. Thus, the only difference with the contemporary British system was 
the number of people allowed to vote. In a democracy the suffrage was wider than it currently 
was.  
In many cases, democracy was explained as universal suffrage. A speech given by 
Gladstone outside parliament, to a crowd in Liverpool, might have contributed to this 
meaning. As James Stanhope (Conservative)
100
 echoed, Gladstone had said that ‘if by 
democracy he meant liberty—if by democracy he meant the extension to each man in his own 
sphere of every privilege and of every franchise that he can exercise with advantage to 
himself and safety to the country, then I must say I do not see much to alarm me in the word 
'democracy.'’101 Stanhope was so appalled by this definition, that he described it as ‘the most 
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dangerous sentence he ever read’, ‘for the word "if" led either to no franchise at all or 
universal suffrage.’102 Gladstone’s prophecy of a system under which ‘each man’ could 
exercise the suffrage alarmed Stanhope, who concluded this ‘must lead to universal suffrage’: 
a dreadful prospect. 
Stanhope repeated this statement, for it reminded him of a similar statement made two 
years earlier, in the House of Commons, which had caused quite a stir. In 1864, Gladstone 
had said that ‘every person not presumably incapacitated by some consideration of personal 
unfitness or political danger was morally entitled to come within the pale of the 
Constitution.’103 This promise of suffrage extension, given by the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, had seemingly shocked many among the upper classes, and the new speech given 
at Liverpool was perceived by Stanhope as a ‘mere repetition’.104 The only difference was the 
fact that now, this extension of the suffrage to ‘every person’ was explained by Gladstone as 
the essence of democracy. 
During 1866-7, this perception of ‘democracy’ as a form of government with a 
universal suffrage, was reiterated numerous times. Often universal suffrage and democracy 
were named in one breath, as Henry Selwin (Conservative)
105
 did, who said that he would 
‘like to know how many steps there were thence to universal suffrage and democracy’.106 
Such remarks suggest the two concepts to be strongly connected. Sometimes this link was 
articulated even more explicitly, for example by George Bowyer (jurist and Liberal yet 
independent-minded MP)
107
, who believed ‘that no Member of that House would wish to see 
democracy, based on universal suffrage, triumphing’.108 Hence, universal suffrage was a 
substantial element of ‘democracy’. 
  
3.2.4 Extended suffrage 
Nevertheless, many other speeches make clear that in this period, universal suffrage was not a 
necessary element of the concept of democracy. Often, it was enough to talk about any 
extension of the suffrage – any deviation from the current system – to bring the term 
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‘democracy’ into the debate. Edward Bulwer (writer and Conservative politician)109, for 
example, opposed the Reform Bill of 1866, and said he did so because it promoted the 
democratic principle that ‘every working man [had] a right to a vote’.110 He rejected the idea 
of allowing working men to vote: accepting this principle would inevitably lead to 
democracy, for him a gruesome perspective. Charles Neate (scholar and Conservative Liberal 
MP)
111
 agreed with him, when during the 1867 debates, he stated that ‘he was not prepared 
for this measure of extensive democracy and household suffrage […] ; it would, in his 
opinion, be a very great mistake’.112 The bill, which indeed approximated household suffrage, 
at least in the boroughs, was thus rhetorically dismissed as a measure of ‘extensive 
democracy’. 
Hence, many MP’s portrayed ‘working men suffrage’, ‘household suffrage’, or 
‘manhood suffrage’, as ‘democratic’, to be able to criticize the reform bill. They loaded the 
concept with a meaning that was useful in the debates: a meaning that approximated the 
imminent reform measures. Therefore, ‘democracy’ was given several different meanings. 
There was no set definition for how wide the suffrage had to be, to be named ‘democratic’; 
the politicians flexibly changed their stance as they saw fit. Therefore, in the 1866-7 debates, 
the concept of democracy certainly did not necessarily mean a system with universal suffrage: 
an aspect we might today judge as a decisive element. Democracy primarily referred to the 
abandonment of the contemporary constitution, and the replacement of it by some sort of 
popular government. But what kind of rule a ‘democracy’ would be, exactly, no one was very 
sure. Although its general meaning was not very contested, reaching a consensus on its 
precise definition would be a difficult task.  
 
3.3 Alternative? An eye on the past 
 
3.3.1 A ‘mixed’ constitution 
The last paragraphs made very clear that ‘democracy’ as a form of government was 
conventionally perceived as a threat. It was something that the MP’s could imagine existing 
somewhere else, but not in the Great-Britain of that time. ‘Democracy’ was primarily very 
distant: it belonged to different countries, such as the United States and France, or to different 
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times, such as Greek Antiquity. Hence, the core meaning of ‘democracy’ was a distant form 
of government. But if this rapprochement of ‘democracy’ was the imminent threat, what 
alternative was offered? How should the British political system look like in the future? This 
latter question was, however, not answered directly: for the political system of the future, they 
only looked towards their own past: the ‘ancient’ British Constitution should be maintained. If 
there was to be any reform, many MP’s agreed, it should affirm the existing political system, 
and not change it. In this discourse, an important role was taken up by the British constitution, 
or more specifically: the idea of it as essentially a ‘mixed’ system.  
It was asserted that, over a period of centuries, Great Britain had developed a unique 
type of governance, which was both safe and stable, exactly because the monarchy, 
aristocracy and democracy ruled together and divided power in three parts. Logically, in this 
mix, the queen was the monarch, the House of Lords represented the aristocracy, and the 
House of Commons meant the democracy. It should be noted, though, that in this mix 
‘democracy’ only meant the representation of the interests of ‘the people’, and not the direct 
representation of all individuals, as we may read into it nowadays.
113
  
An unmixed democratic system, on the other hand, not restrained by the power of a 
monarch nor by the House of Lords, sounded perilous to almost all MP’s. To underline this 
doctrine, John Coleridge (baron, judge and Liberal MP)
114
 emphasized that ‘he was not, and 
never had been, the advocate of unmixed democracy’ although he admitted that ‘in all free 
Governments there must be a large mixture of the democratic element’.115 A bit of democracy 
was all right, but there should not be too much, was the broad consensus in 1866-7 discourse. 
The proposed reform bills were seen, or at least rhetorically framed, by many opponents, as a 
threat to the mixed constitution: it was argued that the old, trusted system was now swapped 
for a new, questionable form of government. Why give up on the proven success of the 
‘ancient constitution’?116 
Yet, as part of the mixed constitution, democracy was not a fearful thing, but simply a 
fair and just element of the constitution. As long as it was contained, or ‘clamped’ between 
the monarchical and aristocratic powers, there was no need to worry. In 1866-7, however, 
reform was imminent, and the ‘influence of democracy’ was increasing. If they ‘were not 
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wise in time’, democracy would sweep away ‘the institutions of this country’.117 Reform 
would admit ‘a large infusion of the democratic element into the electoral system of this 
country’118, Charles Russell (former army officer, Conservative MP)119 said. And according to 
the Liberal John Maguire, suffrage extension meant a ‘terrible influx of the democratic 
element’.120 This notion of an existing ‘democratic element’, as one of the valid powers in the 
British constitution, was well-established in parliamentary discourse. But now, from 1866 on, 
the mixed system was threatened by the growth of the democratic part. 
Robert Cecil shared in this fear, and slowly saw the mixed constitution crumble: ‘Our 
Constitution was monarchical; it was aristocratic; it had, also, a large tinge of democracy; but 
speaking practically, the monarchical principle has died. The aristocratic principle you are 
now sentencing to death; the democratic principle you propose to leave alone, unchecked by 
the elements which existed before […]’.121 In the previous century, the power of the monarch 
had, indeed, already declined, and Cecil feared that now the aristocracy was next. The Reform 
Bill of 1867 would leave them with the ‘democratic principle’; an irresponsible and 
unpredictable decision, he thought. Charles Adderley (baron and Conservative MP)
122
, joined 
in his fears, and concluded his concerns with a known expression: ‘Putting new wine into old 
bottles, would only result in the bursting of the bottles.’123 Obviously, democracy was the new 
wine, and the constitution the old bottle, which was about to burst. With a sense of emotion, 
the beloved constitution was placed against the criticized democracy.  
 
3.3.2 The idea of balance 
The central idea underlying this idea of a mixed constitution was a focus on ‘balance’. This 
concept, part of the political order, had a counterpart in the perception of the existing social 
dividing lines: a view of Great-Britain as essentially a class society. At least in late 1860’s 
parliamentary discourse, social-economic factors were frequently designated as the cause of 
the determining cleavages in society. In this view, the British country was divided into an 
upper, middle and lower class. Many parliamentarians showed a strong awareness of the 
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class-divided structure, and made clear they did not want anything to change. They mainly 
wanted to maintain the ‘balance’: in both politics and in society. 
 In this balanced system, the lower classes were almost fully excluded from any direct 
political power. In 1866, for example, only 18 per cent of all adults had the right to vote.
124
 In 
the logic of the mixed constitution, though, this formed no problem. A limited franchise was 
not incompatible with the current tenet of representation of ‘the people’. In fact, parliamentary 
representation was not about individual’s rights at all, but about the representation of 
communities.
125
 Every MP acted for his borough or county, it was said, and looked after all of 
the interests in this area. Therefore, there was no need at all for everyone to vote, it was 
argued: the interests of non-electors would be represented adequately by their leaders anyway. 
Indirectly, thus, all ‘the people’ were already represented in parliament.126 Although it was 
not a rule by the people, it certainly was a rule for the people, one could say.  
In the 1866-7 debates, this balanced situation was perceived to be under threat. If the 
reform bills of 1866-7 would extend the suffrage to large parts of the working classes, the 
perfect political balance would be dismantled. As Robert Cecil described it in 1867: ‘Last 
year I contended earnestly against allowing such an increase of the franchise as would, I 
thought, disturb the balance of classes’.127 The strict suffrage rules kept the necessary 
divisions of political power in its place; any change was thought to be hazardous. ‘Balance’ 
was the main concept with which both the mixed constitution and limited suffrage were 
defended.  
 
3.4 The rule of whom? 
 
3.4.1 Transfer of power 
So what did these parliamentarians actually fear for: what would happen if democracy was 
introduced? Or as Robert Cecil asked aloud: ‘What is it that we dread in democracy?’128 For 
him, the real problem of reform was not to take, in ordinary times, ‘our countrymen into our 
councils, or to see their feelings and wishes represented in this House. On one-half or three-
fourths of the questions that come before us, we know it is as desirable that their opinions 
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should be represented as those of any class in the community’. This sounded almost as the 
argumentation of an MP in favour of suffrage extension.  
But then Cecil showed his true face: ‘What we have to fear is that on particular 
subjects upon which classes are pitted against each other the balance of classes should be 
disturbed by the overwhelming power of the lower portion of the community, and that then 
you would have legislation of a kind which no wise man would approve.’.129 According to 
Cecil, in about one-fourth to one-half of the parliamentary issues, it would be ‘dangerous’ to 
include the lower classes into the Commons, for with their ‘overwhelming power’ they would 
‘disturb the balance’.130 
The imminent reform bill would thus not only be a widening of the suffrage, a sharing 
of political power with the working classes, but instead the effect would be the ‘handing over’ 
of all control. Edward Horsman (moderate Liberal)
131
 summed up the many questions, that the 
opponents of reform had asked in parliament over the last weeks: ‘What are the real 
principles, what are the aims, what are the claims to our confidence and support on the part of 
this new ruler whom Lord Russell seems determined to set over us? Do we adopt his 
principles? Do we endorse his ends?
132
 Parliamentary reform would bring a democracy: a 
transfer of political power to a ‘new ruler’. As Horsman explained it, no one knew what this 
would bring. 
 
3.4.2 Rule of ‘the people’ 
So did these parliamentarians, then, know exactly who this ‘new ruler’ would be? Over the 
two years of 1866-7, the meaning of ‘democracy’ was explained as the rule of several 
different matters. To start with, in many speeches it meant the ‘rule of the people’. A good 
example was given by the Conservative Charles Newdegate, who touched upon the subject of 
democracy and eloquently alternated the word with ‘the government of the people’. He said: 
‘My view of this country does not prove to me that, even under the most favourable 
circumstances, and they exist here, the Government of the people is a desirable event.’133 This 
definition, however, still leaves a great uncertainty: what did ‘the people’ mean? Did it 
literally mean all the individuals present in a certain country, only the middle classes, or 
perhaps only the working class people? 
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The latter explanation seems quite probable, at least in James Stanhope’s speech, from 
June 1866: ‘The Opposition side of the House might have to go farther than they would wish 
towards democracy. He, for one, warned the Government against introducing large bodies of 
the people’.134 Clearly, in this speech ‘the people’ stood for the working classes, who were yet 
to be introduced to the suffrage. Robert Lowe’s (Liberal, Adullamite leader)135 made a similar 
remark, when he talked about ‘the people’ as an uneducated group, of which he himself was 
certainly no part: ‘When you have once taught the people to entertain the notion of the 
individual rights of every citizen to share in the Government, and the doctrine of popular 
supremacy, you impose on yourselves the task of re-modelling the whole of your institutions, 
in reference to the principles that you have set up.’136 Thus, when democracy was explained 
as the ‘rule of the people’, this served to bolster the concept’s negative connotations.  
 
3.4.2 Tyranny of the majority 
This view of democracy as essentially the rule of the working classes was sometimes 
explicated more clearly in parliamentary discourse. Often it was preceded by an intermediate 
step, used by anti-reformers to construct their argument: the idea of democracy as ‘the 
representation of the majority’.137 This was one of the essential fears uttered in the 1866-7 
debates, often explained with the argument that if democracy was majority rule, every 
minority would easily be suppressed. And in contemporary British politics, much value was 
attached to minority rights. In a more practical sense, it was feared that an extended suffrage 
would soon place a majority of working class representatives in the Commons, simply 
because this class was the most numerous group in society. Democracy would thus end up 
soon in working class rule.  
Charles Newdegate explained his fears: ‘When the predominance of one party in a 
democracy has once been fairly established, there is no safety for those who differ with it by 
ever so slight a shade. The majority being overwhelming, all opposition is stifled. No man 
dares breathe a whisper against the prevailing sentiments, for the popular voice will bear no 
contradiction. Hence the suppression of wholesome advice, the concealment of useful 
truths.’138 If Britain became a democracy, the upper- and middle class could only form a 
minority in parliament, and would thus be easily suppressed by the lower-class majority. 
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Although they possessed the education, the intelligence and the political experience, they 
would no longer be listened to. The majority would simply enforce the popular wishes of the 
masses, and, as Newdegate suggested, might even silence deviating thoughts! Due to these 
fears, even Ralph Bernal (Advanced Liberal/Radical)
139
 described the ‘tyranny of the 
majority’ as the ‘greatest evil’ of a pure democracy’140. This became a popular slogan during 
the 1866-7 debates.  
Some other rhetorical slogans were connected to ‘democracy’ as well: it was either 
explained as the rule of ‘numbers’, ‘the masses’, or ‘the mob’.141 It was defined so regularly 
in these ways that William Baxter (author and Liberal MP)
142
, a member in favour of the 1866 
reform bill, became frustrated about ‘such expressions as ‘the “dominion of mere numbers"—
"the rule of the uneducated masses "—"the swamping of property and the transfer of power 
entirely to the lower orders”’. Baxter said ‘they had been made use of with a consistency and 
a levity which was most astonishing, considering the small foundation which they had in 
fact.’143 Such utterances were indeed made regularly in the 1866-7 debates, and it is clear that 
with the ‘masses’ these parliamentarians referred to the lower, working classes. Democracy 
would be their prospective rule. 
 
3.4.3 Suppression of minorities 
Democracy was thus the rule of the majority, in which minorities were suppressed. And in the 
parliamentarian’s class based discourse, the minority they were thinking of, was made up of 
themselves: the middle- and upper classes. They would be suppressed. It was for this reason 
that Alexander Beresford Hope attested that ‘Democracy is not literally the best form of 
government unless this weak side of it can be strengthened, unless it can he so organized that 
no class, not even the most numerous— (And they all knew that the working men formed the 
most numerous class in this country)— Shall be able to reduce all but itself to political 
insignificance, and direct the course of legislation and administration by its exclusive class 
interests’.144 Beresford Hope explained his objections against democracy clearly: the ‘weak 
side’ was that the numerous working classes could seize all political power, reduce every 
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other class to ‘political insignificance’ and then exclusively serve its own interests. Minorities 
would be ‘crushed’.145 
But not only would the minorities suffer, according to Robert Montagu 
(Conservative)
146
 giving the majorities ‘unchecked domination’ would lead to stagnation, and 
ultimately the ‘detriment of all’. ‘If any class obtained supreme power, not only would that 
class suffer because of the stagnation it induced, but every other class also would suffer 
indirectly; because the interests of each of these would be disregarded. Especially would that 
be the case if the class that had the supreme power was the lowest and the least educated of 
all.’147 If only one class ruled, and only looked after their own cause, in the end, every class 
would suffer. No one would benefit from such a system of rule, it would ‘ruin the country’.148 
 
3.4.4 Rule of the uneducated 
So why were the working classes deemed to be so incapable of ruling the country? Samuel 
Laing (author, railway executive, and Liberal MP)
149
 gave two reasons. He worried in 1866 
that, if there was to be any parliamentary reform, then ‘it should not be made in a manner 
which involved the inevitable preponderance of numbers over property and intelligence, and 
paved the way to a system of democracy.’150 It were exactly these two qualities: property and 
intelligence, that the ‘masses’ lacked, and that were thought of as decisive requirements for 
safe and sound government rule. Until then, Great-Britain had been governed by the ‘wealth 
and intellect’: elements now threatened by the democratic ‘principle of numbers’.151 
Democracy was thus explained as the blunt force of the many, and placed opposite of the 
qualities of the few. 
Repeatedly it was stated that the working classes were ‘uneducated’ and ‘ignorant’, 
and therefore incapable of wisely using their right to vote. Edward Bulwer was one of the 
sceptics. He sought to show that England of 1866 was not ready for a democracy, because of 
the lack of education among the working classes: the country did not offer ‘that universal and 
generous system of education without which it would be madness to make the working class 
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the sovereign constituency of a Legislative Assembly.’152 First introduce education, and then 
suffrage extension; was his argument. Proceeding the other way around would be ‘a ruinous 
experiment’.153  
Then, the working class representatives would soon monopolize power in the House of 
Commons, displace the current, experienced elite and do whatever they pleased. For this 
reason, William Baxter warned against ‘handing over the monopoly of political power’ to 
them, ‘the mere multitudes and uneducated masses’, as it would be a ‘great danger’.154 The 
idea of such a transfer of power recurred frequently in the debates. Michael Hicks-Beach 
(Conservative)
155
 followed the same line of reasoning and even stated that he did not think 
‘the intelligence and education of the nation should be subjected to the dominion of an 
inferior order of civilization’.156 The lower classes were inferior to the middle- and upper 
classes, so why should the intelligent and educated be subjected to them?  
Most of the lower classes had indeed only followed a limited amount of education, and 
this would perceived as a grave risk for both future politics and society. How could the 
uneducated ever make a good decision on Election Day? They had neither the experience nor 
the knowledge about politics. It alarmed many politicians that the important task of selecting 
the members of the House, a task with a great responsibility, would be given to the 
uneducated majority of the population. Charles Adderley was one of them, who, after 
discussing the ‘effects of democracy’, was convinced ‘every day more and more that the best 
government is not that in which all have a share, but that which is directed by the class of the 
highest moral principle and intellectual cultivation’.157 
 
3.4.5 Rule of the dispossessed 
Besides lacking education and intelligence, the lower classes did not have any, or at least 
much, property themselves. They were workers, whose only assets were their own sets of 
hands. In several speeches the argument can be found that it was unwise to hand over power 
to the dispossessed, for the jealousy of the working classes would damage the other classes. 
Robert Lowe emphasized the earnestness of this topic, by directly addressing the House: ‘You 
must look these matters in the face, for it is useless to suppose that, founding your institutions 
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on democracy, you can go on legislating with a deference to established privileges and the 
rights of property’.158 It was naïve to think that, under a democratic form of government, 
contemporary property rights would be maintained. In another speech, he affirmed democracy 
had an ‘envious spirit’.159  
If Britain became a democracy, and the workers’ majority gained political power, 
would the wealthy minority still be safe? How could it be assured that they would not 
distribute their wealth and lands for their own benefit? As Alexander Beresford-Hope warned, 
the accumulation of property might be ‘corrected’ by politics, after a ‘democratic cry for 
equal distribution’.160 Democracy was, after all, the ‘system’ of ‘mere numbers and the 
cravings of those who wanted’.161 Hence, if the 1867 Bill passed, ‘in its broadest and most 
dangerous form’, the wealthy and landowning upper class should fear democracy’s rise. 
Especially Robert Lowe enthusiastically exhibited his rhetoric: ‘Does not the right 
hon. Gentleman know what democracy is? Whatever we learnt at Oxford, we learnt that 
democracy was a form of Government in which the poor, being many, governed the whole 
country, including the rich, who were few, and for the benefit of the poor. The question is—is 
not that the form of Government which the right hon. Gentleman is seeking to introduce?
162
 
Democracy meant ‘the government of the rich by the poor’. Obviously this sounded as a 
warning to the upper classes of British society, to which most MP’s belonged.  
 
3.4.6 Synonym of ‘the people' 
As we saw in the two previous paragraphs, the conventional meaning of democracy was a 
particular form of government, often explained in more detail as the rule of the working 
classes. This was the conventional (not contested) meaning of the concept. But in these two 
years, in a few speeches, the word ‘democracy’ was used in a quite different way: not to refer 
to a system of rule but instead directly to ‘the people’ or ‘the working classes’ themselves. For 
this reason, the noun ‘democracy’ was always preceded by the article ‘the’, as this quote 
shows: ‘The question for the House to decide was whether they were prepared for the 
governing power of the country to be thrown into the hands of the democracy.’163 Thus, in 
certain cases, ‘the democracy’ became to mean ‘the people’.  
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This sentence was spoken by Charles York (Viscount Royston, landowner and corrupt 
dandy, Conservative MP)
164
, who must have meant ‘the people’ or a certain group of people, 
because ‘the democracy’ he mentioned, was able to exercise ‘governing power’. He certainly 
did not talk about democracy as a system. Interestingly enough, on the exact same day, two 
others MP’s directly used the word in the same way, and applied it in their own speeches. One 
of them, Michael Hicks-Beach, reflected on the past debates and attested that ‘The questions 
likely to arise under this Bill were not those between Whigs and Tories but between the rich 
and the poor. It was the beginning of a contest between the aristocracy and the democracy of 
the country.
165
 The known antithesis between aristocracy and democracy was explicated as 
the contrast between the rich and the poor. Thus, here, ‘the democracy’ did not only mean the 
rule of the poor, it meant ‘the poor’ themselves. 
 
3.5 Negative consequences; or related concepts 
Now we have reconstructed democracy’s meaning in the 1866-7 debates, and the electoral 
expectations in the short run, it is time to analyse the perceived consequences of democracy in 
the long term. What negative consequences did these parliamentarians foresee for the future? 
In this respect, it is insightful to show with which other concepts ‘democracy’ was connected 
in a semantic web. Democracy was frequently explained with related negative concepts such 
as ‘revolution’, ‘equality’ and ‘despotism’, and contrasted with positive values such as 
‘freedom’, ‘progress’ and ‘Britishness’. How did these related concepts contribute to the 
contemporary meaning of ‘democracy’? 
 
3.5.1 Revolution and agitation 
The negative perception of ‘democracy’ was regularly invigorated by either combining or 
equating ‘democracy’ with ‘revolution’. Walter Meller166, for example, used it in one of his 
speeches against the 1866 reform bill: ‘this he considered a most democratic and 
revolutionary measure.’167 In this context, of course, the two concepts did not necessarily 
have the same meaning, but still, the two were presented as equivalent characteristics of the 
same reform measure. A similar remark was made by Baillie Cochrane (author and Liberal-
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Conservative MP)
168
, who cited an article in which it was stated that ‘this Reform Bill is 
revolution and democracy; and henceforth the democratic element will prevail in the 
country’.169 Numerous times revolution was connected to democracy in these ways; they were 
two contiguous concepts in the same semantic web.  
Robert Montagu made use of ‘revolution’ in a similar way as Meller and Baillie 
Cochrane, but he explicated the connection more clearly. The relationship was causal: ‘What, 
then, did the right hon. Gentleman do in introducing the present Bill? He spent his oratory in 
describing the great scope and range of Parliamentary Reform, and left the country under the 
impression that he was initiating a vast scheme of revolution; he let out that he was 
commencing a democracy in detail, and that the change which he proposed would be not only 
great but reiterated; and that the agitation, always injurious, would be indefinitely prolonged.’ 
Hence, revolution was the scheme: the road, the course of action; of which democracy was the 
result: the system, the form of government. Both terms were explained as causing a ‘great, 
reiterated change’, of which ‘prolonged agitation’ was an integral part. 
This concept of ‘agitation’ was one of the negative words brought in connection to 
both revolution and democracy. It was for example uttered by William Gladstone (Liberal 
leader)
170, who in 1867 stressed the need to defend the ‘securities of the Constitution’, as 
‘guarantees against democracy’. They were ‘the firm, solid, well-built walls, which are to 
stem the tide of agitation!’171 Here, the constitution was stated as the opposite of democracy. 
But, furthermore, the constitution was also equated with the metaphor of ‘walls’, and 
democracy as the ‘tide of agitation’. Agitation meant public unrest, turmoil or commotion: 
things that frightened the calm and civilized members of parliament. 
These were effective words to utter in the House of Commons, because most MP’s 
were proud of Great-Britain’s stability over the centuries. Revolution, agitation and chaos 
were perceived as atrocities, usually only extant on the European mainland. As James 
Whiteside (judge and Conservative MP)
172
 said it: ‘If we look abroad and compare the state of 
the Continent of Europe with our own country, we find that whilst abroad they have been 
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disturbed by convulsions and torn by revolutions, we have been happy in the enjoyment of a 
system of government which has managed to combine liberty with order and stability.’173  
With this argument, Whiteside must have had the French Revolution in mind. In 1866-7 
parliamentary discourse, the French violence, terror and chaos were frequently mentioned, as 
warnings against reform. Politics should be debate in parliament, not agitation on the streets.  
During the French Revolution, according to Marsh, at least, it had been the ‘inherent 
excellence of our mixed Constitution’ that had saved Great-Britain from such disorder.174 
Therefore, if now, the question was ‘how to prevent democracy from gaining ground’, the 
answer must, again, be found by ‘looking at the constitution’.175 The past had proven the 
successes of the British political system: why change what is good? If now reform was 
passed, Marsh suggested, then they would ‘necessarily become to all intents and purposes a 
democracy’.176 The logic was clear: reform would lead to revolution. It would end the chain 
of centuries of stability and peace, and would transform Britain into a democracy. 
 
3.5.2 Despotism and demagogy 
As we discussed before, such a democratic constitution meant the rule of the ‘urban working 
classes’. In some speeches, the MP’s were more precise: it would be the rule of their political 
leaders! Robert Lowe, the front man of the Adullamite movement, for example, often 
repeated the prophesy that a widened suffrage would soon lead to the rule of ‘trade union 
leaders’. In his own words: he wanted ‘to call the attention of the House in a few words to the 
condition of the trade unions, because we are all anxious to discover, if we can, the future of 
that democracy which, I believe, this Bill will be the first means of establishing.’177 The 
Reform Bill would thus establish a democracy, in which the House of Commons would soon 
be dominated by the trade unions.  
But these unions were in a hazardous condition; these organizations would easily lead 
away the masses; in particular its ‘self-constituted leaders’.178 What kind of new leaders could 
they expect? Lowe pointed to America to designate the type of men elected under 
democracies: ‘We see in America, where the people have undisputed power, that they do not 
send honest, hardworking men to represent them in Congress, but traffickers in office, 
bankrupts, men who have lost their character and been driven from every respectable way of 
                                               
173 James Whiteside, Hansard, March 13, 1866. 
174 Matthew Marsh, Hansard, March 12, 1866. 
175 Matthew Marsh, Hansard, March 12, 1866. 
176 James Whiteside, Hansard, March 13, 1866. 
177 Robert Lowe, Hansard, April 26, 1866. 
178 Charles Newdegate, Hansard, May 31, 1867. 
45 
 
life, and who take up politics as a last resource.’ Democracy could only lower the quality of 
politicians. 
Often this type of government was portrayed with a feel for emotion; it was regularly 
framed as the rule of ‘despotism’. This latter concept instilled the same type of fear as 
democracy did: it was the prospect of un-free, un-representative, and authoritarian rule. The 
step from democracy to despotism was only a small one, MP’s emphasized: the matter of 
reform should therefore be treated with the utmost caution. Sometimes the suggested link was 
even closer, then the connection was not causal but synonymous. Robert Lowe, for example, 
almost equated the two concepts, by saying that ‘it is an old observation that every democracy 
is in some respect similar to despotism’.179  
Even ‘worse than despots themselves’, Lowe attested, was the possible election of 
‘those who flatter and dawn upon the people’, in other words: representation by ‘courtiers and 
flatterers’. With this, he implied something we might nowadays call ‘populist’, but was in that 
time referred to with the word of ‘demagogy’. As Robert Cecil predicted the ‘flattery’ after 
reform: ‘No sooner have we done that than the hon. Member for Birmingham, or, perhaps, 
some demagogue keener than he who may supplant him, will urge the further claims of the 
people.’180 In this speech, Cecil attacked the Radical MP Bright, and expressed his fear for 
popular (or populist) policies. The new leaders would not do what was best for the country, 
but instead hand out empty promises, to please their voters. As Robert Montagu explained the 
risks: ‘Any demagogue, by seducing the working men with his oratory, and putting himself at 
their head, could rule the House with irresistible power, and carry his democracy to any issue 
he might desire’.181 Reform would thus place the power into the wrong hands: a dangerous 
process. 
 
3.5.3 The rule of passion 
Robert Lowe advanced on his conception of democracy further, by emphasizing how 
impressionable the working classes were: ‘It is not the educated and reflective who are 
influenced by ideas, but the half educated and the unreflective; and if you show to the ignorant 
and poor and half educated wrong, injustice, and wickedness anywhere, their generous 
instincts rise within them, and nothing is easier than to get up a cry for the redress of those 
                                               
179 Robert Lowe, Hansard, April 26, 1866. 
180 Robert Cecil, Hansard , March 13, 1866. 
181 Robert Montagu, Hansard , April 13, 1866. 
46 
 
grievances.
182
 The uneducated parts of the population had no experience with reflecting on 
political issues, and would have to rely on their instincts. Therefore, in elections, they could 
be easily influenced or persuaded to still these primitive desires. If the people saw injustice 
anywhere, they would want to fix it. This, however, led not to the most prudent politics, Lowe 
suggested.  
Democracy thus was a form of rule, not of reason, but of passion.
183
 These 
‘democratic passions’ would have disastrous results for foreign policy, he explained: they 
would quickly end up in war. Lowe gave examples, and pointed towards the Australian 
colonies of Victoria and New South Wales, who were ‘both governed by universal suffrage’ 
and whose rivalry was therefore likely to escalate into war. And what to think of America? ‘A 
section of the American democracy revolted and broke up the Union, the rest fought to 
preserve it; the war was fought out to the bitter end’.184 The American Civil War had only just 
ended, in the 1866 debates, and Lowe sought a causal connection between this conflict and 
the democratic form of government. ‘Democracy was a terrible warlike power’,185 Lowe 
concluded. 
Samuel Laing also spread the idea that democratic rule was ‘enthusiastic and 
impassioned’, and he, too, identified this as a dangerous feature of people rule. He explained 
his thought: ‘In this country, the centre of a vast colonial empire, and depending on a vast 
system of commerce ramifying over the whole world, the necessity must be taken into 
consideration of a prudent and consistent policy, not swayed by the enthusiastic and 
impassioned influence of democracy’.186 The passion of democracy was opposed to prudent 
and consistent policy: two important pillars for the rule of the British empire. It was feared 
that under democratic rule, only ‘the variety and passions of the moment’ would be listened 
to: the short-term interests of the classes. The longer term vision on the nation, ‘ the 
permanent interests of the country’, would be forsaken.187  
 
3.5.4 Equality and uniformity 
One year later Robert Lowe elaborated on his understanding of democracy, when he 
expanded on one principle on which the 1867 Bill was supposedly based: the maxim of 
equality. Equality was an essential component of democracy: ‘It regards all citizens, however 
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different they may be in other respects, as in the main alike, and founds upon that view the 
future constituency of this country in direct opposition to the old constituency which it 
replaces.’188 This conception of equal, individual rights was heavily criticized by Robert 
Lowe: no man was equal and therefore it was fatuous to base the constitution on it. Some 
proponents of reform indeed assumed this principle, of a ‘right existing in the individual’, and 
thus perceived the suffrage as a natural right of every man. Lowe, obviously, denied the 
existence of such a natural right. According to him, this principle stood opposite of the old 
principle of constituency representation, and the aim of ‘general expediency’.189.  
This democratic principle, ‘that one man is as good as another’ was also articulated by 
James Whiteside, who concluded: ‘Now, that is democracy’.190 And as Lowe, he was critical 
of equality, and said that it was ‘impossible to contend that one man was as good as 
another’191. Different from the proponents of natural right thinking, these politicians did not 
approach ‘equality’ in a normative way: as equal values, that everyone naturally possessed. 
Instead they perceived the concept in a descriptive way: British society simply was not built 
on equality: as we saw, the idea of class-based dividing lines was engraved deeply in 
parliamentarian thinking.  
A few times, the connection between ‘democracy’ and ‘equality’ was made the other 
way around: then, democracy was not perceived as the result but as the cause of equality. 
Robert Lowe was one of the first MP’s to make this argument, when he attested that 
democracy had ‘yet another tendency, which it is worthwhile to study at the present moment’. 
‘It is singularly prone to the concentration of power. Under it individual men are small, and 
the Government is great. That must be the character of a Government which represents the 
majority, and which absolutely tramples down and equalizes everything except itself.’192 In a 
democracy, the state would increase its size and powers, and use this control to ‘equalize 
everything’: to dissolve all differences in society.  
With poetic wordings Lowe made it seem as if democracy was a constant threat, as if 
the present constitution was a fragile valuable, that should be treated with the utmost care. 
‘Democracy you may have at any time. Night and day the gate is open that leads to that bare 
and level plain, where every ant's nest is a mountain and every thistle a forest tree.’193 Under 
the rule of the people, ‘everything’ would be equalized. With this, Lowe, again, pointed at the 
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levelling effects of handing over majority rule to the lowest classes: in a democracy, the 
wealth and lands of the minority were likely to be distributed among the poor.  
When one closely reads the arguments and the metaphors, the feeling springs to mind 
that it was not only material equality that Lowe referred to. In a democracy, even the 
treatment of political matters would be done in a ‘level matter’, ‘characteristic of democracy’, 
Lowe said. He praised concepts such as ‘variety’ and ‘difference’, and opposed them to 
‘uniformity’ and the ‘dead level of democracies’.194 In his own words: ‘It would be 
"refreshing," as people say in novels, to have a little difference’.195 It is probable that the 
Adullamite leader was thinking of the future of parliamentary debate: if the working class 
masses sent a majority to the House, how much actual discussion would remain? If all MP’s 
were equal, would not all the differences of opinion disappear? Lowe feared the demise of 
rational debate.  
 
3.5.5 Protection, not progress 
In some speeches, also the practical outcomes for future policy, under a British democracy, 
were illustrated. Especially these debates point out that the foremost antonym of ‘democracy’ 
was ‘freedom’. Under a democracy, ‘freedom’ would be counteracted in at least three ways: 
in ‘its operation on commercial progress, civil progress, or religious freedom. ‘They would 
find that it [democracy] had been the opponent, and not the friend of, measures for the 
advancement of freedom under those heads’.196 In this speech of Matthew Marsh, and in a 
number of speeches of other MP’s, it was ‘denied that democracy had been favourable to 
human freedom or progress’. 197 Freedom nor progress were part of democratic rule. 
The first of Marsh’s points, democracy’s operation on ‘commercial progress’, was 
explained regularly in connection with free trade policy, or, to be more precise, the lack of it 
under democratic rule. The laissez-faire economic policy was seen as the anchor of British 
success in the economic development and the industrial take-off, and its maintenance was 
deemed very important: ‘If we have a precious jewel in the world it is our free trade policy. It 
has been everything to us.’ Several MP’s looked abroad to see what democracy would mean 
for free trade: let’s ‘take the facts’, Gathorne Hardey (Conservative)198 said. ‘Canada has 
raised her duties enormously, and justified them upon protectionist principles’. Marsh 
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endorsed this argument, and claimed that, in like manner, in the democracies of France and 
America, ‘they found high protective tariffs in connection with democracy’.199 ‘Protection 
was indeed the child of democracy’.200 
The second negative effect of democracy on freedom referred to its effect on civil 
progress, or ‘social and civil freedom’. As Marsh explained, for this, ‘it was only necessary to 
refer to what had been done at the time of the French Revolution, and to the state of things in 
France under universal suffrage at the present moment, to see how far democracy promoted 
civil freedom. The press was completely gagged, and this year there had been twenty-one 
warnings, six condemnations, four suppressions, and two interdictions’.201 Hence, democracy 
would not encourage freedom of the press, nor would it benefit the judicial system. The third 
downside of democracy was its supposed effect on religious freedom: Marsh doubted that, 
under majority rule, minority religions would be as free as they were now. He cleverly 
selected examples and mentioned there had been ‘religious democracies in Spain, Naples, and 
France, but they had not promoted religious freedom’.202 
 
3.5.6 Not for Britain 
Besides democracy’s contrast to freedom and progress, Robert Cecil added a third antonym: 
democracy was essentially un-British. The system was simply not appropriate for Great-
Britain. As he argued in the Commons: ‘I doubt very much whether a democracy is a 
Government that would suit this country’.203 In other countries, on the other hand, such as the 
United states, its effects might be quite advantageous. The decisive differences between the 
US and Great-Britain were determined by both the constitution and society. As Edward 
Horsman said it: ‘In America, such an infusion [of democracy] was perfectly safe, because it 
harmonized with the principles of their Constitution’.204 But if they introduced it into British 
institutions, ‘the result was to make the Executive the absolute tool of the popular branch of 
the Legislature’. This argument was echoed in the House of Commons many times.  
About one month later, Edward Bulwer expanded it, and sought to explain how 
different British society was from American society, to prove that democracy ‘surely in a 
country like England’, would ‘be a ruinous experiment’.205 To him, democracy was 
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essentially the government that belonged to ‘societies in their youth, and in which the habits 
of men […] produce a certain equality of manners and education’.206 British society was old, 
and consisted out of traditional class divisions. American society, quite the opposite, was 
relatively young, and built on the democratic principles of equality.  
 Bulwer gave the example of the ‘very limited area of soil compared to the pressure of 
its population’ in England207: while in the US, there was so much land available, and no 
established landowning class; in much smaller Britain, the wealthy landowners would 
certainly suffer from working class rule, with its jealous, equalizing nature. Allowing the 
pressure of the population to run its course via political influence, could have grave 
consequences for the distribution of land. Therefore, John Pakington (Conservative)
208
 
concluded that ‘in the United States you may without danger extend the elective franchise to 
classes, to which it would be highly imprudent to do so in a Reform Bill adapted to this 
country.’209 Britain and democracy could, thus, not go hand in hand. 
 
3.6 Response: Denial of democracy 
It is an important fact that the word ‘democracy’ was first brought into the parliamentary 
reform debates by the opposition: Conservatives en Adullamites. Not the government, who 
proposed reform, nor the Radicals, who supported it, were the ones who chose ‘democracy’ as 
their slogan. The word bore a negative connotation, for most, and was used as the weapon of 
the opposition. Anyone seeking to discredit the imminent bill, could apply the concept as a 
negative frame. The government, on the other hand, did not adopt the word as their slogan at 
all, and most of them, including William Gladstone, Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1866, 
seemed to ignore the term. A search through the debates highlights this fact: in 1866, the word 
‘democracy’ was uttered by Gladstone only once, when he quoted an attack made by Lowe.210  
 
3.6.1 We will never be a democracy 
His successor, Benjamin Disraeli (Conservative leader)
211
, took a different attitude towards 
the slogan and already on March 18, 1867, when he was about to introduce his new version of 
reform, reflected on the theme. In that night, before the actual debates took place, he 
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explained that his reform would not tend to democracy: ‘We do not, however, live—and I 
trust it will never be the fate of this country to live—under a democracy. The proposition 
which I am going to make to-night certainly have no tendency in that direction’.212 Obviously, 
he had closely witnessed the debates of 1866, and tried to prevent his reform bill from 
undergoing the same accusations. His remark that his proposal would not be democratic was 
thus made in advance, in expectation of future criticism. Disraeli tried to stop democracy as a 
slogan.  
Disraeli not only made an effort to erase the connection of ‘democracy’ with his 1867 
reform bill, but also sought to replace it with a new frame. He made a new distinction, of 
which he said it ‘ought to be borne in mind by the House in dealing with the provisions of the 
Bill which I am about to ask leave to introduce.’ According to the new Chancellor, reform 
was not about acknowledging ‘democratic rights’, but instead about handing out ‘popular 
privileges’. This sounded less threatening. Furthermore, a ‘privilege’ made it look like a 
favour, given to the working classes; opposed to a ‘right’: something they inherently 
deserved. This perception of the suffrage as a ‘natural right’ was highly controversial at the 
time; as the debates indicate. Disraeli came up with an alternative. The vote was a reward, not 
a right. 
As Disraeli explained the distinction between the two concepts, popular privileges 
were ‘consistent with a state of society in which there is great inequality of condition. 
Democratic rights, on the contrary, demand that there should be equality of condition as the 
fundamental basis of the society which they regulate.’ This was a clever explanation, for as 
we saw earlier, the fact that Great-Britain knew great inequality, had been an argument in 
1866. By making this reform bill about popular privileges instead, Disraeli sought to gain 
support. Unfortunately for Disraeli, though, the term ‘popular privileges’ never replaced 
democracy’s role as the slogan to counter parliamentary reform.  
Over the year 1867, Disraeli’s reform bill was attacked for the same reasons and with 
the same words as Gladstone’s proposal a year before: this proposal went too far and would 
open the way to a democracy. However, different from Gladstone, Disraeli did defend his bill 
by reflecting directly on the word democracy. Several times he commented on the word and 
tried to distance himself from it: ‘That word "democracy" is an awful word. I despair of 
getting a definition of it even from hon. Gentlemen opposite’.213 Disraeli’s despair underlines 
the notion that no clear consensus existed on democracy’s definition. At one time, Disraeli 
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assumed that it meant ‘that the populace is to be the ruler of all things’. And in that case, the 
Chancellor concluded, ‘the borough qualification we propose’ is ‘far from being a democratic 
qualification’. His reform would not be democratic at all, he maintained, and with him, both 
property and institutions were safe.
214
 
But Disraeli’s protests were without use: over the next few weeks of debate, the 
accusations of ‘democracy’ persisted. At one point, he decided to respond, again: to challenge 
its connection to reform and to ask about its meaning. ‘Now that this measure is brought 
forward’, Disraeli said, ‘we are told that "democracy is triumphant," and we are about to 
change the Constitution of England and all those principles on which our predecessors have 
exercised the noble franchises which have been bestowed by Parliament. I think that a most 
extraordinary statement to be made with reference to the present situation of affairs.’215 
Clearly, the connection of reform with democracy provoked Disraeli, who thought the 
allegation was improper and, moreover, exaggerated. 
Repeatedly, Disraeli asked about the concept’s meaning: ‘I wish, that some of these 
great lights would condescend to tell us what they mean by this terrible word democracy 
which they now introduce with such facility into our debates’.216 He did not want his bill to be 
linked to ‘this terrible word’, and demanded a clear definition: only then could be verified if 
this bill would be democratic. Disraeli asked: ‘Is it household suffrage? I suppose it is 
household suffrage. That is democracy. Well, there are 4,500,000 inhabited houses in 
England. […] Not more than a moiety of these, even if this Bill passes, will be inhabited by 
persons qualified to exercise the franchise. Then, if household suffrage be democracy, what is 
this all about?’ His measure was so limited, and would only increase the constituency with 
‘about 300,000’ respectable Englishmen.217 Hence, all the drama was overstated. 
 
3.6.2 Condemning the catchphrase  
Nearly all expressions of ‘democracy’, given by the government and reformist 
parliamentarians, followed upon allegations made by the opposition. Thus, they only spoke of 
‘democracy’ as a response: when quoting the opposition, and when reflecting critically upon 
their assertions. In their speeches, they sought to deny the allegations of promoting 
‘democracy’, because, for them, too, the word carried a negative connotation. They wanted to 
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prove that this reform would not be an ‘advance towards democracy’. Because of these 
accusations, many MP’s reflected numerous times on the meaning of the concept.  
The fact that the pro-reformist MP’s only used ‘democracy’ as a response, can be 
underlined by the way they introduced the word into their own speeches. As William Baxter 
unfolded, after the first month of debate, in April 1866: ‘They had heard a great deal lately of 
the dangers which were impending from what was called unbridled democracy’.218 
‘Democracy’ had entered into the debates through the opposition, and always served to show 
the risks of reform. Baxter responded to this slogan, and stated that the expectation of such 
democratic consequences was ‘outrageous’.219 The measure at hand was a moderate proposal 
to enfranchise 400,000 respectable men, and it ‘quite passed his comprehension’, how anyone 
could believe this would lead to a democracy. Baxter even doubted the sincerity of the 
oppositions fear: ‘if any hon. Gentlemen in that House really believed in the dangers which 
these Gentlemen stated threatened the landed interest of this country, the House of Lords, and 
the throne of their beloved Queen herself, he did not think they could have slept in their 
beds.’220  
Numerous other MP’s in favour of reform followed Baxter’s line of reasoning and 
critically assessed the opposition’s rhetoric: John Coleridge, for one, asked why ‘this horror of 
democracy [had] been kept over their heads, when the question was simply one of lowering 
the franchise and the redistribution of seats’.221 The issue at hand was not about parliamentary 
reform, but about giving ‘the working classes increased power’.222 This was nothing 
threatening or revolutionary; it was not about democracy at all. Charles Villiers (Liberal 
Tory)
223, too, explained reform as a ‘moderate measure’, instead of a democratic act. He 
condemned ‘all this cry and alarm at the consequence of democracy’, and uncovered the 
opposition’s discourse as ‘speculative fears’, ‘sought to alarm us’.224 Fear was the instrument 
to convince parliament to vote against reform, and ‘democracy’ was its slogan. Reformist 
MP’s sought to elucidate these tactics.  
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Both John Coleridge and Austen Layard (archaeologist and Liberal MP)
225
 went even 
further than elucidating: in 1866 they directly combatted the rhetorical tricks from the 
opposition side. According to Coleridge, the opposition’s talk of democracy had delivered 
‘able discourses, so carefully composed, so skilfully delivered, and so delightful to listen to’, 
but these were only hollow phrases. This rhetoric might sound impressive, but for the topic 
under discussion, ‘they had really no force, and no relevancy whatever’.  226 Coleridge sought 
to imply that although (or even, because) the style was exiting, the content was weak. 
‘Democracy’ was a powerful but empty catchphrase. 
The denunciation of the measure as ‘democratic’ might, then, only remain interesting 
as an ‘exercise of clever men’, Austen Layard stated.227 He did not value the slogan that high, 
and argued that ‘Democracy may be a very good and safe subject for young politicians to try 
their maiden speeches upon.’ He made a comparison between democracy and stuffed animals, 
used by primitive young warriors and huntsman to practice their swords and spears, to prepare 
themselves for encounters with a real animal. ‘Much in the same way the more aged and 
experienced of the hon. Gentlemen opposite use my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham. 
He is made to represent this formidable monster—democracy; and upon him younger 
Members of the Conservative party are invited to try their courage and their strength’.228 
Attacking the reform bill with ‘democracy’ was here seen as an ‘easy’ tactic, mainly suited 
for inexperienced debaters. In this way, Austen Layard condemned the use of democracy as a 
valid and worthy phrase for veteran MP’s. 
 
3.6.3 Copying the slogan 
Only a few reformist MP’s went further than criticizing the use of the word ‘democracy’. 
They turned around the opposition’s argument and stated that it was not reform that would 
lead to democracy, but instead, the refusal of reform. Several times it was suggested that it 
would be dangerous to vote against the reform bill, that this was a necessary measure, and that 
no one knew what would happen if it was rejected. William Baxter framed the reform 
proposal in this way, as a prudent decision: ‘Gradual changes made in time, wise concessions 
gracefully given, did not tend to bring about revolutions. It was that policy of determined 
resistance to all changes, and the persistent refusal to grant reasonable popular demands, 
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which in the end endangered the constitution’229 Reform was placed against revolution: if now 
the suffrage was denied, the people might stand up, start a revolution, and endanger the 
constitution. 
 Baxter, however, did not speak of the consequences in the terms of ‘democracy’, but 
only mentioned the impending ‘revolution’. Francis Crossley (carpet manufacturer, 
philanthropist and Liberal MP)
230
, however, spoke of both. He suggested that now was the 
time for reform, and framed the bill as a direct and necessary successor to the widely 
renowned First Reform Bill of 1832. ‘If in 1832 a step had not been taken we should have had 
a revolution. This 1866 bill was another step in the same direction, and in like manner he 
believed it would preserve the peace and prosperity of the country for many years. If they 
‘wanted to destroy the evils of democracy they should admit those who were outside within 
the pale of the Constitution, and thus give them an interest in maintaining its action and 
existence’.231 Reform should thus be chosen by all who wanted to ‘destroy the evils of 
democracy’. Now the proposition used the slogan for their own cause. 
 
3.7 Few positive remarks  
Until now, this chapter has emphasized the conventional negative connotation of the concept 
of ‘democracy’ in the 1866 -7 debates. However, there were a few – in fact only a handful – 
of MP’s who spoke of the word in clearly positive terms. Their utterances formed a major 
exception to the norms of contemporary parliamentary discourse. Carefully these MP’s 
brought up the idea that democracy could show some flaws, but that these did not outweigh its 
merits. The most well-known MP who belonged to this group was perhaps John Stuart Mill 
(philosopher, economist, and Liberal MP), who sat in the Commons from 1865 until 1868.
232
 
 Mill concluded in the year 1866 that many ‘reasonable things’ could be said both ‘pro 
and con about democracy’.233 He was joined a year later by Edward Knatchbull-Hugessen 
(baron and Liberal MP)
234
, a major proponent of reform, who attested that, while extending 
electoral rights to the un-enfranchised, they should, ‘at the same time’, ‘seek to provide that 
whilst we reap the full advantages—we shall avoid or at least mitigate the evils—of 
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democracy.’235 The system could, thus, entail evils, as the critics of reform had emphasized, 
but could also offer advantages. In their reform effort, they should reap these democratic 
benefits. Democracy was thus not all danger and evil. 
These two MP’s agreed in their aim of reform and their appreciation of democracy. 
However, more than Knatchbull-Hugessen did Mill feel the need to set the two concepts 
apart: according to him, ‘democracy’ was not the issue right now: ‘This is not a democratic 
measure’.236 He believed it ‘neither deserve[d] that praise, nor, if hon. Members will have it 
so, that reproach’.237 This quote confirms the notions that Mill, himself, thought of 
democracy as something praiseworthy, but understood that this idea was unconventional in 
the Commons. While for most MP’s, the bill was democratic, because it went too far, for Mill, 
it was not democratic, because it went not far enough.  
In a few remarks, though, both MP’s sought to defend ‘democracy’ and to demonstrate 
its advantages. They looked for arguments and examples in the same places as the opponents 
of reform had done: both in the past and abroad. Edward Knatchbull-Hugessen boasted his 
knowledge of history, and exclaimed: ‘From all that I have ever read and gathered from the 
pages of history, I have always believed this to be the great merit of a pure democracy—that 
every man, feeling and knowing himself to be part and parcel of the State—assisting in 
framing those laws which he had to obey, threw, as it were, his own individual strength and 
vigour into the constitution, and so the State, resting upon the concentrated vigour and 
strength of the whole body of the people, became possessed of a certain inherent power and 
vitality which could never be obtained by a country resting upon a less extended basis.’238 
Democracy could thus only strengthen the British state. 
John Stuart Mill made an argument in favour of democracy too; not by looking at the 
past but by looking abroad. To be more precise, by pointing at the United States. This country 
had often been presented to prove the failures of democracy, and Mill admitted that the 
‘various American Legislatures [were] perpetually making mistakes’. However, he continued 
his speech by saying that ‘they [were] perpetually correcting them too’. In fact, the evil of 
democracy was ‘far outweighed by the salutary effects of the general tendency of their 
legislation, which is maintained, in a degree unknown elsewhere, in the direction of the 
interest of the people. Not that vague abstraction, the good of the country, but the actual 
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positive well-being of the living human creatures who compose the population’.239. It was for 
this object of politics that the utilitarian Mill deemed the American democracy superior to the 
British mixed system.  
The essential difference between these two systems was the very aim of politics: what 
was the parliaments guiding line? Should it be the ‘good of the country’, as many 
parliamentarians maintained, or the ‘well-being’ of all individuals, as Mill had taught? And 
what did ‘the representation of the people’ mean? Who were exactly represented: 
communities, classes or individuals? These were the crucial questions underlying the 1866-7 
debates. The few MP’s who spoke out in favour of democracy settled for the latter answer. As 
Knatchbull-Hugessen affirmed, he wished ‘to see men in communities, and not communities 
only represented in this House’. ‘He longed to see that House, as far as possible, the mirror 
and image of the political opinions of the country’.240 This was how a democratic parliament 
worked.  
Such a conception of politics differed tremendously from the current parliamentary 
discourse, and therefore such statements caused quite some unrest in the House. Many 
parliamentarians of both parties jumped up to utter their aversion. To say one was in favour of 
democracy, or to speak of democracy’s merits, was to make a bold, Radical statement. Thus, 
when an MP held such opinions, he had to be strong and confident to dare and utter them in 
the Commons. A remark made by John Coleridge, an MP who himself ‘was not the advocate 
of unmixed democracy’ is interesting in this respect. He said that ‘even were he a strong 
advocate of democracy, he should not think for one moment of forcing his opinions upon a 
society of Gentlemen to whom he knew them to be repulsive’.241 This sentence confirms the 
conventional view of democracy, and clarifies why so few positive remarks about democracy 
were made. Even those who saw some merits in democracy, were discouraged to say it, 
because of the social pressure in the House. The concept was clearly highly controversial. 
Less controversial was the notion that Great-Britain was set on a path into the 
direction of democracy. Yet the consensus was that they still had a choice: the Commons 
stood at the crossroads. While the many opponents of reform had used this image to instil fear 
into their audience, to show the need to make a halt on this path, the few proponents of 
democracy emphasized the need to proceed along with time. As John Stuart Mill said it, there 
was ‘an obvious tendency in this country towards democracy’: this was one of the ‘signs of 
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the times’.242 It was the government’s duty to follow this. William Forster (Liberal)243 
supported this argument, and emphasized that they should not oppose ‘the growth of the 
people and the progress of civilization’, for this was not safe. This MP, who mentioned that he 
himself was called an ‘advocate of democracy’, summed up his feelings in an astute 
chiasmus. Could you stop democracy? ‘I believe you could not if you would, and I trust you 
would not if you could’. With this figure of speech Forster pointed out that stopping 
democracy was both impossible and undesirable. 
 Another reformer, Henry Fawcett (economist and Liberal MP)
244
, concurred with Mill 
and Forster. He looked into the future, and predicted that ‘they were coming to a democracy’. 
Once the ‘great’ democratic principle had been tried, it would step by step take hold, and in 
‘twenty or perhaps fifty years hence’, it would settle a ‘pure democracy’.245 This sounded 
exactly as the argument the opponents of reform had made to denounce the reform bill, but 
different from them, obviously, Fawcett approved of democracy and judged this imminent 
process in a positive way. This he defined as a system of government rule, ‘in which everyone 
ha[s] an equal opportunity of exercising political influence and political power’.246 All should 
be included. Defiantly he stated that ‘he was a friend of democracy’.247 
 
3.8 Mode of persuasion: Pathos 
Despite the efforts of these five MP’s, who tried to attach a positive value to the concept of 
democracy, a negative evaluation dominated parliamentary discourse. For almost all 
parliamentarians during the 1866- 7 debates, ‘democracy’ carried a negative value. It was a 
form of government that a broad majority of the Commons did not want: a group roughly 60 
MP’s repeatedly warned for it, in an effort to stop two parliamentary reform bills. Democracy 
became a slogan, strongly connected to reform, that stood for severe risks in the future and a 
threat to the status quo. The aim of this keyword was clear: to yield an emotional response to 
the matter of reform, and to instil fear into dubitable members of the House. The hazardous 
effects were not worth the risk, the opposition proclaimed. 
The aim and methods of the use of ‘democracy’ can plainly be related to one of the 
‘modes of persuasion’ that Aristotle had described more than 2000 years earlier: ‘pathos’. 
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This rhetoric device meant as much as ‘emotion’: if a speaker appealed to the feeling of the 
public, he was using this style.
248
 According to Aristotle, to create emotion, one should first 
stress the importance of the matter. Therefore, a central element in persuading with pathos, is 
the message that it is the own interest of the audience which is at stake. They must feel fear, 
anxiety, despair or mistrust.
249
 Other advised emotions were outrage, aversion and anger.
250
 If 
the speaker succeeded in evoking such feelings, decisions would be highly influenced by 
emotions. Hence, these exact same aims and methods were (deliberate or not) applied in 
1866-7, in the application of the word ‘democracy’.  
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3.9 Four key actors (1866-1867) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
William Gladstone      Benjamin Disraeli 
(Chancellor of the Exchequer 1859-1866)   (Chancellor of the Exchequer 1866-1868) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Robert Lowe      Robert Cecil 
(Liberal MP 1852-1880)     (Conservative MP 1853-1868)  
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PART II: LOOKING BACK AND BEYOND (1868-1878) 
 
4. THE FIRST MEANING MAINTAINED: DISTANT FORM OF GOVERNMENT 
 
4.1 Had they become a democracy? (1868-1871) 
 
4.1.1 Reform off the agenda  
Now that the Second Reform Act was a fact, the basic qualification for the vote in the 
boroughs practically became the ‘male household suffrage’. Any male householder who paid 
rates, or any lodger that paid a rental of at least ten pounds, and lived in the same house for at 
least one year, could now register to vote.
251
 As British historian Jonathan Parry described it, 
this was indeed a ‘revolutionary change’, because now –for the first time – a large group of 
working men throughout the country received a say in the composition of national politics. 
Between 1866 and 1871 the English borough electorate rose from 500,000 to 1.25 million.
252
 
An overview in percentages can be found in graph 1 of the appendix. 
As we discussed in the third chapter, such an extensive change had not been the aim at 
the start in 1866: neither Gladstone nor Disraeli were ‘democrats’. The combination of party 
political considerations and the many amendments delivered by Radical MP’s had broadened 
the new suffrage rules considerably: restrictive measures such as additional property 
qualifications or ‘fancy franchises’ (extra votes for the intelligent and wealthy ) had been 
struck out.
253
 Therefore, at the time, the measure was perceived as a ‘leap in the dark’: what 
would it bring?
254
 Historian Parry went even further and judged the 1867 Reform Act as an 
‘accident’. It was the ‘most unintentional revolution in the history of British politics’.255 The 
eventual outcome was far wider than anyone had wanted beforehand. 
Therefore, both Liberal and Conservative observers were apprehensive about the 
behaviour of the newly enfranchised masses. What would the new voters do?
256
 In the short 
run, though, not much did change. In the first elections, held in 1868 and based on the new 
electoral rules, the public did not reward Disraeli’s Conservative Party for the effort he had 
put in. It was the Liberal party that won a majority in the Commons, and subsequently formed 
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a government, presided by Gladstone.
257
 Parliamentary reform was now removed off the 
political agenda. After decades of repeated debates and futile proposals, now a final 
settlement had been found.  
For this reason, it shall not come as a surprise to anyone that in the period 1868-1871 
the word ‘democracy’ was barely used in the Commons. Quickly after the Act was accepted, 
the concept sneaked off parliamentary stage. While in 1867 it had been mentioned 120 times, 
one year later, only seven parliamentarians used it in their speeches. Now a solution was 
found for parliamentary reform, there was clearly not much need to reflect on the concept 
again. The few times that ‘democracy’ was mentioned in the House, it functioned to look back 
on the Act that had been passed in 1867. Had this reform indeed changed Great-Britain? Had 
they become a democracy?  
 
4.1.2 Step into a democratic direction 
John Stuart Mill was the first to answer this question. He concluded that ‘a great change has 
taken place in the situation of this country as respects its institutions. […] Our Constitution 
has been materially altered in a democratic direction.’ A step had thus been taken, but for 
him, the form of government had not yet changed into a democracy. This was, however, still 
his expectation or, perhaps, his hope for the future. This we can conclude from a quote in 
which he addressed one of the challenges of democracy. For him, the, the ‘great political 
problem of the future […] [was] to obtain the combination of democratic institutions with 
skilled administration’258. The institutions of the future were to be democratic. 
 Nathaniel Lambert (mine-owner and Liberal MP)
259
 joined Mill’s line of reasoning in 
1870, and argued that ‘as the suffrage has been extended we have been gradually becoming 
more democratic’. In his view, democracy as meant form of government in which ‘the right of 
making laws resides in the people at large’. This he judged a fairly positive future prospect for 
Great-Britain: America, ‘the most democratic of nations’ had proven that a democracy was 
able to pay off its debt. Furthermore, ‘popular assemblies generally mean to do the thing that 
is right and just, and have always a degree of patriotism and public spirit’.260 A transfer of the 
legislative task to the ‘people at large’ would thus be beneficial for policy and governance. 
Both Mill and Lambert thought Great-Britain had taken an important step towards democracy. 
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4.1.3 Yes, a democratic suffrage 
One year later, in 1871, Henry Fawcett reflected on the Reform Act too. He reminded the 
House again of the debates a few years before, and portrayed the 1868 Bill as a ‘Trojan 
Horse’, over which the House had fought nightly. Should they let it in? Some had said that 
‘inside it there was a great democracy, which, if once let loose, would issue forth and sway 
the Government’, while others had not seen the dangers and wanted to let it in anyway.  
Fawcett, who mentioned that ‘he had never concealed from the House that he held extreme 
democratic opinions’, was in favour of reform, but was aware as well of the democratic 
dangers, that needed to be checked.
261
 
‘Extravagance’ was one of the disadvantages of democratic institutions: ‘if not 
properly checked, they sometimes tended to make government expensive’. This was exactly 
what was happening now, he argued: only three years after the Act, the government issued a 
‘large expenditure of 3,000,000 pound’.262 Fawcett criticized this policy and maintained that 
‘it was the duty of that House, now that they had a democratic suffrage, to relax not a single 
check which might tend to prevent extravagance’. The suffrage was now thus evaluated as 
‘democratic’!263 However, whether or not the current form of government was democratic too, 
he did not yet say.  
 
4.1.4 No democracy, no alarm  
Prime Minister Disraeli also reflected on the topic in 1871, when he reminisced the ‘last 
Reform Bill’. He remarked he wanted to respond to the ‘vague but terrific pictures of the 
democracy under which we are now suffering’.264 It is certain, however, he meant this 
ironically, and did not truly think Great-Britain was a ‘democracy’ at all. To make this clear 
to all, he quickly added that ‘the constituency of England at this moment consists of exactly 
one-third of the adult males. Hon. Gentlemen will, therefore, see at once that that is not quite 
the form which an overpowering democracy assumes’. With such a limited franchise, surely 
Great-Britain could not be named a democracy. 
Furthermore, he argued, the results of the latest General Election, held after the 
Second Reform Act, showed that ‘at least a moiety of the new constituency voted for 
Conservative candidates’.265 So why would anyone still be alarmed by parliamentary reform? 
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The elections had proven that the last supposedly ‘democratic’ measure was safe. Therefore, 
Disraeli stated, again ironically, that they should not ‘be so frightened by the awful 
democracy which has been created’. The form of government had not changed. Nor had the 
form of representation changed: Disraeli dispelled the notion that ‘we are now, and are for 
ever to be, the slaves of an overwhelming democracy’.266 Democracy had not impaired the 
British institutions. 
Seeing as this quite differs from the notions of Mill and Fawcett, we can safely 
conclude that the value of ‘democracy’ was quite contested in the Commons of 1868-1871. 
This assumption is supported by Disraeli himself, who remarked that ‘it is not expedient that 
hon. Gentlemen on either side of the House, with a view of arriving at very different 
conclusions, on one side of exultation, and on the other of alarm, should express opinions 
which have no foundation whatever in fact’.267 Some MP’s attested ‘in exultation’ that Britain 
was very close to being a democracy, while others were still ‘alarmed’ of its rise. While Mill 
was excited of the democratic direction, Fawcett still feared the people’s extravagance. 
According to Disraeli, both were wrong. Great-Britain was not a democracy, nor should 
anyone be alarmed.  
 
4.2 New reform proposals (1871-1877) 
 
4.2.1 Next on the agenda 
The first three years after the Second Reform Act had proven the fierce opponents of 1866 
and -7 wrong. Great-Britain had not become that awful democracy of which they were so 
afraid; warnings of tyranny, violence, or demagogy did not come true. Not yet, in any case. 
The second warning that these opponents upheld was the idea of a ‘slippery slope’: if this 
reform was passed, then soon Great-Britain would slide away into a democracy.
268
 In this 
view, the Reform Bill of 1867 meant the opening of the floodgates: if this step was taken, then 
further reforms would soon follow. Did the 1870s show such a chain of events? 
Yes, in a way this warning proved more prophetic. As British historian Machin 
summarized it, the measure of 1867 had indeed ‘whet the appetites of reformers for further 
change’.269 A minority of progressive MP’s had wider demands for reform, and although it 
took a few years, from 1871 on they sounded their cries for new electoral reform. These 
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sounds came mainly from Radical and Liberal MP’s, who saw possibilities for further 
electoral improvement. In 1871, they first called for the secret ballot, and in the next few 
years, for the extension of the franchise in the counties, and the vote for women.
270
  
As we shall see, all three debates correlated directly with the occurrence of the slogan 
of ‘democracy’. If reform was discussed, the familiar slogan was brought to the fore: the 
conventional narrative of 1866-7, in which democracy was a word of warning, was simply 
repeated. It was again explained that ‘democracy’ was a popular and dangerous form of 
government, and that the British constitution was moving into a democratic direction. 
Throughout the 1870s, ‘democracy’ remained a word with clear negative connotations.  
Only the first of these three measures was accepted, eventually, and no major reform 
schedule was passed nor contemplated in the 1870s. This might be explained by the lack of 
popular organization and agitation for reform.
271
 The middle-class Reform Union soon 
declined, after the Second Reform Act was accepted, and the working-class Reform League 
underwent a similar fate. This association was dissolved as soon as 1869. With no popular 
agitation in the country, the governments felt no pressure at all to touch upon the highly 
controversial topic. Therefore, neither the Liberal ministry of Gladstone (1868-1874) nor the 
Conservative cabinet of Disraeli (1874-1880) proposed a Third Reform Bill just yet. 
272
 
 
4.2.2 The Secret Ballot 
The first ministry of Gladstone (1868-1874) was, indeed, more concerned with Irish matters, 
educational, and other social reforms, than with electoral change. A major exception was 
made in 1871, when the government proposed the introduction of the secret ballot.
273
 The 
events of the first general elections of 1868 had changed the Liberal stance; gradually 
Gladstone’s government came to appreciate the benefits of secret voting. The large 
enfranchisement of 1867 boosted fears for bribery and corruption: poorer voters could easily 
be tempted to sell their vote, or to submit to the pressure of landlords or employers.
274
 The 
secret ballot would take this problem away at once.
275
 Political patronage would end, and the 
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House of Commons would become a ‘more complete representation of the opinions and 
wishes of the electoral body’, as the Radical John Bright acclaimed.276  
Some Liberals and many Conservatives, however, opposed the measure, for 
traditionally the vote was perceived as an asset, that belonged to the community: it was not an 
individual right. The choice one made affected the entire nation, and therefore it should be 
open for all to see. The possibility to hide one’s personal opinion would remove any sense of 
individual responsibility.
277
 The secret ballot was therefore judged as ‘un-English’ and 
‘unmanly’.278 Secrecy was cowardly, opponents implied. Furthermore, the correlation with 
the occurrence of the word ‘democracy’ is striking. After a frequency of eight in 1870, in 
1871 the concept occurred 47 times. ‘Democracy’ returned as the slogan to oppose electoral 
reform. 
This connection between the ballot and democracy was first made by John Ball (judge 
and Irish Conservative MP)
279
, who brought up the writings of Montesquieu. The famous 
French philosopher, an authority on political thinking, had supposedly said that ‘it is a 
fundamental law of democracy that voting shall be open’. If Great-Britain was to be a 
democracy – Dr Ball made clear he expected this for the future – then the voting system 
should be set up accordingly, and the secret ballot should thus be opposed.
280
 Charles 
Newdegate brought up another French thinker for this same cause: Tocqueville. Tocqueville 
had supposedly written about the changes that now took place in the British electoral system, 
and had judged them as ‘dangerous’, on one ground: ‘that they might lead to the 
establishment of the most irremediable of all forms of Government, that democracy which 
always forbades, if it does not constitute a despotism’.281 The risks of reform were again 
repeated. 
For Newdegate, secret voting was just another step in the hazardous direction of 
democracy. ‘Secrecy of voting does seem logically to entail manhood suffrage’, he attested. If 
the people could vote anonymously, they would vote soon, indirectly, for even more suffrage 
extension, he suggested. And if manhood suffrage was reached, ‘as the consequence of the 
secrecy of voting by Ballot’, they would ‘encounter and entail upon the country the evils of 
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democracy’.282 If now electors could conceal their votes, ‘they would no longer be able to 
arrest the further progress in the descent towards democracy’.283 Democracy would be the 
ballot’s inevitable result.284 
One year later, in 1872, when the secret ballot proposal arrived at its second reading, 
Newdegate again opposed the measure. By using the word ‘democracy’ as a word of warning, 
he sought to oppose the ballot; in a way that many MP’s had done five years before. The 
change in the ballot was presented, as in 1866-7, as a ‘fundamental change in the Constitution 
of the country’. And again, it was attested that the freedom of the constitution was threatened 
by the rise of the ‘unchecked democracy’. And again, this would ultimately tend to despotism. 
As Newdegate said it himself: ‘I watch this tendency to unchecked Democracy with jealousy, 
and for this reason – that all modern history proves that Democracy always tends to 
despotism, if it be not itself despotic’.285  
 
4.2.3 County Household Suffrage 
In the end, however, the frightening narrative of democracy’s dangers could not prevent the 
passing of the secret ballot. In 1872 the measure was accepted and in 1874, for the first time, 
elections were held secretly.
286
 Directly one year after, in 1873, another subject related to 
electoral reform arrived on the political agenda: the extension of the franchise in the counties. 
Six year earlier the Second Reform Act had given household suffrage to the boroughs, but the 
counties were left unchanged. This imparity was deemed unfair by an increasing number of 
MP’s. As Gladstone stated in 1872, ‘the present condition of the county franchise’ could not 
‘very long continue’.287 Something should change: the disparity between boroughs and 
counties was sought to resolve.  
Throughout the early 1870s various Radical proposals were discussed in the 
Commons. But although the question aroused some support in the country, and most of the 
leading Liberals showed signs of yielding to the measure, all contemplated measures were 
defeated in the end. The opposition, consisting of most Conservatives and the former 
Adullamite Liberals, were able to stop the controversial expansion. They disliked the idea of 
such an extensive reform, so shortly after the previous one. When one of these proposals was 
discussed, in 1873, the slogan of ‘democracy’ was applied frequently. Even the argument 
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reminds us of 1866 and -7: that passing such a measure would open the way to ‘universal 
suffrage’, the ‘undermining of the constitution’, and the rule of a ‘democracy’.288 Further 
suffrage extension would inevitably lead to a democracy.  
Again, it was Charles Newdegate who, quite solemnly, stuck to the rhetoric of the 
Second Reform Act. In 1873, in fact, he was the only one to make bitter remarks on 
democracy. Only one Member of Parliament chose to respond to his fierce attitude against 
reform: William Forster. He attested that ‘The hon. Member has spent rather a long time in 
this House in prophesying all sorts of evil results as likely to follow from projected legislation 
in a Liberal direction, and then when the anticipated results have accrued, in pointing out how 
no very great evil had followed after all.’289 Before each reform measure Newdegate warned 
that this would be the decisive step towards the evils of democracy, only to conclude 
afterwards that the outcomes were not that disastrous. Why should the House still listen to 
him? If Newdegate now ‘contended that the extension of the franchise to household suffrage 
to occupiers in counties [would] tend towards the bourne of absolute democracy’, his 
arguments possessed no force, Forster claimed.
290
 
With this second-order language, Forster made clear he started to doubt the argument 
that electoral reform would undeniably result in a democratic form of government. Now for 
the third time in seven years, the same argument was made, that this reform measure would be 
the decisive step. Now Forster stopped and looked back: had this same story not been told a 
few times before? Indeed. And had all the horrors of democracy factually become true? They 
had not. Great-Britain’s politics were still stable, secure and safe.   
The fact that now only Newdegate made the argument of ‘democracy’ against the bill, 
and the additional fact that Forster spoke up against it, points in the direction that the ‘reform 
= democracy’ narrative was losing support in the House. Less MP’s felt it applicable or 
relevant to apply it as a slogan against this franchise extension. In the current political 
situation, the concept’s emotional force was simply less strong than in 1866-7. Of course, 
many politicians still had the warnings of that time in the back of their minds. But from the 
negligible political consequences, they could conclude two things. Either democracy had not 
come in 1867; if so, why should the House believe the warnings now, with the very moderate 
measure of the county franchise? Or democracy had indeed come, but if so, if this was 
democracy, then it clearly was not the horrifying thing the opposition parliamentarians had 
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prophesied. Then, democracy was not the revolutionary, equalizing, or despotic system at all. 
The argument thus began to lose its credibility, causing the slogan of ‘democracy’ to lose its 
validity.  
 
4.2.4 Female franchise 
Quite similarly did another reform topic recur on the political agenda: the extension of the 
franchise to women, on the same limited requirements as men. With this aim, throughout the 
1870s, eight separate bills were introduced in the Commons, but all were defeated in the 
end.
291
 For a broad majority of Liberals and Conservatives giving women the vote was out of 
the question: it was almost unimaginable. The vote was the task of respectable men, and after 
household suffrage was brought to the boroughs, the principle was accepted that the man of 
the house voted for his entire household: including his wife.
292
 Only a small minority of 
Radicals thought otherwise, and felt that respectable women should be included. In 1876, one 
of them introduced a proposal that would do so. Curiously, only in this year was the plan 
opposed with the concept of ‘democracy’.  
And in fact, it was only Charles Newdegate who did so; who used the word 
‘democracy’ as a weapon against the women’s vote. His argument is well-known by now: 
adopting this measure would inevitably lead to the establishment of a democracy. If even a 
few women were given the franchise, for the assumption they had a natural ‘right’, how could 
any men be kept out? ‘If you once accept the principle that the franchise is a right, you 
cannot, without inflicting injustice, refuse to adopt manhood suffrage, or even the universal 
suffrage of both sexes’. If women were admitted to the vote, there was no principle left that 
could stop manhood suffrage. Universal suffrage of both sexes would soon follow. From this 
logic, Newdegate concluded that extending the franchise to women, was ‘the most democratic 
measure [...] that could be devised’.293  
It is interesting that Newdegate was the only MP who repeated the statements on the 
negative consequences of democracy. No one responded to him, at least not in the Commons, 
with the use of the word ‘democracy’. In addition, it is notable that over the years, 
Newdegate’s exact word use changed as well. In 1876, he not only said that the measure was 
democratic, and that therefore it was a bad thing. This had been the core of the argument in 
1866-7. Now, Newdegate argued that the Bill was an ‘extreme measure’, with an ‘ultra-
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democratic’ tendency, based on an ‘ultra-democratic principle’.294 The addition of ‘ultra’ 
must have been aimed at attracting some extra attention. Saying ‘democracy’ alone was no 
longer bold enough.  
The repeated use of the term throughout the 1870s, in a stable political environment, 
had stimulated inflation: ‘democracy’ alone was not the terrifying word of warning it used to 
be. Now all the exaggerated warnings of democratic evils had not come true, ‘democracy’ 
was no very frightening prospect any more. This may explain why most MP’s abandoned the 
concept as a slogan in 1876, when women’s suffrage was contemplated. And it explains too, 
that when Newdegate applied it, he sought to strengthen its force by adding suffixes such as 
‘ultra’. Perhaps this former effect even re-enforced the latter one: Newdegate was so isolated 
in the use of this word, ‘democracy’, that he Radicalized his language use even further: to 
maintain the attention that he desired. 
As Newdegate’s word use changed, his arguments altered too. Repeatedly we have 
seen the argument that democracy was essentially ‘despotic’, or, in any case, would lead to 
‘despotism’. Now, Newdegate said the same thing, but went one step further. He came up 
with a – for Anglican Britain – quite far-fetched argument: ‘If the majority of a constituency 
in any country were composed of women, and if the Roman Catholic Church, for example, 
were to become the dominant power in this country […] we should not only have a despotism, 
but probably a despotism, following upon a Democracy, either governed, or overturned as in 
France in 1852 by the internal though extraneous force of the Papal despotism’.295 If women 
were allowed to vote, Great-Britain could thus end up in the tyranny of the Vatican. 
Apparently, to Newdegate, female voters were more susceptible to religious persuasion than 
their male counterparts. 
 
5. POLITICAL INNOVATION: TWO DECISIVE DEVELOPMENTS 
 
5.1 National party organization and professionalization (1868-1880) 
 
5.1.1 Bottom-up developments  
The 1870s might seem an uneventful decade, for most of the reform proposals were quickly 
defeated. Only the secret ballot was passed. The significance of this period, however, lies less 
in the events than in the longer-term developments. In fact, one innovation in particular 
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gradually transformed the form, rules and legitimization of politics: national party 
organization. Already before the Second Reform Act two ‘parties’ existed, the Liberals and 
the Conservatives, but both were merely parliamentary groupings, with a very loose internal 
structure, and with no fixed, national organization connecting them formally to electors in the 
country.
296
 Both two aspects were about to change. The cause of this was ultimately the 
admittance of urban working men to the suffrage: new voters had to be persuaded to vote for 
their party.
297
 They had to be included into politics: national party organization proved an 
effective manner. This severely changed the practice of both electioneering and politics.
298
 
The process started from the ground up:
299
 local associations formed the foundations 
of later national party organizations. In particular working men’s clubs played an important 
part: since decades, working men came together in their own organizations, and after 1867 
political parties sought to sponsor these. As British historian Pugh described it: ‘Politicians 
felt so apprehensive of losing touch with the urban electors that they threw considerable 
resources into extending the network’.300 Both parties started to sponsor working men clubs 
and friendly societies, to spread their values and ideas among its members. And perhaps most 
importantly: their party name. Through these local clubs, they fostered a habitual loyalty. By 
moving beyond strictly political activity, the political parties permeated the daily lives of their 
members.
301
 
At the same time, local parties emerged throughout the country. In several 
(predominantly urban) districts, formal constituency associations were founded based upon 
individual membership. Hundreds or thousands electors could now, for the first time, 
formalize their political loyalty by becoming a member.
302
 And if they wanted, and had the 
time, they could become an active volunteer. These local partisan activists were vital in 
spreading the message and harnessing the voters. In fact, according to Pugh, they formed the 
central element in the political transition of the late nineteenth century: much of the 
canvassing and propaganda work, previously paid for on an ad hoc basis, was now done by 
volunteers out of free will.
303
 They did it out of sheer identification with the party.  
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5.1.2 National organization: Conservatives 
These associations had their origin in local initiatives; they were not caused by strategic plans 
made at the top. It was a matter of time, however, before the separate organizations united 
into national organisations: the local clubs became branches of one national party. The 
Conservatives came first, with the founding of the National Union of Conservative and 
Constitutional Associations (NUCCA) in 1867.
304
 Although this organization was founded 
without co-operation of the parliamentary top, Disraeli soon gave his blessing. National party 
organization thus started from the rank and file, before they were embraced by party leaders.
 
305
  
From the start, the NUCCA functioned mostly as a propaganda machine.
306
 It printed 
and spread pamphlets nationally, to appeal to the working men’s vote. In these pamphlets, it 
was stressed how badly the Liberals fell down on their promises and how beneficial 
Conservative measures had been.
307
 Furthermore, the National Union emphasized the 
Conservative appeal to traditional values: defences of ‘the Church establishment, religious 
education, private property, the Empire, the monarchy, and the union with Ireland’ were 
appreciated by working men too.
308
 The aim of the National Union was thus clearly one-way. 
Or as John Gorst, honorary secretary, stated in 1867: the Union should be ‘not a meeting for 
the discussion of Conservative principles on which we are all agreed, it is only a meeting to 
consider by what particular organization we may make these Conservative principles effective 
among the masses’.309 
Disraeli clearly saw the necessity of connecting to the new voters, and understood the 
utility of party organization.
310
 Therefore, three years later, he founded the Conservative 
Central office: an organization more closely affiliated to the parliamentary Conservatives. 
This agency was designed to stimulate new local associations, maintain contact with them and 
compile lists of candidates.
311
 By 1872 both the Union and the Office were closely linked to 
each other; through a common headquarters and one leading party agent: John Gorst. Via 
Gorst, perhaps Britain’s first spin doctor, the parliamentary Conservative party became 
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connected to the masses of new voters. Gradually the outlines of a modern, national party 
organization could be distinguished. Its success came soon: the victory in the general 
elections of 1874 encouraged the new organization to continue on the chosen path.
312
 
313
 
This may sound as if the Conservatives adapted very quickly to the conditions of a 
mass electorate. It should, however, not be forgotten that many (mostly rural) constituency 
associations remained small and /, and that not all Conservative MP’s were as dynamic as 
Disraeli was.
314
 Much of the parliamentary party was either indifferent, or even hostile, to the 
increased participation of popular movements. Particularly in the rural areas, local notables 
were highly sceptical about the swift changes.
315
 The Conservative case should never be 
based upon programmes of legislation for the working class, they believed. The danger they 
feared was the prospect of the Conservative parliamentary party ridding traditional values, in 
exchange for working men’s votes.316 If the collective influence would increase, their 
individual dominion would diminish.
317
 
 
5.3.3 National organization: Liberals 
Liberal parliamentarians were similarly divided. The local, urban associations were primarily 
Radical in character: they were the broad bases of various working men, increasingly 
interested in a promise named politics. Via their local associations, named ‘caucuses’, they 
wished to make their voices heard.
318
 This, obviously, threatened the position of local 
notables and parliamentary Whigs, who had controlled political power for over centuries. 
They distanced themselves from the development. Thus, when in 1877, the local associations 
united under a national umbrella, named the National Liberal Federation (NLF), the existing 
differences between Whigs and Radicals were intensified.
319
 
The Liberal’s overarching leader, William Gladstone, was brought in a difficult 
position. At first he was sceptic as well, of programme politics in general and the caucuses’ 
pretensions in particular. Nevertheless, he chose to speak on the NLF’s inaugural meeting. 
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Speaking at such popular events convinced Gladstone of the possibilities: this was an 
excellent way to reach great masses of supporters and to spread his message. Therefore, 
throughout the 1870s, Gladstone found ever more reasons to make a performance in public.
320
 
In fact, he was one of the first national leaders to pursue this course; to take the trouble 
to come to the people; to meet them and to speak with them. Over the years Gladstone visited 
industrial centres, spoke on franchise reform, and repeatedly found a willing crowd. Best 
remembered is his famous ‘Midlothian Campaign’, a series of speeches on foreign policy in 
1880. For the general election of that year Gladstone successfully toured a several cities: an 
event cited as the first modern political campaign.
321
 With his long, passionate talks, he 
reached many of the new electors, and, additionally, won himself the name of ‘the people’s 
William’.322  
The subsequent 1880 elections were won by the Liberal party. This outcome surprised 
Conservative activists, who volunteered for the Conservative NUCCA. They blamed the 
supposed lack of party organization for the disappointing results: the Conservatives methods 
did not advance enough to win the new working men’s vote. With the prospect of further 
franchise extension in the counties, something should change. To improve matters in the 
future, the National Union brought out an advice. They demanded an increase in the budget, a 
further professionalization, and in particular more speeches from their parliamentary leaders 
in the country.
323
 Gladstone had set an example. After the 1870s, it had become clear that the 
rules of the electoral battle had changed. Party organization became part of the competition.
324
  
 
5.3.4 From listening to participating 
The outdoor speeches in the country, given by the – now famous – politicians, were attended 
by crowds of thousands. In this setting, of course, not all of the people could hear the speaker. 
Fortunately, every word was written down by journalists, who reprinted the speeches in the 
provincial and national newspapers, and often added their own lively commentary.
325
 These 
articles were highly popular. The spread was stimulated by the removal of stamp duties on 
newspapers in 1855: after this year, the number of published newspapers grew quickly, from 
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795 in 1856 to 2093 in 1886.
326
 Newsprint extended to larger sections of the population, and 
consequently political news and discussion became very popular and fashionable.
327
 
Throughout the 1870s, political debate spread to the people. Speeches were no longer limited 
to Westminster, but sounded throughout the country. For the first time, politicians were heard 
by a broad audience.
328
  
Yet, not everyone was content with mere listening to political speeches: throughout 
the 1870s, more middle- and working class men wanted to participate themselves.
329
 A first 
opportunity to do this was offered by local debating societies. Independent institutions, not 
affiliated to any of the parliamentary parties, sprang up throughout the country. With names 
as ‘Parliament’ or ‘House of Commons’, these local associations copied the Westminster 
parliament in miniature: with a ‘Government’ and an ‘Opposition’, motions and bills, these 
debating chambers ran on the same lines as the national one. Their popularity grew quickly: 
by 1883, over a hundred of towns had them and their total membership reached 35,000.
330
 It 
aided political education, and furthermore, transformed politics into a popular activity. 
331
 
However, in these debating societies, politics remained a mere game: no real influence 
could be exerted on national decisions. Therefore, the local constituency associations came to 
be used. Although the party organizations such as the NUCCA and the NLF were founded 
with a different aim – one-way propaganda – very soon its members wanted something in 
return. They felt party organization could and should be used for something more; they hoped 
it could obtain a representative function as well.
332
 Throughout the 1870s, the Liberal 
caucuses as well as the Conservative clubs developed into centres of discussion. Local 
members debated political issues and came up with their own solutions. Party organization, 
stimulated by the parliamentary leadership, thus soon elicited representative demands from 
the rank and file. 
Eventually the annual, national conferences, too, became the scenes of lively debates. 
No longer was the agenda restricted to organizational strategies, but increasingly substantive 
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political issues were discussed. The NLF and NUCCA meetings started to suggest national 
measures, prepare party programmes, and indicate priorities to the parliamentary leaders.
333
  
This had not been Disraeli’s nor Gladstone’s objective at the start, but it proved a process that 
could hardly be stopped or countered. Via the national organizations, the local party activists 
sought a way to control their representatives in parliament. Caucuses and clubs claimed their 
place: party organization offered them a platform, to influence national politics outside 
election times. Party membership thus offered increasing leverage to the people.
334
 
The Second Reform Act thus changed not only the electoral system. It started a long-
term process of party organization, which formalized and centralized parliamentary politics. 
Furthermore, it changed the relationship between the voters and the parliament; or the people 
and the government.
335
 By the end of the 1870s, British political debate was no longer a 
closed elite affair. It became instead an open national conversation, in which the common 
people – working men included – could have their say. Party activists became increasingly 
numerous, whilst political associations rapidly spread and multiplied. All these members were 
trying, to some degree, to channel their desires into party policy and, ultimately, into 
government legislation.
336
 Although it remains a matter of contention, to which extent they 
succeeded, it cannot be denied that the place of the people in the balance of political power 
was shifting. Though working class men had not taken over parliamentary power, their 
influence had certainly increased.
337
 
 
5.3.5 Professionalization in parliament 
At the same time, parliamentary politics underwent a shift towards professionalization. In a 
relatively short time, electoral rules transformed so much, that historian Pugh dares to say that 
‘the general election of 1880 may, with some justification, be regarded as the first modern 
election’. In this year, he argues, only few parliamentary candidates stood without the benefit 
of a professional party agent and a permanent party organization. This professionalization 
applied not only to electoral procedures, but also to parliamentary conventions. It affected 
political culture in general: while politics used to be a part-time activity before 1867, now it 
became more a full-time career. Under Gladstone, the parliamentary year grew longer, and 
governments made growing demands upon MP’s. Lengthier debates and more complex 
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legislation demanded more time and effort from the individual members: the function of 
backbenchers changed radically.  
 The most important innovation was perhaps the rise of tighter party discipline. 
Although parliamentary members officially remained their individual vote, pressure was 
exerted on them to vote as one block. The Conservative party was most cohesive: from the 
1860s to the 1880s, they voted more often as one, than the Liberals, both in office and in 
opposition. To many contemporaries, these developments seemed to undermine the status of 
the individual MP. Both Conservative and Liberal commentators and parliamentary members 
criticized the innovation: the party collective encroached more and more upon their individual 
time and freedom.
338
 This should be reversed.  
Even within the House of Commons, some Liberals criticized the party-internal 
transformations. They attacked the influence of local caucuses on other MP’s, and argued that 
extra-parliamentary elements subjected politicians to their dictates. According to historian 
Pugh, however, this conclusion was not very accurate. In practice, ‘the NLF invariably lent 
encouragement to MPs in rebellion against the leadership’.339 Nevertheless, these utterances 
are highly relevant, for they portray the perception of parliamentarians themselves towards 
political innovation. How did MP’s reflect on the narrowed gap between parliament and the 
people? Interestingly, they did so with the use of the concept of ‘democracy’. How this 
connection was made, will be highlighted in the next chapter.  
 
5.2 Social composition in the Commons (1868-1874-1880) 
 
5.2.1 Less aristocrats, more businessmen 
We have now dealt with both the changes in the electorate, and changes in the relationship 
between the electorate and parliament, but we have left the changes within parliament aside. 
Can the demise of democracy as a negative slogan not simply be explained by the changed 
composition of parliament? Did perhaps the extension of the franchise change the 
configuration of the Commons so much, that the anti-democratic speakers were voted out? 
Thus, can we relate the development of democracy’s meaning and value to the changing 
composition of parliament?  
To answer this question, let us start with an extensive perspective, and analyse the 
changing configuration from a social-economic viewpoint. What was the background and 
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profession of British parliamentarians, and how did this develop in our period? An article 
written by historian William Whiteley helps us out: he studied the composition of the 
Commons and distinguished between six categories of professions: ‘Who were the men 
elected to parliament between the Second and Third Reform Bills?’, was his main question.340 
From counting the numbers of each category, present in the Commons, Whiteley concluded 
that in the period between 1866 and 1885, significant alterations took place in the social 
structure of the House.
341
 
The first change was the limited decline of the landed aristocracy, who had occupied 
the majority of seats in the House before 1868. As table one shows, within fifteen years, the 
number of aristocrats declined from 437 in 1865 to 325 in 1880. This process was initiated by 
the Second Reform Act: the extension of the franchise to urban workingmen and the 
accompanying redistribution of seats displaced tens of old members. Furthermore, the 
introduction of the secret vote in 1872 reduced corruption and intimidation, which had 
previously favoured the election of aristocratic landlords.
342
 The second transformation 
Whiteley pointed out was the increase of men of new wealth: dozens of businessmen, lawyers 
and other professional men replaced the departing landed aristocrats. The combination of 
industrialization and electoral reform boosted their chances: after the towns had grown, their 
boroughs or counties had received improved parliamentary representation.
343
  
The third development was, of course, the enfranchisement of the urban working men. 
What did this mean for the social composition of the House? As we portrayed earlier, the 
often repeated warnings (of working men obtaining majorities of seats) turned out to be false: 
in reality, the new voters kept the upper- and middle classes in power. This can be explained, 
first, by the changed relationship between parliamentarians and the people. MP’s could no 
longer look down on the working classes; they had become a real influence on which their 
rule depended.
344
 Consequently, parliamentarians were much more sensitive to working class 
demands than before. The innovation of party organisation did its work: the new voters were 
appeased by pamphlets and popular rhetoric. 
Secondly, few working men stood for election themselves, due to the high costs 
involved in getting and keeping a parliamentary seat. Until 1911, parliamentarians received 
no financial support from the state. Nevertheless, in 1874, for the first time, two working men 
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(ex-miners) stood for election and were able to enter the Lower House, representing the 
Liberal party. Their position was made possible by the support of their coal-mining 
constituency: first at the poll booth, and then via a voluntary remittance of a yearly salary.
345
 
In the House, these men joined two sitting tenant farmers, who had represented their district 
from the year 1868.
346
 All these shifts in composition can be found in table 3 (appendix).  
These three changes in the social composition of the House of Commons must, 
however, not be exaggerated. Even in 1880, a majority of seats was still taken up by landed 
aristocrats. In this year, 325 of the 652 representatives belonged to the landed upper class. 
Hence, the decline was gradual, but steady. Different from the pessimistic predictions, it was 
more an evolution than a revolution. Nevertheless, a significant transformation was put in 
motion. There were now entering, for the first time, propertyless members of the middle and 
working classes: for both Conservative and Liberal parties. Hence, the social composition was 
becoming more and more varied, regardless of the party in power. Perhaps most important is 
the fact that the House of Commons was no longer essentially a chamber of landowners. The 
overwhelming aristocratic majority was gone, and their strength and numbers were declining. 
As the American historian Seymour rightly concluded as early as 1915: ‘the Act of 1867 […] 
broke down aristocratic control in many constituencies’.347 
From this fact, an interesting analogy may be made with the concept of ‘democracy’: 
before the Second Reform Act the Lower House was unambiguous on democracy’s meaning 
and value, but after 1868, the clear negative consensus was broken. The cautious decline of 
the landed aristocracy coincided with the decline of democracy’s negative evaluation. And 
while new MP’s entered the House – with each election in 1868, 1874 and 1880 – almost 
simultaneously new meanings arose, with first neutral and then positive connotations. These 
men had real effects on the language of political debate. As Whiteley stated: ‘The newer 
members made significant contributions on a broad range of subjects.’ As an example, he 
mentioned the ‘intellectual Radicals’, who led the fight for ‘further electoral reform’. 
Although a causal link is always difficult to prove, a notable correlation cannot be denied.  
 
5.2.2 The demise of democracy’s critics 
Perhaps we can test this hypothesis by switching to an intensive viewpoint: by analysing the 
composition of the Commons not by looking at classes, but at individual men. Let us therefore 
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focus on the political careers of the particular MP’s, who used the word ‘democracy’ in the 
parliamentary debates. Can we relate the change in democracy’s evaluation to the shifts 
within parliament? To assess the gradual demise of democracy as a negative slogan, which 
started during the 1870s, the main question we need to answer is the following: when did the 
MP’s parliamentary career end? An analysis of the careers of the foremost opponents of 
parliamentary reform – those enthusiast operators of the negative slogan of ‘democracy’, 
often quoted in chapter three – might lead to a tentative indication.  
During the 1866-7 parliamentary reform debates, a group of about twenty-four 
members of the opposition side actively and repeatedly used the concept of ‘democracy’ in a 
negative way. Although these twenty-four were not the only ones criticizing reform and 
‘democracy’, they were indeed the forefront: the most active and original users, who shaped 
the political discourse  which others merely copied and quoted. For their leading role, most of 
the narrative of the first part is based on the quotes of these selected twenty-four. Did this 
group of MP’s survive the first general election of 1868? And the subsequent elections in the 
years after? 
Already six of them quit parliamentary politics before 1869: Edward Bulwer, 
Christopher Griffith, Matthew Marsh, James Stanhope, and James Whiteside were either not 
re-elected or voluntarily left the Commons in 1868. Robert Cecil left the parliament as well in 
that year, but did not abandon politics completely: he was still at the start of a long and 
successful political career.
348
 In the next elections, of 1874, four additional members were 
displaced: John Coleridge, Walter Meller, John Pakington and Charles York did not return in 
the House. And six more sat in the House until 1880: Charles Adderley, George Bowyer, 
Alexander Baillie-Cochraine, Gathorne Hardy, Edward Horsman, Robert Lowe, and Robert 
Montagu. Charles Russell quit in 1882. Thus, in the three elections after the Second Reform 
Act, sixteen active opponents had left the House: they had either quit voluntarily, were not re-
elected, or had died.
349
  
Hence, when the Third Reform Act was discussed in 1884, 16 out of 24 – two-third – 
of the most active critics of ‘democracy’ had disappeared from the House of Commons. Eight 
were re-elected continuously: they sat long enough to witness both the Second and the Third 
Reform Act debates: William Baxter, Samuel Laing and Charles Newdegate remained their 
seats until 1885, after the passing of the Third Reform Act. Alexander Beresford Hope sat 
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until 1887, Henry Selwin until 1892 and Michael Hicks-Beach even until 1906. Of these men, 
Charles Newdegate was the fiercest opponent of ‘democracy’, who continued to press against 
further parliamentary reform for many years. In fact, he was the only one to do so; he upheld 
his rhetoric of democracy’s dangers until his death in 1887.  
Only one MP had switched sides: Samuel Laing. While in 1866 he had still worried 
about democracy’s effects, ten years later he openly appreciated the democratic outcomes of 
the Second Reform Act. The other men simply kept silent about the concept. William Baxter, 
Alexander Beresford-Hope, and Henry Selwin did not mention ‘democracy’ at all after 1867, 
although they sat in the House for years after. The same holds for William Gladstone: in the 
1870s and 1880s he rarely used the word in the Commons. Perhaps these men realised, as 
Laing had, that all the negative consequences – founded in the word ‘democracy’ – had not 
come true, but different from him, did not want to explicate their error in the House. Or, if 
they had retained their negative evaluation, felt that the slogan had lost its emotional force. It 
had been used too often, without success in stopping parliamentary reform.  
From these facts, we can conclude that the use of democracy as a negative slogan 
faded, at the same time as its previous representatives disappeared from the House. But was 
there also a causal link between these two developments? This position is hard to defend. 
Sixteen out of the twenty-four members had left the Commons in 1880, but still, of the 
remaining eight, seven members abandoned the slogan anyway. Only Charles Newdegate 
maintained his agitation. Therefore, it seems more plausible that the slogan itself was getting 
worn out. Over the 1870s, it lost its force and applicability.  
Nevertheless, the displacement of MP’s may have amplified this process: the less the 
slogan was repeated in the 1870s, the less new parliamentarians could connect to it. New 
MP’s, elected in 1868, 1874, and 1880, were unfamiliar with the debates of the Second 
Reform Act, and rarely heard the word ‘democracy’ in its negative sense. Furthermore, these 
new politicians brought new values into the House. An increasing number of them, of course, 
was elected by the working men’s vote, and could surely not be against it. As we shall see, 
consequently, the evaluation of ‘democracy’ in the Lower House gradually improved.  
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6. A SECOND MEANING EMERGED: SYNONYM OF ‘THE PEOPLE’ 
 
6.1 ‘The democracy’: no slogan but a fact (1868-1871) 
 
6.1.1 The people, or a part of it 
During the 1870s, a pivotal development took place in the concept’s meaning, which has not 
yet been fully discussed. From 1868 on, an additional meaning of ‘democracy’ was added in 
the Common’s parliamentary debates. No longer was ‘democracy’ only a form of 
government; instead, it also became a synonym for ‘the people’ themselves: ‘the population’, 
or at least a part of it. With this meaning, ‘democracy’ was always said in combination with 
the article ‘the’. Thus, ‘the democracy’ meant ‘the people’. A glimpse of this we already 
witnessed in paragraph 3.4.6, in a few of the 1866 speeches, but now, its usage grew quickly. 
Thus, while in 1866-7 ‘democracy’ was conventionally said to refer to a distant or future form 
of government, in the following years ‘the democracy’ was increasingly said to designate 
something in the present: the people. Exact numbers can be found in graph 3 and 4 of the 
appendix. 
 In the period 1868-1871 the word was often applied in this new way. It should 
therefore not surprise anyone that ‘democracy’ no longer solely appeared in debates on 
parliamentary reform or franchise extension, but can be found in speeches on various topics. 
In a debate on the Church in Ireland, for example, William Johnston (Orangeman, Radical 
Irish MP)
350
 mentioned that he ‘was not afraid to face the Protestant democracy of the 
country’.351 In this sentence, the word democracy could easily be replaced with ‘part of the 
population’, without changing its meaning. Two months later, William Charley (lawyer and 
Conservative MP)
352
 talked about ‘the Conservative democracy of the country’, and said he 
was their ‘representative’.353 He claimed that this democracy would support the passing of a 
certain bill. Thus, ‘the democracy’, now meant as much as a ‘part of the population’. 
However, it remains unclear whether it meant the Protestant and Conservative common 
people, or all the Protestant and Conservative people. Or did it only mean the voters? We 
cannot be sure. 
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 In many cases, ‘the democracy’ was mentioned without the addition of an adjective as 
‘Conservative’ or ‘Protestant’. In 1870, for example, in a debate on education laws, George 
Dixon (educational reformer and MP)
354
 sought to describe the current state of politics, and 
touched upon the concept as well. He attested that ‘they had one of the strongest governments 
that had existed for many years’, and added that ‘they were supported by a democracy whose 
power had not yet been fully developed’.355 From this we can conclude with confidence that 
‘a democracy’ must have meant ‘the people’ or at least a part of it. The addition that its 
‘power had not yet been fully developed’ suggests that Dixon referred to the working classes, 
who three years earlier had received the vote.  
  
6.1.2 The working classes 
This interpretation of ‘the democracy’, as essentially ‘the working classes’, was explicated 
more clearly in a speech held by Edward Craufurd (Scottish Radical MP)
356
, who expressed 
himself in a debate on the taxation of rifles. He claimed that the Chancellor of the Exchequer 
now introduced a taxation measure, because he ‘had no confidence in the democracy’.357 
What did ‘the democracy mean here? The whole nation or just a part of it? Craufurd must 
have thought chiefly of the lower classes, as he directly added that the imminent measure 
‘would take away the power of reaction from the lower orders’.358  
 This definition of the lower or the working classes, was taken up as well by Frederick 
Corrance (Conservative)
359
; an MP who in 1871 stated that the main differences in the House 
were based on differences between ‘local and class interests’. Boroughs stood against 
counties, upper classes against working classes. He wondered what would be the 
consequence, ‘whenever interests clashed’. If the boroughs won this stride, ‘they would find 
themselves in the hands of an irresponsible democracy of the large cities’, he said. 360 The 
‘politics of an urban democracy’ would then rule: the lower classes, which lived in British 
towns. Their ‘democratic’ rule would be chaotic. 
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 No parliamentarian reflected on this shift in meaning in second-order language; not in 
the House of Commons itself, at least. The MP’s added a meaning to a word without 
mentioning it, almost as if it was a completely different word at all. Of course it was not: the 
only difference was the use of an article or not. However, its meaning was separated from the 
start. Whereas ‘democracy’ had been a political slogan, which succeeded in 1866-7 in 
yielding emotional responses, ‘the democracy’ was no slogan at all. No longer was the noun 
restricted to the topic of parliamentary reform; it was applied in various subjects. 
Interestingly, it seemed to show no added value, compared to the already existing concept of 
‘the people’: its meaning was just as vague and broad. And similarly to this synonym, it 
carried neither inherent positive nor negative values. It was essentially a neutral fact, used by 
both Conservatives, Liberals and Radicals, to either acclaim the support of ‘the people’ or to 
condemn it.  
 
6.2 Criticizing its influence (1871-1877) 
 
6.2.1 Obeying the democracy 
In the next few years, however, from 1871 to 1877, the concept of ‘the democracy’ was less 
used to designate ‘the people’ in a positive way, and increasingly to assign the negative 
effects of the Second Reform Act. Most utterances of ‘the democracy’ in this period were 
made by parliamentarians, who looked back on the changes of the Second Reform Act and 
critically assessed the way the ‘rules’ of politics had changed since. In particular, they 
criticized the way that ‘the democracy’ had increased their influence on political affairs. 
While in the period 1868-1871, ‘the democracy’ had a fairly neutral meaning, in the following 
years it was associated most often with negative values. How this meaning developed in the 
1870s, is explained in this paragraph. 
It all started in 1871, when the House of Commons debated on the ‘abolition of 
purchase’ (of military ranks) in the British Army. John Pakington opposed this measure, for 
he thought it was a ‘costly, party, crotchety project’. The plan at hand would not contribute to 
‘the national defences of the country’, would only cost money, and was only chosen from a 
desire to adopt a ‘democratic system’, he stated. Most important: Pakington said it was a ‘sop 
to democracy’.361 By saying this he suggested that the bill was not introduced for its rational 
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necessity, but only proposed to please some parts of the population. The measure was a mere 
bribe, used to obtain the favour of the people.  
This was no valid motive for legislation, Pakington implied. According to him, the 
government acted ‘in the vain hope of satisfying the appetite of that insatiable monster’.362 
With this, he meant ‘the people’, ‘the voters’, or perhaps ‘the working classes’. About this 
exact meaning, we cannot be too sure. The democracy meant, here, the people, or at least a 
part of it. Their influence on politics had clearly increased: a development Pakington seemed 
to regret. Now the government only sought the democracy’s approval, they neglected their 
true task, he feared. The form of representation was changing, now the gap between the 
government and ‘the democracy’ had shrunk. 
A similar argument was made one year later, by Henry Fawcett, who also argued that 
the influence of ‘the democracy’ was growing. According to him, this was a dangerous 
process, for it might lead to the rise of ‘socialism’. Socialism was summed up by him as the 
policy of ample state intervention: the State was to provide ‘land for the people at a low 
price’, ‘houses at a cheap rate’, and, most dangerous of all: ‘free education’. In fact, free 
education was ‘the first plank in the programme of the International’.363 This ‘socialism’ 
might come upon them ‘at any time’, Fawcett maintained, as now even Disraeli, while 
‘striving for place and power’, ‘would not object to make Socialist bids for the support of the 
Democracy’.364 In one of Disraeli’s speeches, half a year before, he had apparently made 
‘Socialistic’ promises to the British voters, to gain their support. The increased influence of 
the people now threatened the independent position of politicians. 
This shift in representative behaviour caused the ‘great danger of Democracy’, 
Fawcett suggested. If politicians merely echoed the people, they would soon make ‘repeated 
and increasing demands’ upon the state budget, and nourish irresponsible policies such as free 
education. This was completely out of line with the laws of current economic thought. ‘The 
people’, however, lacked any such knowledge; Fawcett worried: the ‘popular notion as to the 
Consolidated fund [the government’s bank account] was that it was a perennial source of 
wealth, kept full by the bounty of nature, and that in the general scramble for it the more any 
constituency could get the better’.365 The people did not understand that the government’s 
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money came out of the pockets of the ratepayers: the voters themselves! State extravagance 
would harm them and the economy. Any obedience from parliament to ‘the democracy’ or 
‘popular feeling’ was therefore unintelligent.366 
 
6.2.2 Two meanings separated 
Hence, a few years after the passing of the Second Reform Act, it gradually dawned upon 
several MP’s that the conventions of politics were changing. While ‘democracy’ was used 
less as a warning for the future, it was increasingly applied to assess the reality of the present. 
The key innovation was the changing relationship between parliamentarians and voters. Now 
even Disraeli made direct promises to his voters about future policy; an indication that the gap 
between parliament and the people had shrunk. Whereas parliamentarians used to listen to 
public opinion, then weigh and assess it with their own critical minds, now some politicians 
directly listened to the people, and tried to please them where they could. The critical 
assessment and reflection by the educated, intelligent, better part of the population was thus 
taken away from the process. ‘Representation’ came to mean more a reflection of popular 
wishes than the vague inspiration of popular opinion. 
This idea that the influence of ‘the democracy’ in politics had been growing was 
broadly acknowledged: it was perceived as a fact. But from this, neither Pakington nor 
Fawcett concluded that the innovation in representation had also changed the form of 
government. No critic said that now they had an influential democracy, they had also become 
a ‘democracy’. They clearly distinguished the two meanings of the word in their discourse. 
This total separation of two narratives – based around the same noun – might seem rather odd, 
as if having a democracy and being a democracy was completely unrelated to each other.  
However, we can detect some logic in the full separation. Perhaps, in the 1870s, the 
‘negative’ narrative of the Second Reform Act – the story of democracy as a warning, a 
distant but frightful form of government – was too jaded, too worn out, to be repeated again. 
Instead of warning for the future, most critics of the people’s influence chose to attack the real 
and visible changes occurring before their eyes. For them, it made more sense to talk about 
‘the democracy’, to pinpoint exactly where the problem lay (the influence of ‘the people’, or 
‘the working classes’), than to fall back on the vague warnings against a political system. The 
problem now was simply not a future form of government, but the current changes in the 
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form of representation. These innovations should be reversed. The two narratives were 
therefore not connected. 
 
6.3 Mode of persuasion: Logos 
This interpretation of democracy’s second meaning, as a mere ‘fact’, can be related to the 
second of Aristotle’s modes of persuasion: Logos. Logos can be translated as ‘argumentation’ 
and meant as much as the ‘content’ of a speech. 367In the view of the old Greek thinker, this 
was the core of any plea: it is the combination of standpoints and effective arguments. As 
Emeritus Professor in the History of rhetoric Antoine Braet stresses, these standpoints need to 
have a basis in reality, to be able to convince someone.
368
 Therefore, every speaker makes 
assertions about states of affairs in reality: facts of existence that can be checked by others; or 
value-based assumptions, that he shares with his audience. Subsequently, he builds up his 
arguments based on these facts and values. If he succeeds in doing so, he has taken the first 
and important step towards persuasion.
369
 
As we saw in this chapter, the concept of ‘the democracy’ came to be part of the ‘standpoints’ 
in speeches. It was not aimed to trigger emotion, nor was it part of any particular type of 
argument. Instead, it was a building block of several different arguments, used to refer to 
actual facts present in reality. To say ‘the democracy’ was to mention a group of people 
outside parliament: it referred to the current state of affairs. It was neither controversial nor 
disputed: it was a fact upon which every MP agreed. The ‘logos’ was clear: Great-Britain in 
the 1870s had a ‘democracy’ (a people), it was there, and could be mentioned in several 
subjects of debate, by any Member of the House. 
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6.4 Four key actors (1868-1878) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
William Forster       Charles Newdegate 
(Liberal MP 1861-1886)     (Conservative MP 1843-1885) 
 
 
 
Henry Fawcett      John Pakington 
(Liberal MP 1865-1884)     (Conservative MP 1837-1874) 
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PART III: THE THIRD REFORM ACT DEBATES (1878-1885) 
 
7. THE FIRST MEANING REVALUATED: DISTANT FORM OF GOVERNMENT  
 
7.1 Reform on the agenda, again (1874-1880) 
Despite the changes in political organization and social composition, further parliamentary 
reform remained the wish of a minority of MP’s, throughout the 1870s. This minority 
consisted mostly out of Liberal Members, including the Radicals. They were in favour of 
further enfranchisement, with as their main aim the extension of household suffrage to the 
counties.
370
 For a broad majority in the House, though, such a measure went too far. The 
cabinets too opposed it: for the Liberal ministry of Gladstone (1868-1874), the time was not 
right for yet another reform, and after the elections of 1874 the reform-sceptic Conservatives 
won a majority in the Commons. Therefore, from 1874 on, the county reform was lost out of 
sight. Disraeli was able to form his second ministry, which would sit on the government 
benches until 1880.
371
  
No one expected the Conservatives to reform the counties.
372
 Their previous reform of 
1867 was passed mostly because of party political considerations, but now the conditions 
were very different. Now they had a sound majority in the Commons, and no electoral benefit 
of reform. Extending the vote in the counties, their traditional home base, was risky, and 
furthermore, a popular organization pressing for change was again absent. Hence, the only 
effect of introducing such a controversial measure could be to split their party. Therefore, 
Conservatives did not propose any franchise extension, nor any redistribution of seats. When 
the topic was discussed, it was because Liberal MP’s made proposals in the Commons. They 
maintained it on the political agenda, until Disraeli’s cabinet was through.373  
The national elections of 1880 seemed to end the stalemate. After six years of 
Conservative rule the Liberal Party won a large majority in the Commons, allowing Gladstone 
to form his second cabinet. The Liberals, who had for years discussed parliamentary reform, 
but could not achieve anything, now had the matter in their own hands again. They were 
expected to finally settle the county household suffrage. However, old divisions remained to 
exist: Whig aristocrats, still suspicious of reform measures, had not lost their influence. 
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Gladstone even appointed some in his new cabinet.
374
 The broad Liberals party was split 
between its two wings: progressive Radicals on the one hand, and Conservative Whigs on the 
other. This division delayed a decision on reform. 
It was for this reason that the matter of the household franchise in the counties was not 
easily settled.
375
 As we saw before, a Liberal majority in the Commons did not mean a 
majority in favour of reform. Years of debates circled around the same theme. The issue of 
the county franchise remained on the political agenda throughout the early 1880s – until a 
majority was found in favour. It was increasingly debated, especially since 1878: the year in 
which the Commons remembered the passing of the Second Reform Act, now ten years 
before. This induced its members to reflect on the current state of politics. What had been the 
results of the previous reform measure, and how should a next one look like? How had 
representation changed, and what could be improved? While answering these questions, the 
House reflected regularly on the meaning of the word ‘democracy’.  
In these parliamentary debates, the dichotomy between the two meanings of 
‘democracy’ was maintained. While in some speeches ‘democracy’ was still a distant form of 
government, a warning for the future, in others, ‘the democracy’ meant ‘the people’, a present 
entity which had already obtained political influence. These two narratives were reiterated 
from 1878 on. This continuation, however, does not imply that nothing changed. Quite the 
opposite is true: because ‘democracy’ was now so highly debated, it becomes clear that 
certain elements were profoundly disputed. Although the Members of Parliament not always 
confronted each other with their different notions; from several speeches we learn that they 
had very different thoughts on democracy. Within each of the two narratives, there was no 
agreement on the exact value or the meaning of the concept. Therefore, all the contested 
elements will be discussed, in this chapter and the next. This will portray how contested 
‘democracy’ was, from 1878 to 1885. 
 
7.2 Contested meaning and value (1878-1882) 
 
7.2.1 The rule of one class 
Among the parliamentarians who spoke of ‘democracy’ as a future form of government, there 
was an important disagreement on the concept’s exact meaning. Who would rule in a 
democratic system? For Robert Lowe, the main opponent of suffrage extension and 
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democracy in 1867, ‘democracy’ still meant the class rule of the lower classes. But, perhaps 
surprisingly, he rarely used his old slogan of ‘democracy’. In 1878, he only repeated his old 
argument once: when he said he objected ‘to any class, high or low, having the whole political 
power of the State.’ Be it a plutocracy or a democracy, the objection is the same. No one class 
is fit to govern by itself’.376 In 1879, again, Lowe brought up the concept of ‘democracy’ only 
once. He seemed reluctant to do so, as he stated first that he was ‘not going to say anything 
against democracy’. Yet, he then started repeating all his known arguments against this form 
of government. It was not ‘durable’, it would disturb the balance, and it would put the 
institutions in peril. He still maintained a democracy would land them into ‘difficulties from 
which there will be no retreat’.377  
Although his arguments were the same as in 1866-7, Lowe’s style had changed. He no 
longer held lengthy speeches on every negative aspect of democracy. After repeating his 
known statements, Lowe quickly apologized to the House, ‘for having detained it so long’.378 
What did he mean by this; where were the fierce speeches? We cannot be sure. It sounds 
almost as if Lowe did not want to interfere with the matter too much. He only mentioned 
‘democracy’ to stress that ‘this question is not so easy a matter’ as [hon. Members] think it 
is’.379 For Lowe, in any case, the concept still meant the rule of one class, the lower or 
working classes. ‘Democracy’ was still part of the same argument as in 1866-7, in which any 
suffrage extension, and any step towards democracy, was rejected.  
In 1883, Arthur Arnold (writer and Radical MP)
380
 applied the concept of democracy 
in a similar way, although he took the very opposite position: in favour of it. Arnold first 
quoted the Conservative Robert Cecil, who ‘was afraid of the class “the largest in numbers”, 
and had said that ‘democracy like death, gives back nothing’.381 In this view, democracy thus 
was the rule of the most numerous class. This was the working class, Arnold explained: 
working men would rule Great-Britain of the future. In his own words: Robert Cecil ‘should 
despair of the future of the country if he did not see that the increase in the power of the 
working class was inseparable from that future’.382 Arnold therefore suggested that ‘his right 
hon. Friend might become better acquainted with the most numerous class’. Class rule was 
coming: whether he liked it or not. 
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7.2.2 Or government by the whole people? 
This quote already indicates that the authority of Robert Lowe and Robert Cecil – on this 
subject – was not as undisputed as it had been ten years before. Now a Radical repeated 
Cecil’s words: not to criticize its definition, but to appreciate the outcome that was meant to 
frighten. Nevertheless, this explanation of democracy’s meaning as the rule of only one class 
was not shared by all reformist politicians. Quite the contrary: in the late 1870s, several 
parliamentarians stepped up to promote their own interpretation. Arthur Kavanagh 
(Conservative)
383
 was one of them. He elaborated on the topic and explained that, to him, the 
‘equal representation of all classes’ was the key element of democracies.384 This was the 
exact opposite of Lowe’s and Cecil’s explanations: whereas they had always maintained that 
democracy was the rule of one class, Kavanagh stressed democracy meant the rule of all 
classes.  
This contrast can logically be explained by the different value they attached to this 
system: while Lowe still opposed democracy, Kavanagh claimed in fact that ‘the true 
principle of a safe and sound democracy’ was the ‘safest, broadest basis upon which a 
Constitution could rest’.385 He argued that Great-Britain’s development towards ‘democracy’ 
was a good thing. For this exact reason, to make democracy an acceptable concept, he 
provided the word with a positive definition. If democracy was not the rule of one class, but 
instead, the ‘equal representation of all classes’, it became acceptable at once. If democracy 
was the inclusion of all, and not the tyranny of one class, the chief argument against it was 
removed right away. In this view, democracy was a system that not yet existed, but that they 
should aspire for the future.  
Two days later, Rowland Blennerhassett (journalist and Liberal MP)
386
 repeated the 
words chosen by Kavanagh. He also claimed that ‘the true principle of democracy is the 
government of the people by the whole people equally represented, not the government of the 
people by a majority of the people exclusively represented.’387 The old principle that 
democracy was the ‘tyranny of a majority’ was now literally denied. While in 1867 most 
proponents of suffrage extension had opposed ‘democracy’, eleven years later, the proponents 
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of further extension used ‘democracy’ in a clear positive way. The previous meanings of 
‘majority’ or ‘one class rule’ therefore had to be replaced. 
Four years later, Blennerhassett explained his thoughts on ‘democracy’ even further. 
According to him, the question was now ‘to reconcile the rapid advance of democracy, 
consequent on the extension of the franchise, with the rights and liberties of every section of 
the people—how, in a Reform Bill, to unite generosity and intelligence.’388 Thus, if the 
franchise was extended, they advanced towards democracy: this was a good thing. The only 
danger they should evade was that, somehow, the ‘now unenfranchised’ would get the ‘whole 
power in their hands’. Then, the ‘rights and liberties’ of minorities would not be safe, he 
suggested. This was exactly what Lowe had argued, and had presented as the definition of 
‘democracy’. Blennerhassett opposed this interpretation; and argued that such a majority rule, 
the dominance of one class, had nothing to do with ‘democracy’ at all. ‘To that the true 
principles of democracy itself were opposed’, he maintained: ‘those principles required the 
just presentation of the whole people, and of every class in the people’.389 Democracy thus 
now carried a positive value: it meant the representation of every class. 
 
7.2.3 No power can prevent it 
Although it was contested who would rule in a democracy, it is clear that for all these 
parliamentarians, ‘democracy’ meant a certain, distant form of government, and potentially 
the system of Great-Britain in the future. But how would they become it? Did they still have a 
choice? Or was the rise of democracy unstoppable, and perhaps even, inevitable? The 
expectations in this respect were highly diverse. Before we elaborate further on one of these 
perspectives, let us remember the water metaphor that had been used frequently in the debates 
of the Second Reform Bill: the act was a floodgate which unleashed a devastating wave of 
democracy. A similar figure of speech was now used with the opposite aim, by the proponents 
of democracy and reform.  
 George Morgan (lawyer and Liberal MP)
390
, for example, brought up the metaphor 
again in 1879, and explained its meaning most clearly. Indeed, they were in the middle of a 
‘wave of democracy’, he said, and argued that ‘they had as little chance of resisting the wave 
of democracy by opposing this proposal as the Danish King had of resisting the rising of the 
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tide.’391 This was a reference to a legend about Cnut the Great, a mediaeval King, who had 
arrogantly commanded the tide of the sea to halt, but had failed to do so. He could not stop 
nature. In the legend, Cnut had then admitted there was no King but God, and hung his gold 
crown on a crucifix.
392
 With this comparison, Morgan emphasized that ‘democracy’ was an 
uncontrollable force, such as the sea, that could not be resisted, even if they tried. 
Blennerhassett thought too that ‘democracy’ could no longer be stopped, but left the 
metaphors behind. Already in 1878, he argued avowedly that ‘the democratic extension of the 
franchise must go on; there is no power in the country that can stop it now’.393 This 
explanation, too, made it sound almost as if the democratic extension was a force of nature; as 
if the Commons did not have the decision in its own hands. Blennerhasset’s view on this does 
point in this direction, as he argued that ‘active and permanent forces in the life of the nation 
are constantly at work, which erelong will bear us onwards more rapidly than ever towards 
the ultimate triumph of democratic principles’.394 They had started a process of 
democratization that could now not be stopped. 
Clearly, Blennerhasset was in favour of this democratization process: now the ‘petty 
shopkeepers, the tradesmen, and the artisans’ were admitted in the boroughs, how could ‘the 
large mass of precisely similar population which happens to reside beyond the existing 
borough boundaries’ be kept out? The boundaries between boroughs and counties were rather 
artificial, Blennerhasset suggested, and therefore made no valid motive to exclude thousands 
of miners and farmers.
395
 Furthermore, the agricultural population, ‘described a few years 
[earlier] as that mute and helpless multitude who [had] never made their voices heard in the 
din of politics, or their presence felt in any social movement’, were now ‘clamouring to be let 
in’.396 Perhaps it was this social pressure from below which, in Blennerhassett’s view, made 
democracy an unstoppable force. 
Blennerhassett thus agreed that democracy was now ‘inevitable’. In 1879, he added 
that the imminent change would also be ‘irrevocable’. The next Reform Bill, which was now 
contemplated, would extend the suffrage in the counties, so that ‘a wide democratic franchise 
all over the country’ was established. Such a step was not far away, Blennerhassett 
prophesied, ‘within no distant date’ it could become ‘an accomplished fact’. Then Great-
                                               
391 George Morgan, Hansard, March 4, 1879. 
392 Henry of Huntingdon, The Chronicle of Henry of Huntingdon, comprising The History of England, From the 
Invasion of Julius Caesar to the accession of Henry II. (1853) 199. 
393 Rowland Blennerhassett, Hansard, March 8, 1878. 
394 Rowland Blennerhassett, Hansard, March 8, 1878. 
395 Rowland Blennerhassett, Hansard, March 8, 1878. 
396 Rowland Blennerhassett, Hansard, March 8, 1878. 
95 
 
Britain would become a true democracy. They were not yet there, but very, very close. 
Blennerhassett made these remarks to emphasize the need to set up safeguards in time, so that 
‘the rights and liberties of every section of the community’ were ensured. The ‘supremacy of 
numbers’ had potential dangerous effects, that needed to be checked, he claimed.397 
Democracy was on its way and they should better be prepared.  
 
7.2.4 Or could it be stopped? 
Of these two MP’s, Morgan was fully in favour of the imminent and inevitable democracy, 
while Blennerhassett also admitted some dangers that should be checked. Many other MP’s 
shared this anxiety, but, different from Blennerhassett, felt they could still prevent 
‘democracy’. According to them, it was a force that could still be stopped. George Bowyer for 
example, admitted in 1880 that ‘the tendency of the present time was in the direction of 
democracy, not only abroad, but in this country’. Again, it was ‘the tide which was setting in 
that direction’, but according to Bowyer, this tide could still be ‘stemmed’.398 Therefore, he 
opposed a motion in which the House considered the shortening of the duration of 
Parliaments. Taking such a measure might stimulate the democratic tide: this he did not want. 
The main subject in which ‘democracy’ figured, though, was clearly the potential next 
reform bill, that would extend the suffrage in the counties. Claud Hamilton (Conservative)
399
 
fiercely opposed any such measure. He argued that if a new Reform Bill was passed, and 
‘every householder’ in the country, in both borough and county, was given the vote, there was 
no principle left to stop there. ‘Why should not every man have an equal right?’, he asked 
ironically. Every ‘poor fellow’ should then be admitted to the vote as well. ‘What harm would 
it do?’, he asked, as if it was a very light or easy question. Household suffrage in the counties 
would soon lead to ‘manhood suffrage’: ‘and there they would be, with universal suffrage, 
and equal electoral districts – pure, unrestricted, sublime democracy’400. For Hamilton, 
democracy’s meaning was clear: a system based on universal suffrage.  
This idea that extending the suffrage in the counties would lead towards a democracy 
was shared as well by George Goschen (financier and moderate Liberal MP)
401402
. In 1878, 
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when the topic was explored, he raised an expressive question: was it ‘safe for the House or 
the country at this time of day to cast its sword into the scale of democracy?’ He himself 
answered first: ‘He did not think it was’.403 According to both Hamilton and Goschen, 
whether or not the British government was to be democratic, was still a choice. If now a new 
Reform Act was passed, this might turn out to be the definite step towards a democratic form 
of rule. Any further change in the franchise was therefore a delicate matter. Hence, 
‘democracy’ was still a controversial concept with distinct negative connotations. 
Such rhetoric reminds us of the arguments made earlier, most often in the 1866-7 
debates. It implied that the House still had the choice whether or not to proceed towards a 
democracy: passing a next reform bill would open the way, but rejecting it would halt the 
process. Democracy was thus not an inevitable force, and could still be stopped. But different 
from 1866-7, between 1878 and 1882 more MP’s had the idea that they had proceeded 
further, and were closer to a democracy than before. That is why Charles Warton (barrister 
and Conservative MP)
404
 said in 1881 that now was ‘a time when they were trembling on the 
brink of a democracy.’405 With other words, they were very close to becoming a democracy. 
He perceived it as a frightening prospective: they were ‘trembling’. Only one small push was 
enough to fall off the brink, and into the hands of the democracy. A new Reform Act could 
exactly be such a decisive push.  
This idea that ‘democracy’ was something of the imminent future was shared by 
Frederick Inderwick (lawyer and Liberal MP)
406
. In 1883, he responded to a distinct argument 
that some MP’s had made to defend female suffrage. Lord Beaconsfield, for one, had said that 
‘female suffrage is the best, if not the only, effectual barrier to an ever-increasing 
Democracy’.407 This argument was founded on a fallacy, Inderwick contended. The tendency 
of the franchise was only downwards – ‘it cannot be raised’ – and eventually it would get so 
low that ‘men of bad and revolutionary passions’ would obtain the vote. Admitting women to 
the suffrage, though based on the same conditions, would not change anything, Inderwick 
argued: this would only add ‘the bad passions of a low class of women’.408 The best thing 
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they could do, thus, to halt the ‘ever-increasing democracy’, was to stop any lowering of the 
franchise. No further extensions to men, or to women, he suggested. Democracy was a 
process that should now be stopped. 
 
7.3 The Third Reform Act Debates (1884-1885) 
 
7.3.1 Reforms of Gladstone (1883-1885) 
When Gladstone led his second cabinet (1880-1885), he had two leading reform priorities: 
dealing with electoral corruption and settling household franchise in the counties. The former 
aim was settled in 1883, when the government succeeded in passing its Corrupt and Illegal 
Practices Bill.
409
 Despite the introduction of the secret ballot, eleven years before, electoral 
malpractices continued to exist. Additional measures were therefore taken. By criminalizing 
attempts to bribe or intimidate voters, and standardizing the amounts that could be spent on 
election expenses, Gladstone’s cabinet hoped to stop corruption. Candidates should now 
publish their campaign expenses and could only employ one paid election official. 
Consequently, campaigns came to depend more on volunteers, and voting increasingly 
became an individual act of choice and conscience.
410
  
The second important step towards reform taken by this cabinet followed in the next 
year: 1884. In this year a major Third Reform Act was proposed. The reason that Gladstone 
took four years to come up with this, was the silent agreement that, after a Reform Act, a 
parliamentary dissolution and a general election should soon follow. 
411
 Had they proposed 
their reform as soon as 1880, then Gladstone’s second ministry would only have lasted 
shortly. Therefore the cabinet chose to wait. But when in the autumn of 1883 Radicals 
throughout the country organized large meetings, to demand the county suffrage, and the trade 
unions urged Gladstone for the same thing, his cabinet undertook action.  
After more than a decade of repeated debates on reform, finally the government itself 
proposed a bill that would establish household suffrage in the counties. This measure was, 
peculiarly – very different from all the previous parliamentary reform measures – not the 
result of a politicized debate, nor the outcome of party political considerations. The settlement 
was instead the result of inter-party negotiations, between the leaders of both the Conservative 
and the Liberal party. They came together to agree on compromise changes with mutual 
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advantage in mind. Neither the masses nor the parliament brought about reform this time: 
agreement was reached behind the closed doors of statesmen’s houses.  
Both the outlines and the details of the Third Reform Act had been discussed between 
the party leaders before they introduced it to parliament. Consequently, under increasing party 
discipline, the opposition to reform in the Commons had declined to a minimum. Although 
some parliamentary quarrels on details continued to exist, the principle of reform was trusted 
by a broad majority in the House. Different from the First and Second, this Third Reform Act 
was primarily based on consensus. 
 
7.3.2 Two opponents left 
When the measure was discussed in the Commons, the frequency of the word ‘democracy’ in 
the Hansard records rose again. With 59 times in one year, it topped any previous year since 
1867. However, the use of democracy as a negative slogan, applied against reform, had 
almost completely disappeared. The narrative had lost most of its supporters; only the handful 
of MP’s that still opposed the principle of further enfranchisement maintained the frame of 
‘democracy’ as a word of warning. In fact, in 1884, only two Members of the House protested 
against the imminent reform bill for the reason it would establish a democratic form of 
government. With the concept of ‘democracy’ they solely tried to prevent the threat named 
democracy. Those two members were Charles Newdegate and Robert Peel. 
Charles Newdegate, the persistent anti-reformist Conservative, still sat in the House 
and was still principally opposed to any further step towards ‘democracy’. He assailed the 
Prime Minister, William Gladstone, because his speech about reform ‘was based upon 
Democratic principles’: doctrines that Newdegate strongly disputed.412 With these 
‘democratic principles’ he mainly referred to Gladstone’s portrayal of the suffrage as a 
‘natural right’. This was a false dogma, in Newdegate’s view: the vote was not a right at all; 
instead it was a ‘trust’, which should only be given to respectable and capable men, who were 
certainly fit to exercise it. In the past twenty years, this idea of the ‘right to vote’ had 
pervaded the Commons, and the wise and just words of the late Lord Palmerston
413
 were 
forgotten.
414
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Quite interestingly: this charge of ‘democratic’ principles was repeatedly alternated in 
the rest of Newdegate’s speech with attacks on the principle of ‘equality’.415 They took turns 
as if they meant the same. We can conclude, thus, that the two concepts had a similar meaning 
and value to him.
 Apparently, ‘democracy’ and ‘equality’ had a close connection in a 
semantic web: they were quite interchangeable. Hence, the concept of ‘equality’ had a 
negative meaning to him as well: it implied ‘uniformity’ and would bring ‘a dead level to the 
country.
416
 Perhaps Newdegate reasoned that if the charge of ‘democracy’ had lost its 
frightening effects, maybe ‘equality’ had not. He used both words as weapons to refute 
Gladstone’s plans. 
These remarks on ‘democratic’ and ‘equality’ principles were followed by a small 
meta-discussion, when Newdegate stated defiantly that ‘if such a change of the principle of 
equality was to be observed, it would involve a revolution.’ Gladstone stood up, and 
responded by shouting ‘No, no!’. He objected to the use of the term ‘revolution’. The Hansard 
recorded Gladstone saying: ‘Perhaps, when he [Newdegate] next addressed the House, he 
might coin some new word to convey his meaning.’417 In 1884, it was all very well to be 
named ‘democratic’, or to be charged with having ‘principles of equality’, but to suggest a 
‘revolution’ would follow, was one step too far. This is where Gladstone drew the line. 
Newdegate then rephrased his words and said: ‘The system that would then exist would 
approach very nearly to that of equal electoral districts, and would be another step in the 
direction of Democracy.’  
Both the parliamentary mastodons, Gladstone and Newdegate, had sat in the House for 
many years; respectively from 1832 and 1843. The latter used this experience against the 
former. In 1884, Newdegate looked back on previous decades and argued that ‘he 
remembered the Prime Minister when he was a very different politician.’ In previous years, 
Gladstone had ‘eulogized the character and conduct of the House of Commons as it existed 
between 1832, when the first Reform Bill was passed, and 1852’. Gladstone had even written 
that ‘after 1852’, there had been ‘a deterioration’. Newdegate then asked Gladstone whether 
‘any improvement had taken place since 1867?’.418 He himself thought not. If the ‘character 
and conduct’ of the Commons had been optimal between 1832 and 1852, and 1867 had not 
been an improvement, why enfranchise even more people now? Why keep changing the 
composition of the House, if it had only been for the worse? 
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The second principal opponent to reform and democracy was Robert Peel (baronet, 
son of former Prime Minister Peel (1788-1850), and Liberal Conservative MP)
419
. Different 
from Newdegate, he had voted in favour of reform in 1867. The measure now proposed, 
however, went too far for him. In his own words: ‘I believe the measure of the Government 
will subvert the existing order of things, and therefore it cannot add to the welfare, the 
happiness, or the prosperity of our country.’ As many opponents of reform had done in 1867, 
now seventeen years later, Peel came up with the argument of the Constitution. The British 
constitution was very complicated, he argued, it was ‘perhaps, the most complicated [piece of 
machinery] the world has ever seen’.420 Therefore it should not be impaired in any way.  
One of the greatest writers – he said not whom he meant – supported this statement, 
Peel argued. This author had supposedly proven that ‘Happy and well-governed are those 
States where the middle part is strong and the extremes weak’. This was exactly the case in 
the current constitution: Great-Britain had a mixed system with a fair balance. The 
equilibrium was threatened, however, by the Third Reform Bill of 1884. As Peel explained: 
‘If you unduly strengthen the extremes, whether in the direction of an Aristocracy or a 
Democracy, you will, in my opinion, weaken the leading merits of our Constitution’.421 
Democracy was thus an extreme direction, to which reform would lead. 
 
7.3.3 Balanced, wise, and just 
The exact opposite argument was made by Blennerhasset, who defended the reform bill with 
the use of the same slogan. He emphasized that the future form of British government should 
include all the classes, and that no majority should suppress any minority in the House. 
According to him, that was the ‘widest principle of democracy’.422 Democracy was the rule of 
all the people, and not the domination of one class. This Reform Bill was a step in the right 
direction, Blennerhassett suggested. It was, in his own words, ‘the grandest measure of 
Reform that was ever submitted to Parliament’. He defended it fiercely: this reform was truly 
‘democratic’, for it would maintain the balance in society.423 Therefore, they should vote in 
favour. Democracy was again used as a slogan, but now with a clear positive value: in favour 
of reform. 
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In 1885, when the county franchise extension was passed, and the Commons discussed 
the expected redistribution of parliamentary seats, John Lubbock (banker, scientific writer and 
Liberal MP)
424
 emphasized the benefits of democracy as well: it seemed that ‘government of 
the people, for the people, and by the people, was so obviously wise and just that it must 
almost of necessity work well in any intelligent community’. Nevertheless, he still worried 
about the possible failure of democracy: the form of government they were now approaching, 
or had perhaps already approached. He did not explicate his views on this matter very clearly. 
He concluded from his history books that democracy had ‘often failed in the past’: ‘Why in 
State after State had power so often swung from one extreme to the other—from the tyrant to 
the demagogue, and back again from the demagogue to the tyrant?’425 The past proved 
democracy’s flaws: what would it bring to modern Britain? 
The true reason for the failures of democracy in the past was, Lubbock held, ‘the 
faulty manner in which the principle had been applied’. In fact, he argued, ‘there had never 
yet been true representation on a large scale’. Thus, to function properly, the democratic 
principle should yield a ‘true representation’ of the people, yet no modern country had ever 
achieved this. Thus, nothing was wrong with the principle of democracy; only with its 
practical implementation. Great-Britain should now do better, he suggested. A solution for 
this problem, however, he did not give. 
Lubbock only mentioned that the democratic systems that had been tried had given 
‘undue power to extreme men’. They left ‘those of moderate views, who generally constituted 
the great majority, almost unrepresented and practically powerless.’426 This statement forms 
an interesting deviation of the previous argument, which held that exactly because democracy 
was essentially ‘majority rule’, demagogues or tyrants were elected. The majority chose them. 
Democracy used to be the ‘tyranny of the majority’. But now, Lubbock attested that ‘the great 
majority’ held ‘moderate views’. This part of the population would even be ‘almost 
unrepresented and practically powerless’. This is an interesting line of reasoning: as if only 
the ‘system’ and not the ‘majority’ was to blame for the election of tyrants. It seems as if 
Lubbock, above all, tried to criticize previous democratic systems, without disparaging the 
people.  
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8. THE SECOND MEANING MAINTAINED: SYNONYM OF ‘THE PEOPLE’ (1878-
1885) 
 
8.1 Contested meaning and value (1878-1883) 
 
Besides the declining use of ‘democracy’ as a distant form of government, the narrative of 
‘the democracy’, as the synonym of ‘the people’ continued to exist, before and during the 
Third Reform Act debates. In many speeches, though, this concept was applied in a similar 
negative way: to state that ‘the democracy’ would obtain – or had already obtained – an 
important amount of political influence. As in the 1870s, which was analysed in chapter 6.2, 
there was disagreement on the desirability of this development: was democracy good for 
legislation? Was the changed relationship between politics and the people an improvement? 
Very different from the early 1870s though, from 1878 on, critique was alternated with 
acceptance, and sometimes even with praise. The political innovations were increasingly 
accredited. In the next two paragraphs it is explicated how the new role of ‘the democracy’ 
was discussed, before and during the Third Reform Act debates. 
 
8.1.1 Reform will change representation 
In the years 1878 to 1883 the concept of ‘democracy’ occurred most often in debates in which 
a next reform bill was contemplated. Now it was not only said that further parliamentary 
reform would lead to a ‘democracy’, and that this would be undesirable, but instead a 
thorough argument was given to deprecate the imminent changes to the character of politics. 
More specifically: it was maintained that further reform would change the relationship 
between parliament and the people.  
Charles Legard (baron and Conservative MP)
427
 was one of the important actors, who 
in 1879 summed up his objections. His main argument was based on the relationship between 
the Member of Parliament and the voter: ‘I conclude what the Radical Reformer really desires 
eventually to effect is a direct effectual Representative of the people; representing them not as 
a delegate commissioned to take care of their interests, but as a deputy appointed to speak 
their will.’428 For Legard, the parliamentarian should have the task to represent the people 
indirectly, and to take care of their interests. But increasingly, the gap was shrinking, and he 
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feared that politicians would act as ‘deputies’, who mirrored the people’s voice directly. This 
new development threatened the traditional view on representation. 
Legard’s view of the contemporary form of government was quite traditional. It had 
long not been said
429
, but he brought it to the fore again: Great-Britain’s constitution was a 
‘mixed Government’ and this should stay this way. They had for centuries had a ‘limited 
Monarchy’, with which Legard was satisfied. But now, the ‘Radical Reformers’ wished to 
constitute a ‘pure democracy’. These two powers were inconsistent with each other. ‘A 
complete and democratic representation, such as the Reformers aim at, cannot exist as part of 
a mixed Government’, he argued.430 If the Household suffrage would be extended to the 
counties, this would mean a decisive change in the Constitution. Taking this step would 
establish a complete democracy: a dangerous, difficult and unprofitable operation.  
Two MP’s responded to Legard’s speech, though not in terms of ‘democracy’.  Robert 
Lowe came in to approve the arguments that were brought in, which proved ‘that there ought 
to be no lowering of the franchise’,431 and George Morgan stepped up, to oppose this 
reasoning. Contrary to Legard and Lowe, Morgan thought that democracy could not be 
stopped, even if they wanted it. He stated, perhaps ironically or annoyed, that Charles Legard 
had made a ‘very amusing speech’. This may point out that Morgan did not take his 
arguments very seriously. He then explained why, in his view, Legard’s arguments were false. 
Morgan reminded the House that now ‘they had had 10 years' experience under household 
suffrage, and if a mistake had been made in 1867, they ought to have found it out before this.’ 
432
 If Household Suffrage worked in the boroughs, why not introduce it in the counties? Yet, 
in this response, Morgan ignored the maxim of ‘mixed government’, as brought up by Legard. 
Three years later, Legard’s arguments were echoed again, now by George Goschen. 
This Liberal MP gave an interesting speech in which he, too, summed up the contemporary 
fears for political innovation. He said: ‘The alarms of hon. Members opposite, he thought, 
touched both the present and the future. They were afraid for the immediate present that 
certain dark designs were to be carried out, and they were also afraid for the future. To put 
those fears into words, their case was this—they seemed to feel that there had been an 
increased volume of Democratic movement. They seemed to fear that the Parliament of the 
future—the immediate future, one would almost think—would be different from the present 
House of Commons; that it would abandon the traditions of the past, and that—why he was at 
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a loss to conceive, but for some reason or other—there was going to be a kind of fierce Party 
spirit, which was going to suppress the minority on every possible occasion.’433 
To sum it up in 21
st
 century language: according to Goschen, several parliamentarians 
were afraid for the changes in political culture. They had the idea that the rules of parliament 
were transforming: traditions were diminishing and party commitment was growing. The 
main cause of this was the ‘democratic movement’ which, over the years, had increased 
rapidly. It was the democracy, the increased influence of the people into parliament, which 
caused various political innovations. The fear was, thus, not for the unknown, as it had been 
in 1867, but exactly for the changes that were now coming into effect. New innovations were 
judged with suspicion. What would be the consequences in the long run? An insecure, 
negative outlook dominated their perspective. 
 
8.1.2 Or had change already come? 
Goschen thus clearly pointed out that most of the political innovations, which Legard still 
feared for the future, had in fact already taken place. The increased involvement of ‘the 
democracy’ into politics had changed the character of representation: it was now no longer a 
prospect for the future. Several members in the House made similar remarks. Stanley 
Leighton (antiquary and Conservative MP)
434
, for example, stated in 1882 too that ‘they 
approached to democracy’. And he, too, did not expect very positive effects: ‘did any one 
suppose that our political conscience would be purer, our political methods less violent, our 
political partizanship less extreme?’435 British politics were changing, he felt: the traditional 
methods and individual conscience were already undermined. This change was again 
connected with the constitutional changes of 1867 and the rise of ‘the democracy’.  
To explain how this change actually functioned, Leonard Courtney (baron, journalist 
and Liberal MP)
436
 cited a self-proclaimed ‘democratic representative’, who had said, ‘as an 
illustration of the way in which the influences of the people outside were growing’, that ‘the 
strongest Members in that House altered or suppressed their opinion, on the ground that the 
masses of the people were against them.’437 In recent years the people, outside of parliament, 
had interfered increasingly with parliament’s decisions. Now ‘the masses’ engaged in political 
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debate, helped shape public opinion, and forced their opinions on the Members of the House. 
It was this latter point that frightened Courtney mostly: ‘the dependence of hon. Members 
upon the feelings of the people was growing rapidly, and was undermining their independence 
of thought’.438 It was out of fear for the masses that MP’s changed their behaviour in the 
House. This was the political innovation that the democracy had brought. 
The Liberal Courtney himself regretted this development, and criticized the 
Conservative party for assenting to this change. He stated polemically that ‘the policy of the 
Tory party’ formed ‘the triumph of unchecked Democracy’, for they reflected directly ‘the 
prejudices and the passions as well as the moderation and reason of the nation’. According to 
Courtney, the Conservative party, who at the time had a majority in the House, was guilty of 
democratic policies. The Tories were no longer the independent representatives of the people 
but had changed into the dumb spokesmen of the masses. Their role was degraded to the 
voice, not the mind, of the public. Democracy thus maintained its negative meaning. It stood 
for the acceptance of the new relationship between parliament and people.  
The idea that the relationship between parliament and the people had indeed changed, 
was shared by Charles Warton. In an 1882 debate, he mentioned that ‘the right hon. 
Gentleman must feel that if he did not comply with the wishes of the Democracy, he would be 
devoured, like Antæus, by his own dogs.’439 In other words, he said that it was logical if 
Members felt they should listen to the ‘wishes of the Democracy’ – the desires of the people – 
for if they did not, they would be ‘devoured’ by public opinion.440 This statement tells us 
most, probably, of Warton’s own conscience. The influence of extra-parliamentary opinions 
had risen to unacceptable levels, he implied. 
 
8.1.3 Democracy furthers legislation 
One parliamentarian spoke up against these critiques: George Russell (writer and Radical 
Liberal MP)
441
. He saw in fact an important role for ‘the democracy’ in the House of 
Commons. In a speech in 1882, he stated that ‘the House of Commons was doomed to a 
decrepit and inglorious old age if for one moment it lost touch with the democracy or 
constituencies or people of the United Kingdom.’442 The connection between parliament and 
the people was thus very important, he emphasized: the link was necessary and should be 
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strong. The people in the constituencies should be able to trust the British institutions: its 
‘dignity’ and its ‘efficiency’.443 ‘The democracy should be in full sympathy and harmony with 
its Representatives in the House’, he said. Only then could the government rule with success. 
Only then could the House do its work ‘as in the past’. It was for this very reason that ‘the 
democracy’ was so important to Russell’.444  
In 1883, Jesse Collings (Radical)
445
 gave a speech in which he too praised the role of 
‘the democracy’, with one particular aim: to criticize the government’s expenditure. He 
suggested they should listen better to what ‘the modern democracy’ wanted. What did the 
people desire? An ‘audience of the working classes’ would not get excited of spending on 
Royal Parks and Palaces, nor of a ‘gunpowder and glory’ policy. Fewer expenses should 
therefore be made in the Navy, the Army and the Civil Service. Instead, this money should be 
spent on ‘the people’ themselves: the state could help make their lives ‘richer and fuller’. The 
modern democracy insisted namely ‘upon a certain amount of rest and enjoyment, and […] 
the State should help them in that matter’.446 More expenditure to social improvement was 
legitimate, Collings argued, for the simple reason that this was what ‘the modern democracy’ 
desired. 
Directly opposite to Collings stood Donald Currie (shipowner and Liberal MP)
447
. 
Although he uttered them more than a year later, his arguments clearly contrast with the 
speech mentioned above. According to Currie the country needed not cuts but, instead, a large 
increased expenditure on the Navy. Only then could the British colonies be defended. 
Colling’s argument that ‘the Democracy’ did not want this, or the idea that the people were 
‘indifferent’, was invalid. Currie had reasons to believe otherwise. He argued that now ‘the 
Democracy’ was ‘awakening to the glorious inheritance’ they had in the colonies.448 The 
people thus in fact desired extra expenditure themselves! He tried to prove this point by 
reading out a letter he had received from a ‘working man’, who supported extra expenditure 
on the Navy.  
The interesting thing occurring here, is the fact that both politicians, both Collings and 
Currie, looked towards ‘the democracy’ (whatever its exact meaning: in any case large parts 
of the population) as a way to legitimate their proposals. If the people wanted it, they should 
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do it. This was a new way of approaching politics. The new conflict of opinion was not based 
on difference in principles, but on different views on the people’s desires. Both politicians 
now argued that they knew best what ‘the democracy’ wanted. Nevertheless, the question 
does remain whether Collings or Currie truly believed they knew what the democracy desired, 
or whether it was just a clever strategic argument in political debate. Nevertheless, the fact 
that it came to be used says a lot about the changed value of the concept of ‘democracy’.  
Hence, from about 1878, more Liberal parliamentarians came to acknowledge the fact 
that ‘the democracy’ had received a distinctive say in politics. Now the suffrage had been 
extended, ‘the people’ were a power to deal with. And whether they liked it or not, the form 
of representation had changed. Acknowledgement not yet meant acceptance, but certainly the 
former cleared the way for the latter. This acknowledgement, however, led first to another 
discussion: whether the political innovations, which had already taken place, had made an 
improvement or not. If ‘the democracy’ now ruled Great-Britain, what did this mean for 
legislation? 
Samuel Laing undoubtedly thought the effects had been positive. Ten years after 1867 
he used ‘democracy’ – quite suddenly – in a very positive way: to portray the advantages of a 
widened suffrage. Or at least, to point out that the often repeated dangers and disadvantages of 
democracy had no basis in reality. Laing, for example, praised the United States as an 
example: this democracy, with its universal suffrage, had kept the peace, disbanded its army 
and kept up the national credit. The extended suffrage had added much value, he argued. It 
had changed Americans into ‘an eminently law-abiding people’, while in France, it had 
‘sobered and improved the French character’.449 Interestingly, Laing first discussed 
‘democracy’ as something occurring in other countries, before touching upon the 
developments in Britain.  
After that, Laing argued that ‘we must look at home to try and predict what would be 
the effect of that great extension of the suffrage which so alarmed the right hon. Gentlemen 
[Robert Lowe], but which, after all had, to a great extent, already taken place’. The first major 
suffrage extension had indeed already passed in 1867. While Lowe had said, back then, that 
this would yield ‘all sorts of horrible things’, according to Laing it had been a great success. 
Ten years after 1867, he responded to Lowe, and said that he wished to know ‘where were the 
political, social, and financial atrocities’ for which they had been warned. 450  
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Robert Lowe’s visions of the rule of the ‘ignorant democracy’ had, admittedly, made a 
‘plausible theory’ at the time, but the practice of the last ten years had proven him wrong. The 
widening of the suffrage had not transformed the government into the unstable rule of 
‘popular passion or delusion’, but instead, as Laing said, had ‘greatly aided legislation’.451 
According to him, the predictions of democracy’s effects ‘might have been true of ancient 
Rome or mediaeval Venice’, but in contemporary Britain, suffrage extension proved a safe 
measure. The people were ready for it, and even in foreign policy, ‘the wisdom of the many’ 
saved them ‘from the folly of the few’.452  
Although Laing admitted that the electoral changes had been ‘democratic’, he did not 
conclude literally this had changed the current form of government into a ‘democracy’. 
Although the shift had ‘to a great extent’ already taken place, there were still some additional 
changes to be made. A next reform bill could make the final adjustments, he suggested: then 
they could follow the great democratic examples of France and America. This interpretation, 
that a major transformation had already taken place, was shared by Peter Rylands (steel 
manufacturer and independent Radical MP)
453
, who stated that 1867 had indeed transformed 
the ‘Constitution of this Kingdom’. ‘The change […] had taken place’. 454 
On the other hand, though, Rylands emphasized that the actual effects on the 
government had been minor. Although the constitution had changed, the people in 
government had not. But he was sure ‘the time would come when […] they would have a very 
strong element of democracy represented upon the Government Bench.’455 Thus, in 1879, this 
MP felt that the influence of democracy had not yet reached its potential limits. The Second 
Reform Act, however, had made this possible. As the influence of the people, ‘the 
democracy’, was growing, their participation in government was only a matter of time. The 
conditions for a democratic government were already there. 
 
8.1.4 Or did the tyranny rule? 
George Goschen was not convinced of the advantages of the latest suffrage extension that 
Laing and Rylands defended, but was willing to admit that not ‘any of the legislation of the 
last 10 years had been of a terrible character’.456 This was, however, only due to the fact no 
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democratic demands had been made. Not yet, in any case, for Goschen thought it still was too 
early to draw any conclusions. He had seen ‘no proof yet, that [the House] would be able to 
resist and that it was not already under the strong influence of numbers’. For this reason, it 
was too early to pass a next reform bill: the extension of the franchise to the counties had to 
wait. ‘We travelled fast in these days’, Goschen argued, ‘but 10 years was a short time to 
allow to elapse between one great Reform Bill and another’.457  
Furthermore, Goschen was not satisfied with the political effects of the previous Bill. 
It was said the Act of 1867 was safe, for ‘even that democratic measure resulted in increasing 
the power of the Conservative Party’, but Goschen perceived things differently: the newly 
elected Conservatives were ‘no longer Conservatives in the old sense’. ‘They no longer 
performed the function which they used to perform – they had not the power of resistance. 
They showed it in their attitude on great questions, upon which they came more under 
democratic influence’.458 The people had thus not become Conservative, Goschen suggested, 
but instead, the Conservatives had become democratic. 
He criticized this development, for if the influence of the people grew, the individual 
responsibility of parliamentarians was bound to decline. Therefore, he wondered if ‘statesmen 
still [held] their own – against all the gusts of popular opinion and passion?’ Goschen felt that 
the Conservative party not always had the power to ‘resist’ the voice of the people; a 
development he deeply regretted. This ‘weakening of individual responsibility and of the 
responsibility of statesmen’ was, he claimed, a ‘well-known characteristic of democracy’. 
This democratic element was, he suggested, ‘clearly becoming a characteristic of the present 
time’.459 Although Goschen did not conclude that Great-Britain was becoming a democracy, 
he vaguely attested that its essential elements were indeed introduced. 
This idea was explicated even more clearly by Leonard Courtney, who concluded 
from this that they were in ‘the middle of a democratic process’. This MP, who opposed any 
further suffrage extension, reminded the House of previous reform debates, in which ‘they 
were often told that the tide of democracy would erelong come upon them’. But according to 
him ‘it had already come, and they were floundering in the middle of it’.460 ‘The democracy’, 
Courtney argued, had already taken an undue influence on politics.  
The increasing influence of the people on politics had caused severe results for actual 
policy, he stated. ‘What had been the history of legislation and of public opinion during the 
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last few years but the history of government by impulsive, varying, unsteady opinion? Ever 
since this Parliament had been called together they had had, time after time, exhibitions of 
currents of opinion running now in one direction, now in another; not in consequence of the 
dictates of prudence and reason, but because some sentiment, feeling, or passion had for the 
moment taken possession of the public mind.’461 Hence, in Courtney’s view, the country was 
already flooded by the tide of democracy; the Commons was ruled by the changing passions 
of the public mind. 
In 1882, when the House considered to close down, by national law, the public houses 
on Sundays, Charles Warton, too, opposed the bill for its ‘democratic’ tendencies. According 
to him, it was tyrannical. He explained his logic, and took Cornwall as an example. He 
claimed that ‘the chances were 999,999 to one against a Cornishman being arrested on 
Sunday for drunkenness, and this Bill was directed against the one.’462 With such odds, why 
should they close all the public houses, and take away the free choice of all men to visit such 
a house? The only motive for passing such a measure was that some people wanted others to 
‘conform to their ideas’, he attested critically. The measure would impair individual liberty, 
and was a typical example of the ‘tyranny of people’ and ‘a gross instance of the tyranny of 
democracy’.463 Democracy’s rise had caused tyrannical legislation.  
 
8.2 The Third Reform Act Debates (1884-1885) 
 
8.2.1 Already enough democratic influence 
In a majority of the speeches of 1884-5, ‘democracy’ meant not a ‘form of government’ but 
was, instead, a synonym for ‘the people’464. With this definition, it could be used with both a 
negative value, to oppose parliamentary reform, and with a positive value, to defend it. This 
was similar to the meaning in chapter 6.1 (1868-1871). Yet, the way these two groups defined 
the concept now differed considerably, as we shall see. The few MP’s that still opposed the 
principles of franchise extension defined the concept of ‘the democracy’ primarily as one 
class. More specifically: the working class, the urban population, or the industrialized 
workers. They spoke of ‘the democracy’ to clarify two things: first that ‘the democracy’ 
already had enough influence, and secondly, that the Third Reform Act would be an unfair 
and unwise decision.  
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Especially George Goschen’s name should be noted. In an effort to oppose the 
imminent parliamentary reform, he started by assessing the contemporary state of politics, to 
prove that ‘the democracy’ already had enough influence. For this purpose, Goschen gave an 
interesting impression of the way parliament had changed in the last two decades. He 
responded to Gladstone, who had earlier given his thoughts on the parliamentary 
developments since 1867. The PM had praised the innovations and had argued that 
‘Parliament had greatly improved, and that there was now more comprehension of the wants 
of the people than there had ever been before.’ If this was the case, many Members of the 
House argued, ‘Why not then go further, and enfranchise 2,000,000 more?’465 
Goschen, on the other hand, concluded that the political innovations had been enough, 
and should not go further. He also stressed that many results had not been beneficial. In 
particular, he criticized the shifts in political opinion: ‘If Parliament has improved in some 
senses, are there not totally different views prevailing on political questions, some of which 
might be dangerous to the State? In this House do we not take a totally different view on 
many questions from that which we took 10 years ago?’ 466 Now the ‘wants of the people’ 
sounded more clearly in the House, Goschen complained that this was not the best for the 
general interest. Not all the opinions of ‘the people’ belonged in parliament: ‘dangerous’ 
views should be kept out. 
The main problem that Goschen assessed was the increased influence of the people: 
the rule of ‘the democracy’. He criticized the status quo more directly by asking: ‘Do we not 
see that Democracy at every turn is clutching the arm of the Executive power? Do we not see 
that it is influencing our actions in our Indian Empire, and testing our hold on subject races?’  
467
 In the last twenty years, the public opinion had increased its grip on the government. 
Although no working men sat in the government themselves, and only two sat in the 
Commons, their influence was immense: their voting power resulted in real political leverage.  
The political innovations of party organization and professionalization had indeed 
changed the relationship between politicians and their voters. But Goschen was alone in his 
criticism. The Hansard recorded him saying: ‘We see it in the relation of Members to their 
constituents. [Cheers] Those cheers come from hon. Gentlemen below the Gangway; they are 
Democrats, and they know that the measure the House is going to pass is calculated to 
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strengthen the hands of the Democrats.’468 These cheers denote how controversial the topic 
was: while Goschen detested the shrunken gap, other Members literally cheered it. And while 
for Goschen, ‘Democrat’ still bore negative connotations, for other Members, it became a 
proud party name. These Radical politicians, who sat ‘below the gangway’, felt they 
represented the ‘democracy’.469 For them, to be called a ‘democrat’ was no longer an insult. 
Besides mentioning the Radicals, Goschen in particular attacked the Conservative 
party, for it was becoming more and more democratic. The change had started in 1867, when 
the Second Reform Act was passed. That act was ‘the work of a Conservative government’, 
Goschen explained, and what followed was the birth of something new: ‘the Conservative 
working man’. Although ‘he votes for Conservative men’, ‘he coerces Conservative Members 
in a democratic direction’, Goschen maintained. Conservatism had thus become democratic; 
by a process they had started themselves. ‘The whole attitude of the Conservative Party has 
been entirely changed, as it was certain to be, by the Act of 1867’.470  
The result of this was that the Conservative MP’s felt ‘much more’ the contact of 
democracy, Goschen claimed. And the same could be said of the Liberal Party. Members of 
both sides had ‘lost the power of resistance to principles’, and now only rivalled with each 
other in the competition for votes. Goschen described contemporary political debate in this 
way: ‘They rather present the attitude of a body of rival practitioners, who are prepared to 
carry out the will of the people in competition with politicians on this side who advocate 
precisely the same principles.’471 Politicians only battled to carry out the will of the people. 
No clear distinctions on principle were left. The main cause of this political innovation was 
‘democracy’. ‘Since the Reform Bill of 1867 democracy has been making tremendous strides 
on both sides of the House’, Goschen said. With this conclusion, he certainly had a point. But 
his resistance was outdated, and caught up by reality. Therefore, he stood alone: it made him a 
voice crying in the wilderness. 
 
8.2.2 Goschen’s last efforts  
After having explained why the ‘democracy’ already had enough influence on national 
politics, Goschen reflected on the probable effects of the imminent franchise extension. In his 
speeches, he regularly mentioned ‘the democracy’, which it would enfranchise: or more 
specifically, the ‘urban democracy’. This he explained as the ‘industrial workers’: they would 
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benefit most from the suffrage extension in the counties: not the agricultural labourers. 
According to Goschen, the bill would cause an ‘entire transfer of political power from an 
agricultural and farm class to the urban class’.472 The cause of this was the urbanization and 
industrialization of the counties: if household suffrage was attained here, then the ‘agricultural 
constituents’ would be entirely outvoted, Goschen claimed. The bill would remove the 
balance between rural and urban areas, causing industrial workers to rule the country. All 
other interests would then be ignored.  
Further in the speech, Goschen repeated this statement, but was met with a response 
from fellow MP’s, which was noted in the Hansard Records. He said: ‘An election on the new 
franchise, as I can conclusively prove, will immensely add to the strength of the urban 
democracy—[Cheers]— […]’473 While he himself tried to criticize the ‘new franchise’ with 
the argument it would ‘add to the strength of the urban democracy’, some other MP’s in the 
House praised such an outcome. They cheered. The point that essentially divided these two 
camps was a difference of opinion on the value of democracy. For Goschen, the concept 
meant, above all, ‘majority rule’. He feared that, if ‘the democracy’ was strengthened even 
further, the ‘principle of protecting minorities’ would be lost.474 Minorities would then be 
trampled upon. For the cheering members, on the other hand, the inclusion of ‘the democracy’ 
seemed only fair: it would not transfer power but establish a true mirror of public opinion in 
the country.  
The different interpretation of this essential concept was once explained by Goschen 
himself, in second-order language. He remarked: ‘We are perfectly agreed as to its effect; but 
there is this great difference between us—that what is their hope is my fear.’ While Radical 
MP’s wanted even more influence of ‘the people’, he himself thought they had already more 
than enough. While they hoped for further franchise extensions, he feared it. The reason for 
this stance was not – if we believe his own words – that he distrusted the people (‘That is not 
so’). He, in fact, remarked that he ‘would gladly see the enfranchisement of large additional 
numbers’. The main reason for opposing this reform bill was the fear that then ‘these hon. 
Members’, these ‘democrats’, would obtain a ‘vast majority in the House’. Then the 
‘preponderating power’ would be given to one particular class.475 And this was not how 
Goschen wanted the House to look like: above all, he wanted to maintain the class balance. 
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If we compare this line of reasoning with the speeches opposing reform of 1866-7, we 
can conclude that the argument (suffrage extension = democracy = one class rule) had 
remained the same. But in the seventeen years that had passed, an important element had 
changed. Now, in 1884, Goschen did not attest that the measure would create a democratic 
form of government: he spoke not of ‘democracy’ as an imminent political system. Instead, he 
only named ‘the democracy’ to designate the working classes. Apparently, the concept of 
‘democracy’ as a fearsome system had lost much of its applicability; in a time when reformist 
politicians proudly stated they were ‘democrats’. For them, the word ‘the democracy’ carried 
a positive value: increasingly, MP’s stated they represented ‘the democracy’. Hence, the 
conventional meaning of the concept was no longer solely negative. This process diminished 
the pejorative force it once carried. 
 
8.2.3 A safe, fair, and wise reform 
The fact that only a few MP’s opposed the bill on principal grounds and with the use of the 
word ‘democracy’ was also noted in the Commons. John O’Connor Power (barrister and Irish 
Parliamentary Party MP)
476
, for example, portrayed the state of affairs quite comically, by 
recollecting a familiar metaphor. He said: ‘[Goschen] had warned them against moral 
cowardice and swimming with the stream; but he did not think that on this occasion the right 
hon. Gentleman showed so much courage in not swimming with the stream. To use another 
metaphor, it seemed to him that the right hon. Gentleman had taken the desperate resolve of 
jumping overboard, hoping that he could buffet the waves of Democracy by himself alone.’477 
The old metaphor of the ‘democratic tide’ or the ‘democratic wave’ was now ridiculed: it had 
definitely lost its force. 
Power seemed to enjoy these maritime metaphors, for he continued his speech by 
stating that he ‘looked upon every proposal of this kind as an effort made by a wise and far-
seeing statesman to guide the ship of State over the turbid waters, and to allow it to pass along 
on its course into a harbour of refuge. […] He would sympathize with the right hon. 
Gentleman thoroughly in not going with the stream when it was going in the wrong direction; 
but he regretted that the right hon. Gentleman occupied the peculiar and unique position of 
being directly and emphatically opposed to the principle of the Bill. If there was danger to the 
State by this increase of political power being placed in the hands of the people, that argument 
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would more properly have come from the Leader of the Opposition.’478 From this quote we 
learn both that Power himself saw no danger in the increased power of ‘the people’, and, 
perhaps more interestingly: that Goschen now occupied a ‘peculiar and unique position’. A 
large majority of parliamentarians accepted the democratic principles; but Goschen stood 
alone.  
That now in 1884, the fear for the democracy had faded, was confirmed by William 
Willis (barrister, judge and Liberal MP)
479. In November of that year he argued that ‘there 
was no fear now of the democracy being led by demagogues.’ From this he concluded that the 
next important reform question, the redistribution of seats in the Commons, ‘might with 
perfect safety be left to settle itself after the 2,000,000 had been enfranchised’.480 First the 
suffrage should be extended in the counties, and after that the new House could decide on an 
eventual redistribution. This was a safe procedure, and no one should be worried of ‘the 
democracy’. The fact that Willis still emphasized this aloud in the House, however, does 
indicate that this was not a view shared by everyone. It was more a reassurance than a 
doctrine. 
In a similar way, Henry James, also in favour of the reform measure, tried to take 
away eventual worries about democracy’s rise. James also made clear that ‘democracy’ 
should not frighten anyone now. He gave one reason: democracy was not something of the 
rural, but instead, of the urban areas. And now that the counties would receive the household 
suffrage, the rural element, and not the (democratic) urban part, would be strengthened. While 
Goschen had denied this distinction, James kept it up. ‘This Democracy’, he argued, ‘is far 
more strongly developed among the urban than among the rural populations’.481 Here, 
apparently, ‘democracy’ meant neither a form of government, nor the population itself, but 
something that could ‘develop among’ the people. Perhaps it referred to the ‘industrialization’ 
or to ‘political Radicalism’: elements particularly present in urban areas. Of James’ exact 
meaning, though, we cannot be too sure. 
Perhaps a contribution made by James Picton (author and Liberal MP)
482
 might help 
us to refine our understanding of the contemporary meaning. Picton made an interesting 
distinction in the meaning of ‘the democracy’ in 1885, when he argued that ‘the democracy’ 
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were not in favour of war. It was ‘foolish to suppose’ this, he stated, and said that: ‘it might be 
true that the idlers at the shop windows, who gazed at a senseless picture of a military square 
fighting against Arabs, were in favour of war, or that the loungers in the music halls, echoing 
sanguinary choruses, were eager for war; but the ordinary democracy—the democracy of 
organized industry—were impatient of war, and disgusted also.’483 Thus, a distinction was 
made between ‘the ordinary democracy’, people who worked in ‘organized industry’, and 
others: ‘idlers’ and ‘loungers’: people who did not work. The activity of labour was thus an 
essential factor in the meaning of ‘the democracy’.  
 As the quotes in this paragraph demonstrate, the parliamentarians in favour of reform 
used the concept of ‘the democracy’ primarily as a response to its critics. They tried to 
explain that ‘the democracy’ was fit to receive to vote, and that no dangers would follow from 
enfranchising them. In a few speeches, though, reformist MP’s took an active – instead of a 
reactive – stance: Stephen-Williamson (owner shipping company and Liberal MP)484, for 
example, tried to emphasize the need and the benefits of the measure, by using the word 
‘democracy’. According to him, ‘the Democracy of this country’ needed ‘strengthening and 
invigorating’. A ‘more resolute Democracy’ was necessary, for one particular reason: ‘to 
demand from this House a more adequate and business-like concern for the many social 
questions that demanded attention.’485 If ‘the democracy’ became stronger in the House, the 
many social questions in the country could finally be properly addressed.  
 
9. A THIRD MEANING EMERGED: CURRENT FORM OF GOVERNMENT (1885-
1886) 
 
9.1 After the Third Reform Act 
In December 1884 the Third Reform Act was accepted by a majority in the House of 
Commons. It added over two million men to the electorate: now all male householders in both 
counties and boroughs could register to vote – at least if they met the residence requirement of 
one year. Within less than twenty years, the ratio of adult male voters had developed from 1 in 
3 (1869) to 2 in 3 (1885).
486
 Electoral bribery had been tackled, electoral districts had been 
equalized, and – perhaps most importantly – the default power of the landed political class, 
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via a vast number of seats in the Commons, had now finally been broken.
487
 An enormous 
step towards democracy was made; as historians now agree. 
But how was this step perceived in that time, in the House of Commons itself? What 
was the meaning and the value of ‘democracy’ after the Third Reform Act? To find out, let us 
look closer at the debates of the year 1886. This year is particularly interesting because of the 
high frequency of ‘democracy’: in 1886 it occurred 156 times. One year before, it had only 
been said 26 times. In the entire period under study, only the year 1866 could top that number. 
How can we explain this sudden increase? The answer lies in a new reform measure, which 
however, had nothing to do with extension of the franchise. The subject that excited so much 
talk of ‘democracy’ was the proposal for Irish Home Rule.488 
Besides parliamentary reform in Britain, the issue of Home Rule in Ireland was the 
second important issue in the nineteenth century.
 489
 Irish political parties fiercely campaigned 
for it in the 1870s and 1880s: first the Home Rule League and later the Irish Parliamentary 
Party. Under growing nationalism, they demanded their own Irish parliament, to exist within 
the existing British Empire.
490
 For long, though, had their demands been futile: within the 
House of Commons, they could convince no majority in favour of such an extensive 
constitutional change. However, from 1885, matters were about to change, when the Irish 
Parliamentary Party won more than fifty additional seats in the Commons.
491
 
William Gladstone, Prime Minister in 1886, was persuaded that the Irish ‘people’ had 
now definitely pronounced in favour of self-government. The more he read about the subject, 
the more he convinced himself that the Irish people shared their own national identity, and 
that this will of ‘the people’ should not be denied. Home Rule would be a mere natural 
development of the principle of popular, responsible self-government, an idea so often 
proclaimed during the parliamentary reform debates.
492
 The contemporary policy of coercion 
seemed immoral, and should therefore be ended. Furthermore, the measure would bring 
pragmatic benefits: the obstructive Irish Nationalist MP’s would be removed from 
Westminster, and set an example for the success of strong, local bodies, all maintained in the 
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unity of the Empire.
493
 A personal motive might have urged Gladstone to swift action: this 
could be his last service to Great-Britain, before retirement. Most of the proposal, nowadays 
known as the First Home Rule Bill, he wrote himself. 
494
 
The measure, again, divided the Liberal Party. Although it appeared in line with some 
Liberal ideals, it directly contravened other principles: primarily those of national and 
imperial integration. Besides principal issues, the opposition stated that disastrous practical 
consequences would follow. How could a local parliament ensure the liberties of all groups 
present in the Irish society? Instead, it was the rule of British law that best secured the social 
harmony in that divided nation.
495
 This coercion was certainly not repression, they 
maintained.  
Furthermore, the opposition argued that this could never be a final settlement: it would 
only encourage Irish Nationalists to agitate for complete separation. And perhaps it would 
even set a bad example for the subjects in the rest of the Empire: what would it mean to the 
colonies?
496
 In the end, these arguments won the vote. After two months of debate, a majority 
in the Commons – including 94 Liberal MP’s – defeated the bill.  
 
9.2 The Irish Home Rule debates (1886) 
 
9.2.1 Legitimizing positions for and against 
During these 1886 Home Rule debates, the concept of ‘democracy’ was applied very often. 
Again, it carried two meanings: it was both a synonym for ‘the people’ and a form of 
government. But now, in nearly all of the utterances made with this former definition, it had a 
very clear positive value: ‘the democracy’ was again a slogan, now to legitimize a stance 
towards Home Rule. Quite interestingly, it was both used to oppose and to defend the 
proposal: both members against and members in favour said they did so because of the 
interests and the desires of ‘the democracy’. Various politicians of all the parties, 
Conservative, Liberal, or Irish, accredited their particular position to their close relationship to 
‘the people’. Legitimization was the key aim. 
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A good example of an opponent’s argument was given in May 1866, by Robert 
Hanbury (Conservative)
497
. He countered the measure for the reason that ‘the democracy of 
England had now come into power’, and that therefore, they should listen to the wishes of the 
people. According to him, ‘what the democracy wanted was that Ireland should be bound to 
England and Scotland by equal laws. Let the facts be put before the democracy of England, 
and he had no fear of the result.’498 The House of Commons should thus base their decisions 
on the wishes of public opinion, he suggested: parliament should implement the desires of the 
people, now that it was admitted that ‘the democracy’ had come into power. ‘The democracy’ 
was now clearly said to legitimate his position in the debate. 
Arthur Winterbotham (cloth manufacturer and Liberal MP)
499
 followed Hanbury’s 
logic. In an effort to stop the Bill, he argued: ‘Why did not the Irish Members give the 
democracy of England one chance? To the first Parliament elected by the democracy they had 
given no chance. How had they given it a chance? They were going to cut themselves adrift 
from this Parliament. ["No, no!"] They were going to set up a Parliament in Dublin, and they 
claimed the right to make laws for Ireland in Dublin.’500 The second sentence of this quote is 
intriguing: Winterbotham now explicated that this parliament, in which they sat now, was the 
first which was elected by ‘the democracy’. If now, at this stage, the Irish Members cut 
themselves loose, to set up their own parliament, they would not even give this new form of 
government a real chance.  
Several other Members of the House followed the same line of reasoning as Hanbury, 
however, to defend the Irish Home Rule Bill. James O’Brien (Irish Parliamentary Party)501, 
for example, argued that any hon. Gentlemen who opposed the Bill, did not ‘fairly represent 
English and Scotch opinion’. They did not ‘represent the opinion […] of the ruling power in 
these countries – the enfranchised democracy of Great-Britain and Ireland’.502 The 
democracy, thus, ruled in Great-Britain, and its opinion should therefore be translated 
properly in decisions of the House. Charles Fenwick (trade union leader and Liberal MP)
503
 
joined in, and claimed that the Bill had ‘the sympathy of […] the great and growing 
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democracy of this country’.504 And Thomas O’Connor (journalist and Irish Nationalist MP)505 
predicted hopefully that, in the second reading of the Bill, the House would ‘obey the mandate 
of the democracy of England, speaking through Representatives with a unanimous voice’.506 
Now, the function of parliament was explained as a mirror of the people, which supposedly 
possessed one opinion on this issue: in favour of reform. 
This latter Member, Thomas O’Connor, mentioned later that ‘the British democracy’, 
had given ‘to the people of Ireland a message from the masses of the English people of peace 
and reconciliation between the two nations.’507 This quote shows beautifully how the concept 
of ‘democracy’ was easily alternated with the English ‘people’ and ‘nation’. Increasingly, ‘the 
democracy’ was applied to mean not only the working classes, but essentially all the English 
people. A remark made by Edward Macnaghten (judge and Conservative MP)
508
 confirms this 
observation. He stated first that he trusted ‘the people of England’ and then said: ‘I trust the 
democracy of England. Surely this great nation is a wise and understanding people’. 
Democracy, people and nation had suddenly become interchangeable concepts with an equal 
meaning. 
 
9.2.2 Acceptance by Goschen 
How did George Goschen, the persistent opponent of democracy, deal with all these 
statements of the ‘now established democracy’? Interestingly, he did not deny it at all. In 
April 1886, he even stated himself, similarly, that they had now enfranchised ‘the 
democracy’. This he explained as ‘the new recruits’, ‘the new voters’, who now had to take up 
‘new duties’. And although he presumably still did not accept it, he said that, ‘with regard to 
the future’, they were not to be an ‘autocracy’ but a ‘democracy’.509 Thus, he still did not say 
they had become a democracy yet, but displayed his expectations for the future. His emotional 
style and rhetoric was diminished. Now, for the first time, Goschen did not use the concept to 
agitate, but to state a fact. The negative value of ‘democracy’ had now fully disappeared.  
During the debates about Irish Home Rule, Goschen mentioned the concept too, when 
he stated the following in June 1886: ‘The democracy of this country is now enthroned for the 
first time, so to speak, in office; and it has to face in its first days this tremendous 
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responsibility.’ Now he explicated fully that now, for the first time, ‘the democracy’ was 
enthroned: now, in 1886, ‘the democracy’ sat ‘in office’.510 They had handed over power to 
the people, or the working men, he concluded. But now, already, they had to debate such an 
important issue as Home Rule. This indicates that Goschen did not trust the democratic 
Commons could prudently deal with it. 
In fact, Goschen was as opposed to Home Rule as he was opposed to suffrage 
extension, and feared for the outcome. He summarized his concerns: ‘I say, do not let it be 
hustled into a fatal and irrevocable step. This step is irrevocable. Do not let the first chapter in 
this new volume of our history open with a breach in the Constitution and a sapping of the 
foundations which bear the weight of this colossal Empire.’511 The enthronement of 
democracy was thus acknowledged as a new chapter in history: ancient traditions had come to 
an end. Goschen was defeated: though he had long fought against it, he had lost the battle 
against ‘the democracy’. Consequently, not the democracy, but Home Rule was the imminent 
change he sought to stop. Not the people itself, but the choice it would make, now endangered 
the Constitution. In 1886, the rule of ‘the democracy’ itself was, perhaps not accepted, but 
certainly acknowledged, even by its former foremost opponent. 
 
9.3 Assessing the changes 
 
9.3.1 We are now a democracy 
The essential meaning of the concept of ‘democracy’ was, from the start of our period in 
1866, a distant form of government: it was a system of the distant past or of different 
countries. Back then it was a slogan used to warn against parliamentary reform: almost no one 
wanted a democratic system in the future. After the passing of the Third Reform Act, though, 
something very important had changed. ‘Democracy’ was still said frequently, and still meant 
a particular form of government, but no longer was it a distant form of government. It was no 
longer something of the distant or imminent future. When the concept was used in 1886, it 
was instead applied to mention the current form of government. It was repeatedly stated, by 
members of all parties, that now Great-Britain had become a democracy. Within twenty years, 
the concept’s value had turned completely: from negative to positive. 
Perhaps this definite shift in this meaning (form of government) can be explained from 
the change in the second meaning: that of ‘the democracy’ (synonym of ‘the people’). After in 
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1886 it was regularly confirmed by both reform’s friend and enemy – both Radicals, Liberals 
and Conservatives – that ‘the democracy’ now ruled, and that the people were entrusted with 
all political power, it also became possible to defend that the form of government had become 
democratic. If ‘the democracy’ ruled, why would they not be a ‘democracy’? In the last few 
years, the two definitions of democracy had conceivably converged: ‘the democracy’ and ‘a 
democracy’ were not so different any more, as they had been in the 1870s. Soon this 
conclusion became undeniable: and in 1886 it was regularly stated in the House of Commons 
that they were a democracy. 
The first parliamentary speech in which this claim was made came from Edward 
Leatham (scholar and Liberal MP)
512
 as early as March 1885. ‘We have arrived at the vigour 
of Democracy’, he said. Leatham looked back in time, and described ‘the history of the 
triumph of Democracy in this country’.513 It was a triumph: democracy proved to be a 
success. The government functioned as it should. Without any shock or brute force, they had 
smoothly changed their form of government, he suggested. How had they got there? 
According to Leatham, the triumph was the main result of the working classes, who had 
‘shown a rare discretion’.514 He praised the prudent choice these ‘new’ enfranchised voters 
had made during the last elections.  
The outcomes of these first ‘democratic’ elections had seemingly surprised Leatham, 
for he said in 1885: ‘With the power, if they had wished it, of deluging this House with 
mechanics and working men, they have deliberately preferred to be represented by men many 
points above them, it may be, in the social scale, yet sympathizing with those of their 
demands which are just, and able to clothe those demands in language and to sustain them by 
arguments which must command the respect, and possibly the acquiescence, of statesmen.’515  
The new votes of the working men had thus gone to men, not of their own class, but of ‘many 
points above them’. The lower classes had placed their confidence in ‘us’, Leatham claimed: 
the upper classes. And now, in return, they knew they could trust the working men. 
Democracy thus turned out to be no class struggle, but instead, class cooperation. 
Leatham was quite contented with this outcome. If this was a democracy, he was not 
worried. If the lower orders simply voted for higher classes, not much would change, he 
figured. Therefore, he strongly opposed the interpretation of ‘democracy’ as a form of 
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government in which parliament was a ‘mere photograph’. This idea had been brought in 
earlier, by another Member of the House. If it was up to Leatham, the Lower House would not 
become an ‘abject epitome of the thoughts, good, bad, and indifferent, of the nation.’ Instead, 
it should reflect its highest thoughts, its noblest aspirations, its broadest sympathies.’ ‘This is 
the very meaning of election’, he argued: ‘We elect, not the random elements, which in their 
infinite variety are to be found scattered everywhere upon the surface, but what is best and 
soundest; and it is only on this grand hypothesis that this House is honourable, or that it is any 
honour to sit in it.’516 For him, ‘democracy’ thus meant more ‘the election of the best’ than the 
‘representation of all’.  
One year later, Henry Labouchere (journalist and Radical MP)
517
 reflected on the past 
changes as well. He looked back upon the Reform Act of 1885, the act which had 
redistributed the seats in the House of Commons, and introduced a system of equally 
populated constituencies. This Act of 1885 had been the definite step towards a democratic 
form of government, Labouchere argued self-assured: ‘After the Reform Bill of last year they 
were landed in a Democracy.’518 This grammatical use of the concept points out that he did 
not mean a group of persons or a class but specifically a form of government: a system. Great-
Britain had become a ‘democracy’ in 1885. What did this mean in practice? Labouchere 
concluded that, as a result, ‘the decisions of the House of Commons were now, to all intents 
and purposes, the decisions of the whole country.’ The opinion of the ‘country’ should thus 
lead the way. 
Labouchere sought to elevate this principle as a new maxim in British politics: now 
they had become a democracy, they should act like one. From this, he concluded that that 
other part of Parliament, the House of Lords, had become obsolete. In his own words: ‘The 
country was now becoming democratic, and hereditary legislators were an anachronism in a 
democracy.’519 The Upper House should thus be changed or abolished. This particular quote 
is all the more intriguing, for Labouchere now not only said that the form of government had 
become democratic, but that, in fact, the entire ‘country’ was becoming a democracy. The 
form of the state and the form of the country were thus equated. However, still an important 
grammatical difference was made: while the first quote (‘they were landed in a Democracy’) 
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suggests completion, the second quote (‘the country was becoming democratic’) implies an 
on-going process. 
 In the rest of his speech, Labouchere elaborated on his understanding of the concept. 
By doing this, he sought to reason why the (supposedly contemporary) democracy could not 
co-exist with a hereditary legislature. ‘Democracy recognized no class distinctions, no 
hereditary legislators; and Democrats regarded a Hereditary Legislature as an insult, an 
absurdity, and an abomination—they regarded such an Assembly, claiming to overrule the 
decision of the Representatives of the people, as a baneful and pernicious institution’.520 In a 
democracy, ‘the people’ ruled indirectly, so why uphold an institution that would only 
neutralize or deny this legitimate power? The House of Lords, in its current form, should thus 
be abrogated. 
The quote mentioned above contains a second interesting aspect. It can be found in the 
first words: ‘Democracy recognized no class distinctions’.521 Apparently, for Labouchere in 
1886, the concept meant the rule of the ‘whole country’, of all the people, and not the rule of 
one particular class. If we compare this with the utterances made in 1866-7, we can conclude 
that a shift of 180 degrees had taken place. Back then, ‘democracy’ meant the rule of the 
‘working classes’, but now, twenty years later, it was stated that in this form of government, 
‘no class distinctions’ at all were made. Democracy now meant the inclusion of all classes 
into politics. More than before did it mean the rule of ‘all the people’: similar to ‘the nation’.  
In one of the debates on Irish Home Rule, an extraordinarily elucidating speech was 
given by James Bryce (Irish jurist, historian, and Radical MP).
522
 Bryce’s main argument was 
that, on this issue, and in any other, they should do ‘what the British people wish’, for the 
very reason that now they were a democracy. Under this form of government, this should be 
the very aim of politics: doing what ‘the people’ want. It formed the legitimization of his 
standpoint: he knew what the public wanted and therefore the House should listen to him. In 
his speech, he further explained his conception of ‘the new-born democracy of England’. 
Democracy was new-born: hence, it was a new situation. Bryce explained his understanding 
of it by addressing several aspects: 
 
‘If our Government were a despotism, or such an oligarchy as ruled before the Reform Act of 
1832, I could understand my right hon. Friend the Member for East Edinburgh (. Goschen) or 
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the Marquess of Salisbury making this proposition. But what are we? We are a democracy, —
a modern democracy.’ […]  
 
‘A democracy has a short memory; and although it might, in a moment of exasperation, pass 
severe laws, it would soon forget the occasion of those laws and repeal them.’ 
 
‘A democracy loves equality, and it could not bear to think, as it would be apt to think, that in 
ruling by stern laws it was oppressing the masses of the people in the interest of a landlord 
class.’  
 
‘A democracy has a tender conscience, and a dislike—perhaps too strong a dislike—of severe 
methods; it would be pained by the fear that it was doing in justice and sanctioning 
harshness.’ 
 
‘A democracy loves freedom, and it would refuse to put into the hands of a Government such 
as the Marquess of Salisbury contemplates that suspension of the Irish representation, that 
subjection of Ireland to arbitrary rule, which would be necessary for his purpose.’523 
 
From these five points, we learn that, at least for Bryce, ‘democracy’ meant a form of 
government, which was very different from ‘despotism’, but that came forth out of an 
‘oligarchy’. It knew both advantages (love for freedom, a tender conscience), and 
disadvantages (a short memory and a too strong dislike of severe methods). Whether its love 
for ‘equality’ was meant as a positive aspect remained unclear: for ‘the masses’ it was good, 
but the interests of the ‘landlord class’ were dismissed.  
Was this speech, then, meant to praise or to denounce the new, modern, British 
democracy? Bryce said this was not the point: ‘I am not arguing now whether in all this 
democracy may be right or wrong, or whether we have done foolishly or wisely in making our 
Government a democracy. With such questions I am not concerned, for what I ask the House 
is to realize the present facts and their consequences. I say that we are a democracy, and that 
we must, therefore, govern on democratic principles.’524 Presenting the ‘facts’ was thus his 
only aim, Bryce maintained. Nevertheless, this speech had an obvious political aim: defending 
Irish Home Rule. Great-Britain had become a democracy, so they should govern on 
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democratic principles: principles that disproved the further suppression of Ireland. Democracy 
had thus become both the argument and the word applied to justify political legitimacy. 
 In the same debate, Alexander Hall (Conservative)
525
 responded to Bryce’s speech: not 
to oppose him but to support his argument. Hall added one more element to his summary of 
democracy’s meaning: order. ‘Democracy loves equality; but democracy loves order.’ He 
pointed towards America as the typical example of a democratic country, an example they 
should follow. ‘And what is the consequence in America?’, he asked. ‘Why, that in that 
country everyone feels safe, and the people grow all the richer for it.’526 His evaluation of 
‘democracy’ as a form of government was very positive: it was orderly, safe, and good for the 
economy. 
 
9.3.2 What would come of the future? 
Nevertheless, the disadvantages of democracy, admitted by James Bryce, were soon taken 
over by the opposition to Home Rule: to debunk this current form of government. Edmund 
Wodehouse (Liberal)
527
, for one, quoted Bryce in a clever way, when he repeated the point 
that ‘democracy can pass severe laws in a moment of exasperation, but soon forgets the 
occasion of them, and repeals them’. This he explained ‘in other words’: ‘democracy ‘can fly 
into a passion and kick somebody, but is incapable of patient, uniform, and consistent rule’.528 
This did not sound as a prudent form of government, he suggested. What would come of it in 
the future? 
As Wodehouse said himself: ‘If that be a true description, democracy will, I fear, 
prove unfit to be lord and master of a vast Dominion embracing divers races and nationalities 
in different stages of civilization and political development; and an Empire which a people 
has made under the guidance of a great aristocracy will slide from its grasp in anarchy, 
bloodshed, and ruin.’529 Now democracy had become established, its negative effects would 
damage the country, he feared. The Empire, which was built up by the aristocracy, was now 
replaced by a democracy, which would ultimately slide into anarchy. Democracy would 
‘prove’ to be unfit, he said: no word was devoted to ways to stop it. It was now a fait 
accompli; a done deal. Only time could prove him right.  
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Wodehouse’s speech, in turn, produced its own response. It was directly after his talk 
that John Nolan (landowner, army officer, and Irish Parliamentary Party MP)
530
 stood up. He 
reacted: ‘the hon. Member who had just sat down [. Wodehouse] told them that he would not 
make a philosophical speech; but, in his [Colonel Nolan's] opinion, that speech was full of the 
hon. Gentleman's peculiar philosophy, for he told them all that democracy would do, and all 
that democracy would not do, and various other things.’531 This response attests an interesting 
point: that Wodehouse’s perspective on democracy had now become quite singular. The idea 
of ‘democracy’ as unfit and dangerous was now characterized as a ‘peculiar philosophy’: it 
was not shared by most Members of the House. While in 1866 this view had been 
conventional, now, in 1886, it had become exceptional. The value of the concept had turned 
drastically within twenty years.  
 
9.4 Mode of Persuasion: Ethos 
The foremost aim of the concept of ‘democracy’ in the 1886 debates was the legitimization of 
political representation. Members of each party defended their position in the Irish Home 
Rule debate, for example, with the reason that they truly represented ‘the people’s’ opinion. 
They stated that they knew what the public wanted, and that therefore their position on this 
topic – either for or against – was the only correct one. Hence, in the past two decades, the 
mission of the Lower House had changed decisively: no longer did the individual MP make 
up his own mind, based on what he deemed best for the nation and his constituency, but 
instead, he followed the opinion of the people, guided increasingly by the professional 
institutions of his party organization. Via both these national parties and the extended vote, 
‘the democracy’ had been able to increase its grip on politics: compelling the MP’s to divert 
their focus more on the needs and desires of ‘the people’. This process changed the 
legitimization of parliament and ultimately the value of the concept of ‘democracy’.  
This emphasis on the aim of ‘democracy’ as essentially a way to legitimize politics can 
be connected to the third mode of persuasion that Aristotle named ‘Ethos’. Ethos meant as 
much as ‘Character’ and stood for the impression that a speaker makes on his audience. This 
element is especially important in political speeches: politicians need to be credible. They 
must be trusted by their audience. As Braet emphasized it: when defending a certain measure, 
to obtain trust is more vital than to supply specific arguments. When we believe adopt a 
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viewpoint on the basis of ‘ethos’, we do so not because of a particular argument, but instead, 
because of the authority of the speaker.
532
  
 Therefore, the mode of ‘ethos’ can be compared to ‘authority argumentation’: the 
speaker emphasizes he should be trusted for the reason he is an authority on the subject. He 
knows what is best.
533
 The ‘Ethos’ element is, however, always something an audience 
attributes to a speaker; it is not something one inherently possesses. It is always an opinion. 
According to Aristotle, three aspects are continuously checked: whether the politician is 
competent, honest, and well-disposed.
534
 However, to make such an impression, the speaker 
can exercise particular manoeuvres. Especially the latter point seems most applicable to this 
study: politicians need to make clear that they are well-disposed towards the audience. They 
must trust that he, at least, shares their preferences.  
He can obtain this trust by emphasizing their commonalities, their mutual interests: 
either their material needs or certain common ideals. But most effective is, as Braet explains 
literally, to refer directly to the audience, or to explain what connects the speaker to this 
audience.
535
 This advice of ‘ethos’, as articulated first by Aristotle, was exactly implemented 
by many parliamentarians in the Irish Home Rule debates of 1886. They, too, emphasized 
their link with their supporters in the country and ‘the democracy’ at large. By building up 
their ‘ethos’, with the use of the concept of ‘democracy’, they legitimized their standpoint, 
granted themselves authority to speak, and made a credible impression on the audience 
outside the House. 
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9.5 Four key actors (1878-1886) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Samuel Laing       George Goschen 
(Liberal MP 1852-1885)     (Liberal MP 1863-1900) 
 
 
 
James Bryce       Robert Peel 
(Irish Radical MP 1880-1907)    (Conservative MP 1850-1886)  
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10. CONCLUSION 
 
The question this thesis tried to answer is why and how the concept of ‘democracy’ 
transformed from an essentially negative to a predominantly positive slogan, within the 
discourse of the House of Commons between 1866 and 1886. By analysing the changing aim 
and use of the concept in hundreds of parliamentary speeches, and by connecting these 
linguistic changes to the actual political innovations of that time, it has been possible to 
formulate a set of convincing explanations. Due to both political and linguistic processes, set 
in motion after the Second Reform Act, the aim and value of the concept changed gradually 
but significantly within two decades. Nevertheless, in this time period, ‘democracy’ always 
remained a word aimed at persuasion: therefore it is categorized in the three ‘modes of 
persuasion’, as first described by Aristotle, more than two millennia before.  
 
10.1 Pathos: Evoking emotions (1866-7) 
The first ‘mode of persuasion’ that can be related to the studied speeches was ‘pathos’: the 
incitement of emotion. During the parliamentary reform debates of 1866 and 1867, this was 
the key aim of ‘democracy’. It was a word of warning, clearly meant to arouse fear among the 
audience. Therefore, ‘democracy’ was regularly connected to related concepts, such as 
revolution, agitation, despotism and equality; and frequently opposed to British values such as 
freedom, progress, balance, and the constitution. Democracy’s exact definition, though, 
remained uncertain: it was a quite flexible concept, which meant some form of popular 
government, with either ‘wide’ or ‘universal’ suffrage. And similarly, it could mean the rule 
of the majority, the rule of the uneducated, or the rule of the unpropertied. Quite often, such 
descriptions were combined.   
There was no need to specify its definition: opposition MP’s adapted its meaning as 
they saw fit. As long as it served its aim: to prevent parliamentary reform. Therefore, the 
message was unambiguous: if this reform was accepted, then sooner or later, Great-Britain 
would end up in a democracy. This frame repeatedly caused excitement in the House, because 
for most parliamentarians, such a prospect seemed gruesome. A broad majority of the House 
of Commons believed that democracy was dangerous and undesirable. Members deemed it 
not compatible with the ancient, ‘mixed’ constitution, the class balance in society and the 
political aims of rational debate and constituency representation. This negative value, as well 
as its meaning of a distant form of government, was part of a clear consensus on the concept: 
no one, except for a few Radicals, wanted to be named a ‘democrat’.  
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10.2 Logos: Stating the facts (1868-1877)  
In the ten years after the Second Reform Act, the concept of ‘democracy’ was applied much 
less frequently: less than ten times a year, except for the year 1871, when the House of 
Commons discussed the Secret Ballot. Again, this reform was opposed with the same slogan 
of ‘democracy’: since 1867, its meaning and value had not changed. But again, the slogan 
could not succeed in preventing reform, for this bill was passed as well. Partly because of 
these repeated ‘failures’, the concept was losing its emotional force during the 1870s. Another 
reason was the fact that MP’s started to realise that all the warnings of 1866-7 had not come 
true: either they had not become a democracy, or it was not as horrific as foretold. 
Consequently, fewer parliamentarians made use of the slogan, and the few that still did 
needed to add extra suffixes such as ‘ultra’ and ‘extreme’, to still attract some attention to 
their words. Piece by piece, the slogan of ‘Democracy’ lost its validity.  
This linguistic process was stimulated by a metamorphosis of political reality. In 
particular two political innovations should be noted: organization in national parties and a 
changing composition in the Lower House. Both processes were set in motion by the Second 
Reform Act: it had broadened the electorate significantly, and added hundreds of thousands of 
new working men to the vote. This forced all the (borough) politicians to change their tactics: 
both Liberals and Conservatives now had to convince the lower classes to vote for them. No 
longer could they hate abhor democracy and criticize the working men; they should include 
them. No longer could they rely on nepotism: party organization came in its place. If they did 
not organize themselves, and did not change their discourse, they would be easily displaced at 
the next election.  
This displacement, however, occurred anyway, though gradually. The social 
composition of the House of Commons was changed considerably by the elections of 1868, 
1874, and 1880. They broke the parliamentary dominance of the landed aristocracy, which 
had lasted for centuries: upper-class nobility was replaced by the upcoming middle-class, and 
even a few working men were able to obtain a seat. In this process, the opposition MP’s of 
1866-7, who had so fiercely opposed parliamentary reform, democracy, and the working 
men’s vote, were gradually displaced by more progressive members. And although a number 
of these anti-democrats still sat in the Commons in the 1880s, they rarely used the slogan in 
the Chamber of Westminster. Democracy’s emotional force had faded, and perhaps more 
importantly, its value had become too contested. The consensus on democracy’s negative 
value was now definitely broken. 
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In the 1870s, not only the value, but also the exact meaning of the concept was 
challenged. Besides the definition of a ‘distant form of government’, an additional meaning 
emerged. Increasingly, the word was said with the prefix of the article ‘the’, to be used as a 
synonym of ‘the people’. With this definition, it could either refer to the entire nation, a 
particular part of the population, or the lower classes – dependent on the MP and the situation 
of his utterance. Although its exact meaning was flexible, one thing was certain: no longer 
was democracy a slogan, but increasingly a fact. That there existed a ‘democracy’ in the 
country was questioned by no one. It was simply a noun like any other, used to make 
assertions about states of affairs in reality. Therefore, it could be applied in debates on various 
topics, by members of each party. As part of the argumentation in speeches, it has been 
connected to Aristotle’s ‘Logos’. 
Although ‘the democracy’ could now be mentioned with neutral or positive objectives, 
in most of the 1870s, the negative value still dominated. The noun was particularly said by 
MP’s who assessed the present reality of politics, and were dissatisfied with the current 
influence of ‘the people’ on politics. Indeed, the relationship between parliament and the 
people was changing, in a time of party organization and professionalization: the gap was 
shrinking, now more working class men desired to participate in political debate. Politicians, 
in turn, maintained closer contact to their voters, by visiting working men’s clubs, local party 
meetings and national conferences. Furthermore, party organizations increased their grip on 
individual MP’s, gradually leading to tighter parliamentary discipline than before. A number 
of MP’s criticized these strategic innovations; and blamed ‘the democracy’ for the change.  
 
10.3 Ethos: Legitimizing positions (1878-1886) 
When after 1878 the House of Commons seriously contemplated the successor to the Second 
Reform Act, it became clear how essentially contested the concept of ‘democracy’ had 
become. Not only did it mean both a ‘distant form of government’ and a ‘synonym of the 
people’, but similarly, it carried both negative and positive valuations. The former meaning, 
for example, was explained first very negatively, as the rule of ‘one class’, which would ensue 
if the suffrage was extended further. This was the same narrative as in 1866-7. Now, however, 
this definition was strongly challenged by MP’s who portrayed the imminent ‘democracy’ 
very positively: for them, it meant government by the whole people. And for them, it was the 
result of a process that could not be stopped. Democracy had become inevitable. 
At the same time, the second meaning of the concept – a synonym of ‘the people’ – 
continued to exist, and was assessed, very similarly, in both negative and positive ways. 
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While some opponents of further reform stated that a Third Reform Act would only change 
parliamentary representation, others realised that the change had already come. ‘The 
democracy’ had already obtained a considerable amount of political influence. But was this a 
good thing? Again the concept of democracy formed the centre of the discussion: while 
proponents of further reform argued that the influence of the people had aided legislation, the 
opponents condemned the changes and rather saw them reversed. They stated rhetorically that 
now the ‘tyranny of the majority’ ruled the Commons. 
This negative valuation of ‘democracy’, though, was scarcely uttered in the final 
parliamentary debates of 1884-5, which directly led to the Third Reform Act. In these two 
years, the concept was again applied with its two meanings, but quite suddenly, its negative 
charge had almost completely disappeared. Only a few veteran parliamentarians, who had 
also witnessed the previous Reform Act, opposed the bill for the reason it led to a democratic 
form of government. For most MP’s, now, ‘democracy’ was said to praise reform. For them, 
it was a balanced, wise and just system; essentially the fair representation of all the people. 
After inventing this new definition, ‘democracy’ could be applied as a positive slogan as well, 
to defend reform.  
The sudden, near consensus on its positive value can be attributed to the way the Third 
Reform Act came about: the measure itself was the result of consensus politics. Liberal and 
Conservative leaders had designed the plan together, before introducing it to parliament. 
Therefore, under increased parliamentary discipline, the opposition was declined to a 
minimum. A broad majority in the Commons did not utter principal objections to the bill in 
the House, and spoke rarely of ‘democracy’ at all. Consequently, the negative slogan of 
‘democracy’ was now applied by only a few dissidents and independent MP’s. In 1884-5, it 
had lost both its impact and its supporters.  
It was only after the passing of the Third Reform Act, though, that the concept of 
‘democracy’ was truly accepted. This became clear in the parliamentary debates on Irish 
Home Rule, another important reform measure which had dominated the political agenda for 
years. In 1886, this bill was both defended and opposed with a reference to ‘the democracy’. 
Now, however, it came to mean not ‘the working classes’, but instead ‘all the people’, or the 
entire nation. Members of each party – of the Conservative, the Liberal, and the Irish 
Parliamentary Party, now stated that they represented ‘the democracy’, that they knew what 
the nation wanted, and that therefore they should vote in favour, or against. With the use of 
this concept, every party legitimized their position in the debate. Because of this aim – 
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making a credible impression – its use in 1886 has been connected to the mode of persuasion 
of ‘Ethos’.  
These Home Rule debates were dominated by the second definition of democracy – 
that included the article ‘the’, and now meant as much as ‘all the people’. For the first time, in 
fact, it was broadly acknowledged, even by its previous and latest critics, that now ‘the 
democracy’ ruled Great-Britain. When even George Goschen accepted the changed political 
conditions, and stated that now ‘the democracy’ ruled, as if it was a fact, the battle was over. 
Furthermore, the first definition, that of a ‘distant form of government’ had vanished. It was 
replaced by a new meaning: that of the current form of government! After all, if indeed ‘the 
democracy’ ruled, why would they not be a democracy? When some members said that now 
they had become a democracy, and no one stepped up to challenge it, the old negative value 
had decisively ended. Hence, in 1886, a new consensus ended the many years of conceptual 
polarization. 
 
10.4 The Sea Change of Democracy 
If we overlook the entire period, we learn that ‘democracy’ made a complete volte-face within 
only twenty years, both in meaning and in value. While in 1866 the concept essentially meant 
a distant form of government; the popular rule of one class; in 1886 it was mostly used as ‘the 
democracy’, referring to all ‘the people’, or sometimes the ‘nation’. This change reflected an 
underlying shift in meaning; whereas first ‘democracy’ essentially meant majority rule, in the 
end, it primarily meant the expression of the will of the people. While the former was valued 
negatively in 1866, the latter was cheered in 1886. At the same time as this concept changed, 
the meaning of the adjacent concept of ‘the people’ shifted too, from the ‘working classes’ to 
‘the nation’. Hence, after parliamentary reforms broadened the electorate, the meaning of ‘the 
people’ was broadened as well.    
Furthermore, at the end of our period, it was regularly stated that ‘democracy’ was the 
name of the current form of government, instead of something of the distant or imminent 
future. Now ‘the democracy’ ruled they had become a ‘democracy’. This latter shift in 
meaning was made possible by a prior shift in valuation: while in 1866 ‘democracy’ was 
looked at with contempt, and desired by no one; during the 1870s, the new influence of the 
people on politics was (though criticized) increasingly acknowledged. And after the Third 
Reform Act consolidated the innovation, the inclusion of the people was fully accepted. 
Therefore, in 1886, the triumph of ‘democracy’ could be proudly proclaimed.  
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The essential change occurring in these twenty years should thus be located in the 
increased influence of ‘the people’ on politics. This process was started, as is often explained, 
‘by accident’, when the Second Reform Act was passed in 1867. It set three processes in 
motion: the electorate was widened, the composition of parliament changed, and their 
interrelationship was redefined. These innovations changed the ‘rules’ of politics: middle- and 
lower classes were for the first time included into politics, which forced parliamentarians to 
adapt their discourse: the words they chose. Or, rather, the value and meaning they attached to 
those words. In the post-1867 reality, most MP’s could no longer abhor democracy and ignore 
the working men. Instead, both old and new parliamentarians embraced ‘the democracy’. 
They invented a new definition, gave democracy a positive value, and changed the aim and 
legitimization of politics. 
The process towards becoming a democracy thus started in 1867, after the 
‘accidentally’ broad extension of the Second Reform Act, exactly as the critics had foretold. 
The House of Commons moved into a democratic direction, but only because parliament’s 
own definition of it changed. Interestingly, this idea of a ‘democratic direction’, so often 
proclaimed in these twenty years, was connected to one foremost metaphor: the image of the 
sea. To be more specific: the metaphor of a democratic ‘wave’ or ‘tide’, which would hit 
Britain after the ‘floodgates’ were to be opened in 1867. This and related metaphors were 
repeatedly uttered in the twenty years of parliamentary reform debates, as we have seen. 
The parliamentarians’ metaphor bears a striking correlation to the image of the ‘sea-
change’, as noted by Shakespeare in ‘The Tempest’. As in the story, the Duke, Antonio, was 
surprised by a storm, and had supposedly drowned, quite similarly was Great-Britain hit by 
the ‘democracy’ in 1867: no one had wanted it: it would supposedly end the ancient 
constitution. The turnover was unanticipated. Thereafter, a gradual process of broad change 
was started. While the Duke’s body underwent a full transformation – from bones into coral, 
and eyes into pearls – quite similarly did Britain’s political institutions evolve: the 
relationship between parliamentarians and the people was revised. It was a full 
metamorphosis: but while the substance (democratic values, composition of MP’s) was 
replaced, the body’s (constitutional) form was retained.  
The Duke in ‘The Tempest’ did not want his death at sea, and similarly, the 
parliamentarians did not want democracy at first. Interestingly, Robert Cecil had literally 
made the same comparison himself, when he said that ‘democracy like death, gives back 
nothing’. But in the end – as Ariel, the spirit said – this was for the best. The song was meant 
to comfort the Duke. Over time, Antonio’s body would change ‘beyond recognition’: it would 
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become more beautiful, and would take on a resemblance to the new surroundings. A similar 
process occurred in post-1867 British politics: after the democratic innovations of suffrage 
extension, the parliament indeed came to resemble its surroundings – British society – better. 
Due to national party organization and professionalization, and a changing social composition 
in the House, the supposedly ‘first’ democratic parliament of 1885 better represented ‘the 
people’ than before. ‘Democracy’ was now valuated as an improved form of rule. Hence, the 
foundation of British democracy was truly a ‘sea-change’.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Table 1: Frequency of ‘democracy’ 
 
Year 
Debates in 
which 
‘democracy’ 
occurred 
Total 
frequency of 
‘democracy’ 
Meaning A: 
Form of 
government 
Meaning B: 
Synonym of 
‘the people’ 
Percentage 
Meaning B 
1866 66 195 184 11 5,6 
1867 51 120 116 4 3,3 
1868 7 7 6 1 14,3 
1869 7 9 3 6 66,7 
1870 8 8 4 4 50,0 
1871 17 42 31 11 26,2 
1872 7 9 5 4 44,4 
1873 2 2 2 0 0,0 
1874 6 7 5 2 28,6 
1875 7 8 4 4 50,0 
1876 5 6 5 1 16,7 
1877 2 2 2 0 0,0 
1878 20 29 20 9 31,0 
1879 13 19 16 3 15,8 
1880 5 5 4 1 20,0 
1881 7 11 3 8 72,7 
1882 26 34 14 20 58,8 
1883 19 24 17 7 29,2 
1884 33 58 25 33 56,9 
1885 18 26 10 16 61,5 
1886 79 155 22 133 85,8 
 
Source: Hansard Records 1803-2005 (http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/) 
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Table 2: Factsheet of quoted Members of Parliament 
Name Party Birth Death 
In 
Commons 
Out 
Commons 
Alexander Baillie 
Cochrane  
Liberal-Conservative 1816 1890 1841 1880 
Alexander Beresford 
Hope 
Independent 1820 1887 1841 1887 
Alexander Hall Conservative 1838 1919 1874 1892 
Arthur Arnold  Radical 1833 1902 1880 1885 
Arthur Kavanagh Conservative 1831 1889 1866 1880 
Arthur 
Winterbotham 
Liberal 1838 1892 1885 1892 
Austen Layard Liberal 1817 1894 1852 1870 
Benjamin Disraeli Conservative 1804 1881 1837 1876 
Charles Adderley  Conservative 1814 1905 1841 1878 
Charles Fenwick Liberal 1850 1918 1885 1918 
Charles Legard Conservative 1846 1901 1874 1880 
Charles Neate  Conservative Liberal 1806 1879 1857 1868 
Charles Newdegate Conservative 1816 1887 1843 1885 
Charles York Conservative 1799 1873 1865 1873 
Charles Russell Conservative 1826 1883 1865 1882 
Charles Villiers Liberal Tory 1802 1898 1835 1898 
Charles Warton Conservative 1832 1900 1880 1885 
Christopher Griffith  Unknown 1804 1876 1857 1868 
Claud Hamilton Conservative 1843 1925 1865 1918 
Donald Currie Liberal 1925 1909 1880 1900 
Edmond Wodehouse Liberal 1835 1914 1880 1906 
Edward Bulwer Conservative 1805 1873 1832 1866 
Edward Craufurd Radical Irish 1816 1887 1852 1874 
Edward Horsman Moderate Liberal 1807 1876 1836 1876 
Edward Knatchbull-
Hugessen 
Liberal 1829 1874 1857 1880 
Edward Leatham  Liberal 1828 1900 1859 1886 
Edward Macnaghten  Conservative 1830 1913 1880 1887 
Francis Crossley Liberal 1817 1872 1852 1872 
Frederick Corrance Conservative 1822 1906 1867 1874 
Frederick Inderwick Liberal 1836 1904 1880 1885 
Gathorne Hardy Conservative 1814 1906 1856 1878 
George Bowyer Liberal but 1811 1883 1852 1880 
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independent-minded 
George Dixon Liberal 1820 1898 1867 1898 
George Goschen Liberal 1831 1907 1863 1900 
George Morgan Liberal 1826 1897 1868 1897 
George Russell Liberal / Radical 1853 1918 1880 1895 
Henry Fawcett Liberal 1833 1884 1865 1884 
Henry Labouchere Radical 1831 1912 1865 1906 
Henry Selwin Conservative 1826 1902 1865 1892 
James Stanhope Conservative 1821 1904 1852 1868 
James Bryce Liberal / Radical 1838 1922 1880 1907 
James O'Brien 
Irish Parliamentary 
Party 
1828 1905 1885 1905 
James Picton Liberal / Radical 1832 1910 1884 1894 
James Whiteside Conservative 1804 1876 1851 1866 
Jesse Collings Radical 1831 1920 1880 1918 
John Ball Conservative 1815 1898 1868 1875 
John Coleridge  Liberal 1820 1894 1865 1873 
John Lubbock Liberal 1834 1913 1870 1900 
John Maguire Liberal 1815 1872 1852 1872 
John Nolan 
Irish Parliamentary 
Party 
1838 1912 1872 1906 
John O'Connor 
Power 
Irish Parliamentary 
Party 
1846 1919 1874 1885 
John Pakington Conservative 1799 1880 1837 1874 
John Stuart Mill Liberal 1806 1873 1865 1868 
Leonard Courtney Radical 1832 1918 1876 1900 
Matthew Marsh Liberal Whig 1810 1881 1857 1868 
Michael Hicks-
Beach  
Conservative 1837 1916 1864 1906 
Nathaniel Lambert  Liberal 1811 1882 1868 1880 
Peter Rylands 
Radical 
(independent) 
1820 1887 1868 1887 
Ralph Bernal 
Osborne 
Advanced Liberal / 
Radical  
1811 1882 1841 1874 
Robert Cecil Conservative 1830 1903 1853 1868 
Robert Hanbury  Conservative 1845 1903 1878 1903 
Robert Lowe Liberal 1811 1892 1852 1880 
Robert Montagu Conservative 1825 1902 1859 1880 
Robert Peel Liberal Conservative 1822 1895 1850 1886 
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Sources: Hansard People (http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/people) and Oxford 
Dictionary of National Biography (http://www.oxforddnb.com.ezproxy.leidenuniv.nl:2048) 
 
Table 3: Social composition of the House of Commons (1865-1885) 
 
Background / Profession 1865 1868 1874 1880 
Aristocrats primarily concerned with land 437 410 382 325 
Businessmen 144 162 171 194 
Lawyers 56 57 69 83 
Other professionals 20 27 24 44 
Tenant farmers 1 2 4 3 
Workingmen 0 0 2 3 
Totals  658 658 652 652 
 
Source: W.H. Whiteley, ‘The Social Composition of the British House of Commons, 1865-
1885’ in: Historical papers / Communications historiques Vol 5 No 1 (1970) 172. 
  
Rowland 
Blennerhassett  
Liberal 1839 1909 1865 1885 
Samuel Laing Liberal 1812 1897 1852 1885 
Stanley Leighton Conservative 1837 1901 1876 1901 
Stephen Williamson Liberal 1827 1903 1880 1895 
Thomas O'Connor Irish Nationalist 1848 1929 1880 1929 
Walter Meller  Unknown 1819 1886 1865 1869 
William Baxter Liberal 1825 1890 1855 1885 
William Charley Conservative 1833 1904 1868 1880 
William Forster Liberal 1818 1886 1861 1886 
William Gladstone Liberal 1809 1898 1832 1886 
William Johnston  Radical Irish 1829 1902 1868 1902 
William Willis Liberal 1835 1911 1880 1885 
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Graph 1: Percentage of enfranchised men in Great-Britain (1831-1886) 
 
Source: C. Cook, The Routledge Companion to Britain in the Nineteenth Century (London 
2005) 61. 
 
Graph 2: Number of debates in which ‘democracy’ occurred in the House of Commons 
(1866-1886) 
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Graph 3: Total frequency of ‘democracy’ in the House of Commons (1866-1886) 
 
Graph 4: Percentages of the two meanings of ‘democracy’ in the House of Commons 
(1866-1886) 
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